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Abstract 
 
At the heart of every environmental dilemma, there are people engaged in the conflict 
between what is good for the individual and what is good for the group. These dilemmas 
include public goods – like clean air, biodiversity, and a stable climate – that, regardless of who 
provides the public good and how much, are shared equally. Public goods are most often 
provided through mandates, less often through price-based incentives and charitable giving. 
Recently, we have begun to see innovations in the energy sector that leverage behavioral 
research to motivate individuals to support renewable energy and conserve electricity.  
In support of those innovations, this research advances our understanding of voluntary 
public goods provision by individuals. How? In an extensive public good experiment, I weave 
together three separate threads of behavioral research to achieve the following objectives: 1) I 
identified four differently motivated, behavior-based cooperative types – non-cooperators 
(19%), conditional cooperators (51%), high cooperators (7%), and a previously unclassified 
group of low cooperators (23%). 2) I established that non-cooperators were not influenced by 
frame, but conditional, low, and high cooperators were; and the different dimensions of 
framing design yielded different behavioral responses. Non-neutral language yielded lower 
cooperation among conditional and low cooperators when they were giving to the public good. 
Taking instead of giving yielded lower cooperation among low cooperators when neutral 
language was employed. 3) I also showed that frames indirectly influenced cooperation through 
beliefs about others’ cooperation. For conditional cooperators, evidence of a beliefs pathway 
was unequivocal, but not at all present for non-cooperators and mixed for low and high 
cooperators. 
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Chapter 1 
Heterogeneous Cooperation and Motivation in a Public Good Dilemma 
 
Abstract: We know from decades of research that people cooperate in social dilemmas 
and cooperation varies considerably. These findings have led researchers to categorize 
individuals into cooperative types, often preconceived categories that conflate behavior 
and motives, ignore the possible effects of framing, and do not reliably predict behavior 
in repeated public good dilemmas. Without pre-specifying the number or nature of 
cooperative types, I assessed cooperative type via an incentivized, one-shot public good 
experiment in which four different sets of participants were subject to four different 
frames. I also separately assessed participants’ motives via responses reported in a 
questionnaire. Analyses revealed four, differently motivated, behavior-based 
cooperative types and no framing effects. Some individuals did not cooperate (19%), 
many approximately matched the cooperation of others (51%), and a few consistently 
cooperated at relatively high levels (7%). In addition, a relatively large and previously 
unclassified group of individuals consistently cooperated at low but non-trivial levels 
(23%). At the same time, motives varied considerably and systematically according to 
cooperative type. Specifically, non-cooperators and low cooperators were similarly self-
interested and significantly more self-interested than conditional and high cooperators. 
In other regards, non-cooperators were significantly less motivated by feelings of 
obligation and perceptions of others’ actions than low, conditional, and high 
cooperators. Low cooperators also were significantly less motivated by feelings of 
obligation than conditional and high cooperators. Both cooperative type and motives 
were not sensitive to frame.
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1 Introduction 
At the heart of every social dilemma is a conflict between individual and group interests. 
Incentivized public good experiments exploit that conflict to reveal differences in decision-
making when real monetary payoffs are at stake, individuals’ earnings depend on others’ 
decisions, and others’ decisions are unknown. These properties of public good experiments are 
at the core of the real-world public good dilemmas that motivate this study – dilemmas such as 
climate stability, public parks, biodiversity, water and air quality, public schools, defense, and 
disaster relief. Public goods are created and maintained through voluntary cooperation, which 
is the focus of this research, and through public policy, which can be informed by studies like 
this one.1  
What are the most robust findings from public good experiments? First, we know that 
behavior in social dilemma experiments deviates from rational actor predictions.2 Second, every 
dilemma experiment shows that behavior differs dramatically among individuals. Third, we 
know that individuals behave differently when decisions are presented differently. In brief, 
many people appear to be motivated by something other than self-interest, behavior among 
individuals is heterogeneous, and framing influences behavior. This research integrates these 
separate strands and addresses the following questions: What is the appropriate typology of 
behavior-based and statistically distinct types of decision-makers in a public good dilemma? 
How are different types of decision-makers differently motivated? Are types and motives 
frame-dependent?  
The novelty of this research lies in its experimental design and methodology, as well as 
its findings. This study empirically establishes behavioral types based on study participants’ 
decisions, assesses participants’ motives via questionnaire response, identifies relationships 
                                                     
1 For example, many environmental goods are public goods suffer chronic under-provision. Environmental policies 
are dominated by mandatory standards (a.k.a. “command and control” regulations) plus relatively few price-based 
policies (e.g., taxes and markets). Very few policies target individuals and leverage social interactions. OPOWER’s 
program of injunctive and descriptive norms among electric utility customers is a promising example of a 
nontraditional energy conservation program “informed by insights from behavioral science” (Allcott, 2011). 
2 Theoretically, a rational actor is an individual who is concerned exclusively with his or her own well-being, makes 
choices that best satisfy his or her preferences, and forms correct beliefs about the world (Camerer & Fehr, 2006). 
This definition typically excludes preferences over others’ actions or outcomes. A rational actor would not 
cooperate in a linear public good dilemma. 
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between behavioral types and motives; and test for framing effects. Specifically, the 
experiment employed two instruments to separately assess type and motives, a one-shot public 
good dilemma3 and an original questionnaire. Each participant was subject to one of four 
strategically equivalent but qualitatively different frames, so that the effects of frame could be 
captured. 4 Empirical methods included the first application of group-based trajectory modeling 
(GBTM) to social dilemma experiments, exploratory factor analysis (EFA), and nonparametric 
tests.  
In contrast to previous studies (e.g., Kurzban & Houser, 2005; Liebrand 1984; Offerman, 
Sonnemans, & Schram, 1996; Park 2000; Parks, 1994; Sonnemans, Schram, & Offerman, 1998), 
this study does not fit individuals into preconceived categories, a practice that a priori limits full 
representation of heterogeneity. Instead, GBTM allows cooperative types to emerge from 
behavioral data, without pre-specifying the number or nature of each type. Each cooperative 
type represented a group of individuals, within which behavior was similar and between which 
behavior was distinct. This study also did not define cooperative type in terms of motives 
explicitly – as in Liebrand (1984), Offerman et al. (1996), and Sonnemans et al. (1998) – or 
implicitly – as in Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), and  
Kurzban & Houser (2005). Why? Behavior is observable; motives are not. In addition, previous 
research suggests that motives-based typing schemes do not reliably predict behavior in public 
good experiments (c.f., Park, 2000; Parks 1994; Sonnemans et al., 1998), but previous behavior 
does (e.g. Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Kurzban & Houser, 2005). Thus, instead of presuming 
or inferring motives, this study assessed motives retrospectively via EFA of questionnaire 
responses. Non-parametric tests revealed systematic differences in motives among cooperative 
types. 
This study revealed four, differently motivated, behavior-based cooperative types and 
no framing effects. As in other experiments, some individuals did not cooperate (19%), many 
approximately matched the cooperation of others (51%), and a few consistently cooperated at 
                                                     
3 This incentivized, two-stage, one-shot public good dilemma was based on Fischbacher & Gächter’s (2010) P-
experiment and Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr’s (2001) “strategy-method.”  
4 Frame is defined as both the “formulation to which decision makers are exposed” and “the interpretation that 
they construct for themselves” (Dufwenberg et al., 2011 citing Kahneman, 2000, p. xiv). In this paper, “frame” 
refers only to the first definition. 
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relatively high levels (7%). In addition, a relatively large and previously unclassified group of 
cooperators consistently cooperated at low, but non-trivial levels (23%).  
Overall, self-reported reactions to the experiment varied considerably and also 
systematically according to type. Generally, motives of non-cooperators differed dramatically 
from all three types of cooperators (i.e., low cooperators, conditional cooperators, and high 
cooperators), and cooperators differed in the level and ways in which they were other-
regarding. Interestingly, however, low-level cooperators were similar to non-cooperators with 
regard to self-interest, but otherwise were more strongly motivated by feelings of obligation 
and perceptions of others’ actions than non-cooperators. Low cooperators also distinguished 
themselves from conditional and high cooperators as significantly more self-interested and less 
motivated by feelings of obligation. Lastly, none of the results were sensitive to the frames 
imposed, suggesting that cooperative type and motives could be attributed to individuals, not 
to frame. 
This paper is the first in a series of three papers all of which are based on a multi-part 
public good experiment. The experiment included a one-shot public good dilemma, a repeated 
public good dilemma, and a questionnaire. It was designed to assess and classify heterogeneity 
in behavior and motives among decision-makers (paper 1), examine how framing effects differ 
for different types of decision-makers (paper 2), parse the role of reference dependence and 
the language in framing effects (paper 2), and examine the channel/mechanism through which 
frames operate and how those channels differ for different types of decision-makers (paper 3). 
In this paper, I address the first of these four objectives through analyses of participants’ 
decisions in the one-shot game and responses to the questionnaire. I analyze data from the 
repeated dilemma in the subsequent two papers.5 
In the remaining sections, I first provide background related to four intersecting streams 
of research. Second, I describe experimental design and statistical analyses, both of which 
contain novel elements. Then, I present results and conclude with a discussion of next steps. 
  
                                                     
5 These three papers make-up the three chapters of this dissertation. In paper 1, papers 2 and 3 are cited as 
Jackman (2016b) and Jackman (2016a), respectively. 
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2 Background 
Social dilemma research is a multidisciplinary pursuit, and the laboratory experiment is a 
foundational tool used to understand decision-making. This research derives primarily from 
experimental economics, behavioral economics, and social psychology with specific lines of 
inquiry into public goods experiments, social preferences, heterogeneity, and framing. 
 
2.1 Public Good Experiments 
Public good experiments are simultaneous games with more than two players, and are 
intended to reproduce the essential attributes of pure public goods. Public goods are non-
excludable, meaning that everyone has access to the good, and they are non-rival, meaning 
that consumption of the good by one individual does not affect others’ consumption. 
Cooperation consists of providing or maintaining the public good. In the standard experiment 
with linear payoffs (𝑝𝑖), every individual (𝑖) decides how to distribute her or his personal 
endowment (𝑤𝑖) between herself or himself and the group. Allocations to the group (𝑔𝑖) 
constitute cooperation and are increased by a positive factor, 𝑘, and then divided among 𝑛 
participants. The result is a marginal per capita return (MPCR) of 𝛾 = 𝑘 𝑛⁄ . Payoffs are typically 
given by the following: 
 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛾 ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1  (1) 
Under the usual assumptions of rational choice theory, the dominant strategy in a public good 
game with linear payoffs is to allocate nothing to the group even though everyone is better off 
if everyone cooperates. This is clearly not what we observe in public good experiments nor in 
real world situations such as donations to the Red Cross, purchases of carbon offsets, or 
voluntary participation in renewable electricity programs where contributions to the public 
good are common.6  
 
  
                                                     
6 See Chauduri (2011) for a recent, selective survey of laboratory public good experiments and Ledyard (1995) for 
an older and exhaustive review of public good experiments. 
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2.2. Prosocial Behaviors and Social Preferences 
Decades of experimental evidence show that standard rationality assumptions do not 
uniformly apply to everyone.7 Some people do not cooperate and are assumed to be motivated 
by self-interest. However, some people do cooperate, and levels of cooperation differ 
significantly across individuals. These prosocial behaviors are often attributed to preferences 
over the actions and outcomes of others, known as other-regarding or social preferences. Other 
regarding preferences include preferences for being kind or doing good such as altruism 
(Andreoni & Miller, 2002; Fehr & Rockenback, 2004), impure altruism and “warm glow” 
(Andreoni, 1990, 1995), and strong reciprocity (Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003); preferences 
over own-other comparisons of actions and outcomes such as reciprocity, fairness, and equity 
(Charness & Rabin, 2002; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Henrich & Henrich 2007); preferences related 
to harming others or foregoing opportunities to help others (Andreoni, 1995; Park, 2000; 
Sonnemans et al. , 1998; Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 1999); and preferences over prosocial 
behaviors or obligations such as prevention of a “public bad” (Sonnemans et al., 1998) and guilt 
aversion (Dufwenberg, Gächter, & Hennig-Schmidt, 2011). In this research, I employ a 
questionnaire designed to expose social preferences and assess motives retrospectively. I also 
examine the relationships between motives and different types of decision-makers. 
 
2.3. Heterogeneity and Typing Strategies 
Together, public goods and social preferences research demonstrates that there are 
different types of decision makers in public good dilemmas who appear to be differently 
motivated (Chaudhuri, 2011). The practice of classifying decision-makers is decades old, and 
cooperative types have been assessed via a variety of ways. I focus on two opposing 
approaches that appear to have the most traction in social dilemma research in both social 
                                                     
7 “Non-standard” contrasts with standard economic assumptions of self-interest and rationality wherein 
individuals are concerned exclusively with their own well-being, make choices that best satisfy their preferences, 
and form correct beliefs about the world (Camerer & Fehr 2006). Well-being in the context of public good 
dilemmas relates to tangible, often monetary payoffs and excludes any sort of social benefit or utility one might 
experience from helping others. Della Vigna (2009) provides an excellent and relatively brief summary of the 
literature on “non-standard” preferences, decision rules, and beliefs at the intersection of economics and 
psychology. Also see Camerer, Lowenstein, & Rabin (2004), Diamond & Vartiainen (2007), Laibson & Zeckhauser 
(1998), and Rabin (2002).  
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psychology and experimental economics – a motives-based approach and a behavior-based 
approach.  
The classification strategy most commonly implemented in motives-based approaches is 
the Decomposed Game in which study participants choose between a series of hypothetical 
own and other outcomes that are then translated into predetermined categories corresponding 
to social motives, social values, or value orientation. For example, Liebrand (1984) defined 
“social motives” to be “the preferences of actors for specific outcome distributions” and 
classified individuals using the Decomposed Game into discrete, predefined types. Other 
researchers similarly defined social values (Parks, 1994) and value orientation (Offerman et al., 
1996; Park 2000; Sonnemans et al., 1998) and assessed individuals’ types. Results were similar 
across studies. Generally, there were larger groups of cooperators, individualists, and 
competitive types, and much smaller groups of altruists and aggressive types.8  
Behavior-based approaches group individuals into types based on similarities in 
behavior in an actual dilemma (e.g., Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010; Fischbacher et al., 2001; and 
Kurzban & Houser, 2005). For example, Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) and Fischbacher et al. 
(2001) used an incentivized, two-stage, one-shot public good dilemma in which individuals 
report how much they would cooperate in response to all possible average levels of 
cooperation. Types were assessed and assigned via inspection of cooperation plotted against 
others’ cooperation.9 Using a repeated public good dilemma and a “statistical-type 
classification algoritm,” Kurzban and Houser (2005) regressed each individual’s cooperation on 
the average level of cooperation observed in the previous round for each individual. They 
assigned individuals to types based on the whether the regression lay everywhere above, 
everywhere below, or crossed the horizontal line at half of the initial endowment.10 These and 
                                                     
8 Using the Decomposed Game, Liebrand (1984) identified 4% altruists, 53% cooperators, 32% individualists, and 
11% competitive; Parks (1994) found 9% altruists, 55% cooperators, 15% individualists, and 21% competitive; 
Offerman et al. (1996) found 27% cooperators, 65% individualists, 4% competitive, 1% aggressive, and 3% random; 
and Park (2000) classified 32% as cooperative, 65.5% as individualists, 0.5% as competitive, and 2% random.  
9 Using a two-stage, one-shot public good game, Fischbacher et al. (2001) found 50% conditional cooperators, 30% 
free-riders, 14% triangle cooperators, and 6% unclassifiable individuals; and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) found 
55% conditional cooperators, 23% free-riders, 12% triangle cooperators, and 10% unclassifiable individuals.  
10 Using a repeated public good game and predetermined types, Kurzban and Houser (2005) found 13% 
cooperators, 20% free-riders, and 63% reciprocators. Three individuals (4%) were not classified. 
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other studies typically find that the majority of participants in public good experiments are 
conditional cooperators (Chaudhuri, 2011). “Free-riders” also make up a relatively large group, 
with smaller numbers of individuals who cooperate at high levels. Importantly, these typing 
strategies can leave non-negligible numbers of individuals “unclassified.”  
Regardless of approach, most methods for classifying decision makers attempt to fit 
individuals into predetermined categories or categories explicitly or implicitly based on 
presumed motives. As a result, some individuals are left unclassified or incorrectly classified. 
For example, Offerman et al. (1996) classified 3% of study participants as random. Park (2000) 
classified 2% of subjects as random. 6% of study participants were unclassifiable in Fischbacher 
et al. (2001), 10% in Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), and 4% in Kurzban and Houser (2005). 
Two additional challenges for these typing schemes – motives-based and behavior-
based – are that they do not correlate with each other and may not predict behavior in public 
good dilemmas.11 Recognizing these challenges, Burlando and Guala (2005) implemented four 
different classification methods to obtain a “data-driven classification” of subject heterogeneity 
plus self-reported, post-hoc explanations for behavior. However, they also imposed a typology 
of cooperative types in advance, and as a result, 15% of their study participants were deemed 
“unclassifiable,”12 thus revealing a third challenge. Even when motives-based and behavior-
based approaches are simultaneously implemented, specifying categories of decision-makers in 
advance can inhibit a complete representation of differences in behavior and motives among 
decision-makers in public good dilemmas. 
In this research, I implement group based trajectory modeling (GBTM described in 
Section 3.3.1) to classify individuals into behavior-based types without pre-specifying types or 
                                                     
11 More specifically, the Decomposed Game yields ambiguous results with regard to its ability to predict 
cooperation in a public good dilemma (Park, 2000; Parks, 1994; Sonnemans et al., 1998). Kurzban and Houser 
(2005) showed that “ the decisions subjects made in games used for classification purposes predict well the 
decisions made in games played afterward.” However, they were more focused on how well group composition 
predicted group outcomes, which turned out to be quite well. Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) assessed discrete 
types as in Fischbacher et al. (2001), but did not use discrete types to predict behavior in the subsequent repeated 
dilemma. Instead, they predicted cooperation for every individual based on a regression of conditional responses 
from the one-shot dilemma, which proved to be a significant but not perfect predictor of cooperation in the 
repeated dilemma.  
12 Burlando and Guala (2005) identified 32% free-riders, 35% reciprocators, 18% cooperators, and 15% 
unclassifiable. 
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motives. GBTM assumes that the behavior of interest varies continuously and widely with the 
goal of summarizing the key features of the data in a representative and parsimonious way 
(Nagin, 2005, pp. 56-57). I separately assess motives and the relationship between cooperative 
types and motives.13 
 
2.4 Framing 
Lastly, all of these and other typing strategies could be sensitive to the way the decision 
is presented, and none account for possible framing effects. Whether imposed externally or 
conceived by the decision-maker, frames can subtly or profoundly influence outcomes (e.g., 
Andreoni, 1995; Bougherara, Denant-Boemont, & Mascelet, 2011; Brewer & Kramer, 1986; 
Cookson, 2000; Cubitt, Drouvelis, & Gächter, 2011; Dufwenberg et al., 2011; Ellingsen, 
Johannesson, Mollerstrom, & Munkhammer, 2012; Fleishman, 1988; Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & 
Lauriola, 2002; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998; Park 2000; Rutte, Wilke, & Messick, 1987; 
Sonnemans et al., 1998; Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 1999). Arguably, frame is inextricably implicit 
in every public good experiment, even when neutral framing is an explicit goal. Therefore, the 
likelihood of belonging to a cooperative type could depend not only on what information is 
presented to decision-makers but also on how information is presented. Thus, the task of 
developing a fully representative typology of cooperative types and a classification strategy that 
is unbounded by preconceived pairings of behavior and motives could be further confounded 
by framing effects. This research addresses those concerns in three ways: framing is included in 
the experimental design, type is assessed via decisions that were not expected to be influenced 
by frame, and the relationships between cooperative type and frame are examined. 
In summary, no method or combination of methods is known to provide an 
independent and objective measure of cooperative type in public good dilemmas. Despite the 
enormous body of research regarding public good dilemmas, social preferences, heterogeneity, 
and framing, there are important unanswered questions. What is an appropriate typology of 
cooperative types that is conceptually tractable and fully representative of behaviors in public 
                                                     
13 In the second paper in this series, I demonstrate that cooperative type predicts cooperation in a repeated public 
good dilemma. 
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good dilemmas? How are different cooperative types differently motivated? Can we assess 
cooperative type as an inherent characteristic of the individual and not an artifact of framing? 
This research addresses those questions. 
 
3 Methods 
The primary objectives of this study were to 1) develop a typology of behavior-based 
cooperative types that is conceptually and computationally tractable and fully representative of 
behavior in public good experiments, 2) identify motives underlying the differences in behavior 
among cooperative types, and 3) demonstrate that cooperative types and motives, as assessed 
here, are an attribute of the individual, not of the decision frame to which the individual was 
subject. 
To those ends, this paper reports the results of an incentivized, one-shot public good 
dilemma and a questionnaire that make up two components of the public dilemma experiment 
illustrated in Figure 1.1. The one-shot public good dilemma and the questionnaire were 
intended to tease apart subject heterogeneity without sensitivity to framing, the first via 
behavior and the second via motives. For each participant, the one-shot dilemma measured 
two types of decisions, an unconditional decision and 21 decisions conditioned on the average 
behavior of others. The 23 item questionnaire solicited individuals’ reactions to the experiment 
and collected demographic information (i.e., self-reported age, gender, economics training, and 
prior experience with a “study like this one”). The experiment was programmed and conducted 
using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) in the School of Information experimental 
laboratory at the University of Michigan. 
Modeling and analyses consisted of five components. First, I confirmed that cooperation 
in the one-shot public good game was consistent with other public good experiments and 
tested for associations between frame and self-reported age, gender, economics training, and 
prior experience with a “study like this one.” Second, using the first application of group-based 
trajectory modeling (GBTM) to social dilemma behavior, I identified four cooperative types 
based solely on behavior. Third, I tested for a relationship between questionnaire responses 
and cooperative types. Then, I applied exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to the questionnaire 
11 
 
data to elicit underlying motives and evaluated relationships between motives and cooperative 
types. Finally, I tested the one-shot public good game and the questionnaire for framing effects.  
In the following, I describe the study participants, experiment, and core analytical 
methods used, namely GBTM, EFA, and Kruskal-Wallis and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests. In all 
of my analyses, I used an alpha level 0.05 for all statistical tests and describe results with p-
values less than 0.05 as “statistically significant.” I use the phrases “highly significant” for p-
values less than 0.01, “weakly significant” for p-values between 0.05 and 0.1, and “marginally 
significant” for p-values close to but greater than 0.1. All analyses for this paper were 
generated using SAS® software.14 
 
3.1 Study Population 
Experimental subjects were recruited from an existing pool of potential participants 
using the School of Information On-line Recruitment System for Experimental Economics 
(ORSEE) at the University of Michigan. Prospective participants were invited via email to 
participate in a “decision-making experiment” for which they would receive “$5 compensation 
for showing up” and “approximately $20 (including show-up compensation)” if they completed 
the experiment. Two hundred and fifty-six adults participated. Per Table 1.1, the average age of 
participants was 20.5 (𝑁 = 252, 𝑆𝐷 = 4.16), 54 percent were women, 37 percent reported 
having no training in economics, and 38 percent of participants reported having no previous 
experience with “a study like this one.”  
I ran 16 sessions, four sessions for each of four experimental treatments, called frames 
and described in Section 3.2.2. Each session included 16 people, and each participant took part 
in only one session. Experimental treatments were assigned with the expectation that 
subpopulations would be similar. As reported in Table 1.1, participants’ age (𝐹(3, 𝑁 = 252) =
1.04, 𝑝 = 0.3745) and training in economics (𝑋2 (3, 𝑁 = 251) = 0.68, 𝑝 = 0.8784) did not 
differ significantly across the four frames, but there was a marginal association between gender 
                                                     
14 Version 9.4 for Windows, Copyright © 2002-2012 by SAS Institute Inc. SAS and all other SAS Institute Inc. 
product or service names are registered trademarks or trademarks of SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA. 
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and frame (𝑋2 (3, 𝑁 = 256) = 6.09, 𝑝 = 0.1073) and a highly significant association between 
experience and frame (𝑋2 (3, 𝑁 = 245) = 13.35, 𝑝 = 0.0039).15 
 
3.2 The Experiment 
This study focuses on a two-stage, one-shot public good dilemma and a questionnaire 
that were part of an experiment consisting of five parts – instructions, practice questions, one-
shot public good dilemma, repeated public good dilemma, and questionnaire – illustrated in 
Figure 1.1 and fully documented in the Appendix. Frames were imposed on every part of the 
experiment with the exception of the questionnaire.  
Each of the 16 sessions of the experiment commenced when recruits arrived at the 
waiting room. The first 16 recruits to arrive participated. Additional recruits were paid $5 for 
showing up and were then dismissed. Study participants were then invited into the computer 
laboratory where each individual chose to sit at one of 16 desktop computers separated by 
partitions. Participants were provided with written, frame-specific instructions stating that “the 
experiment consist[ed] of a series of decision situations” and explaining the decision situation 
and payoffs (see the Appendix). Instructions were also read aloud. To further ensure 
participants understood the decision situation and before the experiment could proceed, all 
participants were required to answer ten practice questions correctly.  
Then the one-shot public good dilemma and the repeated public good dilemma 
proceeded in randomly re-matched groups of four. The public good decisions in the one-shot 
and repeated dilemmas were identical in payoffs but structured differently. The one-shot 
dilemma consisted of two-stages with only one payoff relevant decision (see Section 3.2.3). The 
repeated public good dilemma consisted of ten rounds and ten payoff relevant decisions.16 
Throughout, individuals earned points based on their decisions and the decisions of others. 
                                                     
15 This is the result of a participant recruitment and selection process that did not control the demographic 
composition of experimental sessions (see section 3.2). Supplemental analyses showed that these differences did 
not influence results and conclusions. 
16 Before the repeated dilemma commenced, participants were informed that they would encounter the same 
decision 10 times as part of different anonymous groups of four that would be randomly assigned and reassigned 
for each decision. Decisions in the repeated public good dilemma are explored in depth in the next two papers in 
this series. 
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Each individual’s decision, points earned, and the average decision of other group members 
were provided to each individual after the one-shot game and between each round of the 
repeated game.  
Participants then completed a questionnaire that measured reactions to the experiment 
and collected demographic information. At the end of the experiment, points were converted 
to dollars. On average, participants earned $15 from their decisions plus $5 for showing up.  
 
3.2.1 The Decision 
Every decision in the experiment was essentially the same. Specifically, everyone was 
given decision-making power over an initial endowment of 20 points that they could split 
between themselves and the group in any way, including allocating nothing at all to themselves 
or nothing to the group. In the language of the experiment, allocation to oneself went to one’s 
“personal account.” Allocations to the group went to the “project account.”  
After decisions were made, individuals kept everything they allocated to themselves, 
and every group member benefited equally from allocations to the group according to the 
marginal per capita return (MPCR). Thus, consistent with other linear public good dilemma 
games, payoffs were given by Equation (1), repeated below: 
 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛾 ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1  (1) 
In this study 𝑝𝑖 represents points earned by person 𝑖, and 𝑔𝑖 represents person 𝑖’s allocation to 
the public good (a.k.a, cooperation). The initial endowment was 𝑤𝑖 = 20, and each group was 
of size 𝑛 = 4. Consistent with Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), 
points allocated to the group were increased by a positive factor, 𝑘 = 1.6, and then divided 
among 𝑛 = 4 participants, yielding an MPCR of 𝛾 = 𝑘 𝑛⁄ = 0.4.  
 
3.2.2 Framing 
The decision to cooperate and how much may depend on how the decision situation 
was presented.17 In response, the decision situation in this study was presented in four 
                                                     
17 Frames are created by presenting the same information differently. Framing effects are observed when decision-
makers subject to different frames choose differently. These definitions may seem to imply that frames are 
“objective” and imposed on decision-makers. However, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman made the important 
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different ways according to a between-subject, 2 × 2 factorial framing design that distinguishes 
the action implied by the location of the initial endowment (i.e., give versus take) and the 
language used (i.e., neutral versus non-neutral). Thus, the frames imposed were give neutral 
(GN), give non-neutral (GNN), take neutral (TN), and take non-neutral (TNN) as illustrated in 
Figure 1.2. The structure and language used to differentiate the give non-neutral and take non-
neutral frames mimic the English translation of the give and take frames employed by 
Dufwenberg et al. (2011), excluding use of the words “keep” and “leave.” In the give treatment, 
the initial endowment was located in individuals’ personal accounts. In the take treatment, the 
initial endowment was presented as a portion of the project account. Neutral frames were 
created by substituting “allocate” in place of “give” and “take” while retaining the implied 
action of giving or taking established with the location of the initial endowment.18 The following 
will make this more clear. 
Payoffs were always calculated in accordance with Equation (1) regardless of frame. In 
the give treatments of this experiment, each of the four individuals in a group began with 20 
points in her or his personal account. Participants were then asked how many points, called 
points-income in the experiment, they would “allocate” or “give” to the project account. 
Equation (1) reflects the framing of give treatments, but payoffs were presented as in Equation 
(1a) for the give neutral frame and Equation (1b) in the give non-neutral frame. 
 
Total 
points-income 
= 
(20 – points you allocated to the project account) + 
0.4 × sum of all points allocated to the project account 
(1a) 
 
Total 
points-income 
= 
(20 – points you gave to the project account) +  
0.4 × sum of all points given to the project account 
(1b) 
                                                     
point that frames are also subjective and therefore based on individuals’ perceptions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Tversky & Kahneman 1981, 1986, 1991). In this study, frame refers only to how the frame is constructed. 
18 The framing design was motivated by fairly robust, but somewhat mixed, findings that give frames yield more 
cooperation than take frames (c.f., Apesteguia & Maier-Rigaud, 2006; Bougherara et al., 2011; Brewer & Kramer, 
1986; Cubitt et al., 2011; Fleishman, 1988; Rutte et al., 1987; Sonnemans et al., 1998), and positive frames yield 
more cooperation than negative frames (c.f., Andreoni, 1995; Levin et al., 2002; Levin et al., 1998; ; Park 2000; 
Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 1999). 
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For each individual, points he “allocated” or “gave” to the project account comprised his 
cooperation.  
In the take treatments, each four-person group was presented with a project account 
consisting of 80 points. Each individual was permitted to “allocate” up to 20 of those points to 
his or her private account or “take” up to 20 of those points from the project account. Payoffs 
in the take frames are the same as in Equation (1), but are more faithfully represented in 
Equation (2)  
 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 + 𝛾[∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 − ∑ 𝑥𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 ] (2) 
where 𝑥𝑖  represents personal allocations, 𝑤𝑗 = 20 is the initial endowment, and ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 = 80. 
The relationship between Equations 1 and 2 is given by 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖, where 𝑔𝑖 is person 𝑖’s 
allocation to the project account (a.k.a., cooperation) as in Equation (1). In the experiment, 
payoffs were presented as in Equation (2a) for the take neutral frame and Equation (2b) for the 
take non-neutral frame. 
 
Total 
points-income 
= 
points you allocated to your personal account +  
0.4 × (80 – sum of all points allocated to personal accounts) 
(2a) 
 
Total 
points-income 
= 
points you took from the project account +  
0.4 × (80 – sum of all points taken from the project account) 
(2b) 
For each individual, the points not “allocated to [her] personal account” or not points not 
“[taken] from the project account” comprised her cooperation. 
 
3.2.3 The One-Shot Public Good Game 
The purpose of the one-shot public good dilemma was to generate behavioral data with 
which to assess cooperative type. It was based on Fischbacher & Gächter’s (2010) P-experiment 
and Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr’s (2001) “strategy-method.” First, every participant was 
asked to make a cooperation decision without knowing others’ decisions. This was called the 
“unconditional decision.” Then each participant was asked to complete a “conditional decision 
table.” Completing the table required each participant to decide how they would respond to 21 
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different average decisions by others. After the unconditional and all conditional decisions were 
made, one person was selected at random from each four-person group. For the three 
members of the group who were not selected, the unconditional decision was the payoff 
relevant amount. The average unconditional decision for those three group members was 
calculated, and based on that rounded average, the appropriate entry from the randomly 
selected individual’s conditional cooperation table became the payoff relevant amount for that 
individual. Each individual then received results on his or her computer screen. Results included 
whether he or she was the randomly selected individual, his or her payoff relevant decision, 
and the average payoff relevant decision for the other members of the group. The Appendix 
documents the exact instructions provided to participants, inputs requested from participants, 
and results provided to participants. 
The advantages of this one-shot dilemma are several. First, the decision situation is 
consistent with a standard public good game. Second, the conditional decision table yields 21 
measures of cooperation per person in a very short period of time that are amenable to 
regression analyses. Third, decisions are incentivized. Fourth, Fischbacher et al. (2001) and 
Fischbacher and Gachter (2010) effectively used this dilemma to categorize individuals 
according to cooperation conditioned on others’ decisions. This study shares that purpose with 
the additional objective that an individual’s cooperative type be the same regardless of the 
frame to which she was subject. Because individuals make decisions in response to possible 
average decisions by the other members of their 4-person group, it is very unlikely that they 
form beliefs about others’ decisions. Thus, based on the notion that framing effects emerge 
through a process of belief formation and preferences over beliefs about how others behave 
(c.f., Andreoni, 1995; Dufwenberg et al. 2011; Ellingsen et al., 2012; Park 2000; Sonnemans et 
al., 1998; Willinger & Zeigelmeyer, 1999), the conditional decision table is unlikely to yield 
framing effects. Thus, cooperative type, as assessed from the conditional decision table, would 
be an attribute of the individual, not the frame. 
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3.2.4  Questionnaire 
This original questionnaire was designed specifically with some of the most robust 
findings of experimental and behavioral economics in mind. The questionnaire consisted of 18 
statements intended to elicit feelings of ownership or entitlement;19 feelings about one’s own 
and other’s outcomes, actions, and obligations that relate to social or other-regarding 
preferences20 and social norms; 21 and concern about prospective losses that might expose loss 
aversion.22 The questionnaire also included five statements about confusion, understanding, 
and satisfaction. All participants indicated their level of agreement with each statement on a 5-
point Likert scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The questionnaire also asked 
participants to report gender, training in economics, and previous experience with “a study like 
this one.” The full questionnaire appears in the Appendix. 
 
3.3 Modeling and Analyses 
Recall that the objectives of this research were to identify a discrete number of 
cooperative types based on behavior, to illuminate the motives underlying the differences in 
behavior among cooperative types, and to determine if those types and motives were 
influenced by frames. To those ends I employed group based trajectory modeling (GBTM), 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA), and nonparametric tests, respectively.  
 
  
                                                     
19 Reference dependence is a fundamental concept in prospect theory, pioneered by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979). It refers to the notion that "the carriers of value are gains and losses defined relative to a reference point" 
(Tversky & Kahneman 1991). "The reference point may be interpreted as the default choice, as in the status quo 
bias or endowment effect literature; the aspiration level, as in aspiration adaptation models; the convention, 
norm, or belief about what one should choose, as, for example, in cognitive dissonance studies; past consumption, 
as in addiction, habit formation, status-seeking, or brand loyalty models; and others" (Apesteguia & Ballester, 
2009). 
20 Other-regarding preferences (a.k.a., social preferences) refer to valuations, either positive or negative, of the 
actions and outcomes of others (Camerer & Fehr, 2006). 
21 Consistent with Krupka and Weber’s (2013) interpretation of Jon Elster’s (1989) definition of social norms, social 
norms consist of two elements, 1) “prescribed or proscribed behaviors or actions” that are 2) “jointly recognized, 
or collectively perceived, by members of the population.”  
22 Loss aversion is a fundamental concept in prospect theory wherein people behave as though “losses loom larger 
than corresponding gains” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). 
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3.3.1 Group-Based Trajectory Modeling 
Group-Based Trajectory Modelling (GBTM) was developed by Daniel S. Nagin, Bobby L. 
Jones, and others to empirically identify groups of individuals with similar patterns of behavior 
over time (Jones & Nagin, 2007; Jones, Nagin, & Roeder, 2001; Nagin, 1999, 2005; Nagin & 
Odgers, 2010).23 GBTM is fairly well-known in the psychology and medical literature, especially 
with regard to group-based developmental trajectories. 24 This is the first application of GBTM 
to social dilemma experiments. 
 
3.3.1.1 Model Basics 
With the goal of grouping individuals according to behavior, I applied GBTM to the 
conditional decision table. Unlike existing classification strategies for cooperative types, GBTM 
does not presume a predetermined number of cooperatives types nor does it presuppose a 
relationship between behavior and motives. GBTM is an empirical method that simultaneously 
a) identifies groups of individuals with similar patterns of conditional cooperation, b) estimates 
the likelihood that an individual belongs to each group, and c) models within-group behavior. 
Each group corresponds to a different cooperative type, individuals are assigned to the 
cooperative type to which they have the highest likelihood of belonging, and the model of 
within-group behavior refers to the regression relationship between conditional cooperation 
and the possible average level of cooperation by others.  
More specifically, GBTM is a specialized form of “finite mixture modeling” that 
simultaneously estimates a maximum likelihood model, Equation (3), the likelihoods of 
membership in each group, Equation (6), and the cooperation trajectory for each group 
Equation (7). Importantly, GBTM does not assume that a population actually consists of discrete 
groups. Instead, it assumes that the behavior of interest varies continuously and widely with 
                                                     
23 Daniel S. Nagin and Bobby L. Jones are also responsible for developing the SAS procedure, PROC TRAJ, that was 
used to implement GBTM in this study 
24 GBTM was developed nearly thirty years ago to study the life course of criminal behavior. Since then, GBTM has 
been used in a wide variety of studies spanning criminology, psychology, epidemiology, and medical research 
(Nagin & Odgers, 2010), and in more recently to study network formation, poverty, fertility, and labor markets 
(e.g., Hasan, 2012; Kim & Shin, 2014; Londono et al., 2013; Low, Parker, Hazel, & Welch, 2013; Virtanen et al., 
2011). 
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the goal of summarizing the key features of the data in a representative and parsimonious way 
(Nagin, 2005, pp. 56-57).  
Consistent with the usual conventions of maximum likelihood estimation, GBTM 
maximizes the likelihood, 𝐿, of the observed data 
 𝐿 = ∏ 𝑃(𝐘𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1  (3) 
where 𝒀𝑖 = {𝑦𝑖1, 𝑦𝑖2, … , 𝑦𝑖𝑇} represents 𝑇=21 measurements of conditional cooperation for 
individual 𝑖, and 𝑃(𝒀𝑖) is the unconditional probability of observing 𝐘i for individual 𝑖. The 
unconditional probabilities are further deconstructed into the probability of belonging to group 
𝑗, represented by 𝜋𝑗, and the conditional probability of observing 𝒀𝑖  assuming membership in 
group 𝑗, given by 𝑃𝑗(𝒀𝑖). Specifically,  
 𝑃(𝒀𝑖) = ∑ 𝜋𝑗𝑃
𝑗(𝒀𝑖)
𝐽
𝑗=1  (4) 
In accordance with standard conventions in mixture modeling and for the purpose of 
tractability, conditional independence is assumed so that 
 𝑃𝑗(𝐘𝑖) = ∏ 𝑝
𝑗(𝑦𝑖𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1  (5) 
where 𝑝𝑗(𝑦𝑖𝑡) is the probability distribution function of 𝑦𝑖𝑡 for group 𝑗, which in this case, is 
assumed to be censored normal (Nagin, 2005, pp. 24-26). 
Approximations of group membership probabilities, 𝜋𝑗, employ the logit model
  
 𝜋𝑗 =
𝑒
𝜃𝑗
∑ 𝑒
𝜃𝑗𝐽
𝑗=1
 (6) 
where 𝑗 = 1 … 𝐽 indexes the groups, and 𝜃𝑗  represents the log odds of membership in group 𝑗 
relative to a reference group. Group membership probabilities could be estimated directly, but 
it is difficult to do in practice. In contrast, this approximation is computationally straightforward 
while also conforming to the requirements of group membership probabilities. Namely, each 𝜋𝑗 
is between 0 and 1, and all 𝜋𝑗’s sum to 1 (Nagin, 2005, p. 41).
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25 This approximation also allows for an extension of the model that includes estimation with time-invariant 
covariates, 𝑧𝑖, with the multinomial logit model, 𝜋𝑗(𝑧𝑖) =
𝑒
𝑧𝑖𝜃𝑗
∑ 𝑒
𝑧𝑖𝜃𝑗𝐽
𝑗=1
 (Nagin, 2005, p. 97). In this study, I extended 
the four-group linear model to evaluate the effect of frame, gender, training, and experience on the probability of 
group membership relative to a baseline group, which in this case was non-cooperators. A series of multinomial 
logit regression models showed that frame did not influence the likelihood of belonging to a particular cooperative 
type; there was no significant relationship between frame, training, and the likelihood of belonging to a 
20 
 
Because conditional cooperation clustered at the top and bottom of the cooperation 
range (i.e., at 0 and 20 points), each group’s trajectory was estimated to fit a polynomial using 
a censored normal regression model26 of an unobservable, latent variable, 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ , on the possible 
average level of cooperation by others, 𝑥𝑖𝑡, on as follows: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝜷𝑗𝐗𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0
𝑗 + 𝛽1
𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2
𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3
𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑡
3 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (7)  
The latent variable, 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ , represents “what might have been” had cooperation been unbounded 
and relates to the measured variable for conditional cooperation, 𝑦𝑖𝑡, as follows (Nagin, 2005, 
pp.28-29):  
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 0               𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ < 0  
           𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗             𝑓𝑜𝑟 0 ≤ 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 20 (8) 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 20            𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ > 20  
I describe implementation of GBTM, the essential elements of group-based models, and 
model selection below. I forego further technical details of GBTM and refer the reader to Daniel 
Nagin’s comprehensive book (2005), summary papers (Jones & Nagin, 2007; Jones, Nagin, & 
Roeder, 2001; Nagin, 1999), and a survey of GBTM applications (Nagin & Odgers, 2010).  
 
3.3.1.2 Model Implementation and Selection 
I implemented GBTM with the TRAJ procedure using SAS software with censored normal 
regression models (MODEL CNORM).27 Among the estimated statistics and standard fit 
statistics, essential outputs included estimates of trajectory parameters for each group, 𝜷𝑗 in 
Equation (7), the probability that a randomly selected individual will belong to each group, 𝜋𝑗, 
and the probability of membership in each group for each individual conditioned on observed 
behavior, called posterior probabilities, 𝑃(𝑗|𝐘𝑖). These outputs guide model selection, 
                                                     
cooperative type; there was no significant relationship between frame, experience, and the likelihood of belonging 
to a cooperative type; and there was no significant relationship between the interaction of frame and gender and 
the likelihood of belonging to a cooperative type. However, women were more likely to be low cooperators than 
men. Men were more likely to be non-cooperators than women. 
26 Also known as a double-limit Tobit model, Wooldridge (2010, p. 704) states that the double-limit Tobit can be 
appropriately estimated when “we actually see pileups at the two endpoints and then a (roughly) continuous 
distribution in between,” as was the case for conditional cooperation at every possible average level of 
cooperation by others. 
27 The TRAJ procedure was developed by Bobby L. Jones, Daniel S. Nagin, and Kathryn Roeder (2001). 
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specifically selection of the number of groups and the functional form of each group’s 
trajectory, keeping in mind that group corresponds to cooperative type. 
The overarching goal of model selection is a balance between parsimony and 
explanatory power. Following the two-stage model selection process described by Nagin (2005, 
p. 66), I systematically estimated and evaluated dozens of potential models that combined 
different numbers of groups (i.e., 2 to 10) and polynomial trajectories (i.e., linear, quadratic, 
and cubic). First, I selected the appropriate number of groups. Then I determined the 
appropriate order for each group’s trajectory.  
In most applications of GBTM, selecting the number of groups prioritizes the Bayesian 
Information Criteria (BIC), a widely-accepted diagnostic that rewards parsimony and 
explanatory power in model selection. The BIC is given by 
 𝐵𝐼𝐶 = log 𝐿 − 0.5𝑘 log 𝑁 (9) 
As the number of parameters, 𝑘, increases, the log likelihood, log 𝐿, also increases. Thus, the 
second term “exacts a penalty” for additional parameters in proportion to half the log of the 
sample size, 𝑁 (Nagin, 2005, pp. 63-67). The number of parameters rises with the number of 
groups. The BIC is an approximation of the log of the Bayes Factor, 2 × 𝐵𝐼𝐶 ≈ 2 log𝑒 𝐵10. The 
Bayes factor gives the posterior odds that the alternative hypothesis is correct and is 
interpreted as the degree of evidence favoring the alternate model (Jones et al., 2001; Nagin, 
2005, pp. 68-69). When comparing two models, the null hypothesis is that the model with 
fewer trajectories provides the best fit, and a “sufficient” increase in the BIC (∆𝐵𝐼𝐶) favors 
selection of the more complex model.28 
While the BIC criterion often yields a clear cut choice, in some applications, it does not. 
In this case, the BIC continued to increase as the number of groups in the model increased for 
models with cubic, quadratic, and linear trajectories. However, Table 1.2 shows that the BIC 
had a distinctive pattern of very large increases from 2 to 3 to 4 groups; the increases from 4 to 
5 groups were orders of magnitude less; and the BIC increases from 5 to 6 groups were large, 
                                                     
28 According to general guidelines, increases in the BIC between 0 and 2 provide weak support for the more 
complex model, increases between 2 and 6 provide moderate evidence in favor of the more complex model, 
increases between 6 and 10 provide strong evidence in favor of the more complex model, and increases above 10 
provide very strong evidence for the more complex model (Andruff, Carraro, Thompson, & Gaudreau, 2009; Jones 
et al., 2001). If the BIC decreases as complexity increases, the simpler model is preferred. 
22 
 
but the sixth group was very small (less than 3% of participants).29 More importantly, the 
cooperative types identified in the four group models – non-cooperators, conditional 
cooperators, low cooperators, and high cooperators – persisted as more groups were added. 
Specifically, the conditional cooperator group splintered into less generalizable groups of 
conditional cooperators that were quite small (3% or less) and statistically insignificant; and the 
already small high cooperator group (i.e., 7%) split into even smaller groups (2% or less).30  
After selecting the four-group model, choosing the order of the polynomial function for 
each groups’ trajectory was less important (Andruff, Carraro, Thompson, & Gaudreau, 2009; 
Nagin, 2005, p. 66) and relatively simple. For models with 2 to 10 groups, I tested cubic, 
quadratic, and linear trajectories. After selecting the four-group cubic model, I sequentially 
removed non-significant cubic then quadratic terms, resulting in a model with only linear 
trajectories. The convention in GBTM is to retain linear terms regardless of significance. 
 
3.3.2 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Recall that the questionnaire was designed to expose motives often associated with 
behavior in public good dilemmas. However, I did not assume that any single item in the 
questionnaire would necessarily provide evidence of a specific motive. Instead, associations 
among questionnaire responses were expected, notable differences among questionnaire were 
also expected, and the common nature of associated questionnaire items were expected to 
reveal underlying motives. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) provides a means to identify 
associations among different questionnaire items and assess the motives that those items 
together represent. 
Specifically, EFA is a data-driven, exploratory, and descriptive technique intended to 
reveal the “number and nature of latent [factors] that explain the variation and covariation in a 
set of measured variables” (Preacher & MacCallum, 2003). In this case, each measured variable, 
𝑦𝑗, corresponded to one questionnaire item. Motives were represented by latent factors, 𝜂𝑚, 
                                                     
29 Results for quadratic and cubic trajectories were similar.  
30 In a similar situation, Nagin and Tremblay (2001) determined that the “addition of more groups was not 
informative” and chose the less complex model. Also, Nagin (2005, p. 62) states that “model selection based on 
the mechanical and rigid application of formal statistical criterion may lead to an inferior choice. Good judgement 
and real world domain knowledge are also required in the model selection process.” 
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and factor loadings, 𝜆𝑗𝑚, indicate how strongly underlying motives influenced a questionnaire 
item. In general, the common factor model represents each measured variable, 𝑦𝑗, in terms of 
latent factors, 𝜂𝑚, with factor loadings, 𝜆𝑗𝑚, and error term, 𝜀𝑗: 
 𝑦𝑗 = 𝜆𝑗1𝜂1 + 𝜆𝑗2𝜂2 + ⋯ + 𝜆𝑗𝑀𝜂𝑀 + 𝜀𝑗 (10) 
Large factor loadings reveal which measured items are good indicators of the various latent 
factors (Brown, 2015, p. 18).  
Ultimately, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) included 14 questionnaire items and all 256 
participants. First, I confirmed that correlations between many pairs of questionnaire items 
were large and significant (i.e., above 0.3 in absolute value and significant at the 5 percent 
level). Then, I extracted three factors using the iterated principal factor method 
(METHOD=PRINIT) via the FACTOR procedure using SAS software. Using an oblique rotation 
(ROTATE=PROMAX), I achieved high loading on non-overlapping subsets of measured variables 
and low loadings otherwise (Preacher & MacCullum, 2003). After selecting a three factor 
model, I generated factor scores which can be thought of as the values of the latent factors if 
they were measurable. 
Preliminary factor models that included all 23 questionnaire items yielded factors with 
three or fewer items. A common rule of thumb requires at least three indicators per factor, so 7 
items related to confusion, satisfaction, and reference dependence were excluded. Two 
additional measured variables were also excluded from the EFA, one measured variable that 
yielded high and nearly equal factor loading on more than on factor and another measured 
variable with relatively small factor loadings (i.e., near 0.3).  
 
3.3.4 Non-Parametric and Parametric Tests 
Because most measured variables were not normally distributed, nonparametric tests 
were used to compare behavior and motives across frames and cooperative types. The Kruskal 
Wallis test is a non-parametric test for differences in the medians of a non-normal dependent 
variable (e.g., cooperation and questionnaire responses) for more than two categories of an 
independent variable (e.g., frame and cooperative type). The Kruskal Wallis test reduces to the 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test when the independent variable is dichotomous (e.g., gender, 
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experience, and training). Nonparametric tests were conducted using SAS software and the 
NPAR1WAY procedure with the WILCOXON and DSCF options. Parametric tests (ANOVA and t-
tests) were used to assess differences in factors among and between cooperative types and 
were implemented using SAS software and the GLM and TTEST procedures. 
 
4 Results 
First, cooperation in the one-shot public good dilemma proved to be consistent with 
other public good experiments. Second, four robust, empirically distinct, and behavior-based 
cooperative types emerged via group-based trajectory modeling (GBTM). Cooperative types 
included a largely overlooked group of individuals who consistently cooperated at low but non-
negligible levels. Third, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) revealed three distinct factors 
underlying questionnaire responses that correspond to feelings about own and others’ 
obligations, perceptions of others’ actions, and self-interest. Fourth, non-parametric and 
parametric tests exposed highly significant differences in reported reactions and motives 
among and between cooperative types. Generally, reactions and motives of non-cooperators 
differed dramatically from each of the three cooperator types (i.e., low cooperators, conditional 
cooperators, and high cooperators), and the three cooperator types differed from each other in 
the level and nature of other regarding preferences.  
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
As expected, many individuals cooperated at highly variable and clearly non trivial levels 
either by giving to the project account or taking less from the project account than they could 
have.31 Table 1.3 and Figure 1.3 summarize these results. Specifically, average unconditional 
cooperation was 41% of the initial endowment, (𝑀 = 8.16, 𝑆𝐷 = 6.84), and mean conditional 
cooperation averaged to 34% of the initial endowment (𝑀 = 6.79, 𝑆𝐷 = 4.45). 32 Results like 
these are consistent with previous public goods experiments where cooperation varied from 
                                                     
31 T-tests and Wilcoxon signed rank tests resoundingly showed average conditional cooperation to be nontrivially 
greater than zero. All tests were highly significant (i.e., p < 0.0001). 
32 Mean conditional cooperation is the within-person mean of conditional cooperation according to each 
individual’s conditional decision table. 
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not at all to 100%, and average cooperation typically fell between 40 to 60% of the initial 
endowment (Ledyard, 1995 as cited in Chaudhuri, 2011). In addition, mean and median 
conditional cooperation increased with the possible average level of cooperation by others, as 
did the variance and interquartile range, results that are consistent with the known co-
existence of non-cooperators and conditional cooperators. Furthermore, unconditional and 
conditional cooperation “stacked-up” at focal levels of cooperation, especially at the allowable 
extremes of 0 and 20 points. Finally, the distributions of all cooperation variables were skewed 
and clearly not normally distributed. 
 
4.2 Cooperative Types 
Behavior in the one-shot public good dilemma revealed considerable heterogeneity in 
cooperative behavior. Figure 1.4 provides a sample of actual decisions of six individuals in the 
one-shot public good dilemma. These examples are similar to what Fischbacher et al. (2001) 
and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) observed and representative of the four cooperative types 
identified in this study. Specifically, there were individuals who did not cooperate (Panel A), 
individuals who cooperated more on average than others (Panel B), individuals who perfectly 
and “imperfectly” matched the cooperation of others (Panels C and D), “hump-shaped” 
cooperators (Panel E), and others (Panel F).  
Unpacking heterogeneity was the foremost objective of this research and was achieved 
using group-based trajectory modeling (GBTM).33 Four robust and distinct cooperative types 
emerged to create a comprehensive, well-delineated, descriptive, and relatively simple 
representation of heterogeneous cooperation. Table 1.4 presents that best-fitting group-based 
trajectory model. Trajectories were characterized by highly significant intercepts and linear 
                                                     
33 To characterize heterogeneity, Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) regressed conditional cooperation on other’s 
possible average level of cooperation for each individual. Then they plotted the frequencies of pairs of slope and 
mean conditional cooperation. This same procedure was performed with the data from this experiment. Results 
were similar overall. In addition, type-specific bubble scatter plots confirmed that non-cooperators clustered near 
the origin, and conditional cooperators clustered around slope of 1 and mean conditional cooperation of 10 points. 
In addition high cooperators occupied the upper region of the regression slope versus mean conditional 
cooperation plot with shallow slopes and above average mean conditional cooperation. Low cooperators included 
individuals who generally had shallow individual linear regression coefficients and below average mean conditional 
cooperation. 
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coefficients, probabilities of group membership were highly significant, and trajectories were 
quite obviously distinct. 
Figure 1.5 plots average and predicted conditional cooperation for each cooperative 
type and gives an intuitive representation of regression results.34 Study participants were 
assigned to the cooperative type for which the posterior probability of membership was 
highest. Unsurprisingly, actual cooperation corresponded quite nicely to predicted cooperation. 
Non-cooperators did not cooperate (𝑁 = 48)35 and are not expected to cooperate ever (i.e., 
predicted values for the latent variable were all less than zero, so that predicted values for the 
observed variable were all zero). Conditional cooperators approximately matched the assumed 
level of cooperation by others (𝑁 = 131) and are expected to cooperate less than, but in lock 
step with, the possible average level of cooperation by others (i.e., regression of the latent 
variable yielded a negative intercept, and a linear coefficient close to 1).36 Low cooperators 
consistently cooperated at low but non-trivial levels (𝑁 = 60) and are expected to cooperate at 
consistently low levels with a negligible response to the possible average level of cooperation 
by others (i.e., regression of the latent variable yielded a positive, small, and nontrivial intercept 
and a linear coefficient that, although statistically significant, was near 0).37 High cooperators 
cooperated at a relatively high level regardless of others’ assumed level of cooperation (𝑁 =
17) and are expected to cooperate more on average than others (i.e., regression of the latent 
variable yielded a positive, relatively large, and highly statistically significant intercept), while 
                                                     
34 Predicted conditional cooperation for the jth group is given by 𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑗 ) = Φ𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑗 𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 + ?̂?
𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑡(Φ𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑗 − Φ𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑗 ) +
𝜎(𝜙𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑗 − 𝜙𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑗 ) + (1 − Φ𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖 )𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 , where 𝜙 and Φ are the density function and cumulative distribution 
function of a normal distribution with mean 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑡  and standard deviation 𝜎. Φ𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑗
 and Φ𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑗
 are 
Φ𝑗[(𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 − ?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑗 )/𝜎] and Φ𝑗[(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 − ?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑗 )/𝜎], respectively, and ?̂?𝑗  is the maximum likelihood estimate of 
𝛽𝑗  (Nagin, 2005, p. 32). In this case, 𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0 and 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 20. 
35 Cooperation was not exactly zero for all non-cooperators, but statistically trivial. 
36 Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) used the term “imperfect conditional cooperators” to describe conditional 
cooperation that was in proportion to and somewhat less than the beliefs they formed about others. In this study, I 
use the term “conditional cooperators” to describe individuals who cooperated on average in proportion to and 
either equal to or somewhat less than possible average level of cooperation by others. 
37 Via Fischbacher et al.’s (2001) and Fischbacher and Gächter’s (2010) behavior-based methodology, most low 
cooperators would have been identified as triangle cooperators and unclassifiable. Via Kurban and Houser’s (2005) 
behavior-based methodology, 45 low cooperators would have been assessed as free-riders, three would have been 
identified as reciprocators, and 12 would have been unclassifiable. Without expanding the experiment and to 
collect additional data, it is impossible to assess how low cooperators would have been classified via motives-
based methods like the Decomposed Game. 
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simultaneously conditioning their decisions on others behavior to some extent (i.e., the linear 
term in the regression was positive, highly statistically significant, and less than 1).  
Figure 1.5 also illustrates the dramatically different patterns of behavior among the four 
cooperative types  as is also evident among the individual behavior show in Figure 1.4. In Figure 
1.4, the individual in Panel A was a non-cooperator, panel B shows a high cooperator, panels C 
and D depict conditional cooperators, and panels E and F depict low cooperators. Lending 
additional persuasive evidence, Kruskal Wallis tests of unconditional cooperation, mean 
conditional cooperation, and every measurement of conditional cooperation from the 
conditional decision table confirmed highly significant differences in cooperation across 
cooperative types (all p-values were negligible).  
 
4.3 Questionnaire Analysis 
Questionnaire analyses focused on two goals: 1) identifying the motives behind 
decision-making in public goods dilemmas, and 2) assessing the relationships among 
questionnaire responses, motives, and cooperative types. Nonparametric tests of questionnaire 
responses among and between cooperative types confirmed that study participants 
experienced and conducted decision-making very differently, and those differences 
corresponded with cooperative types. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) demonstrated that at 
least three distinct motives drove decision-making that included feelings about own and others’ 
obligations, others’ actions, and self-interest. In combination, these analyses revealed that non-
cooperators were more self-interested, less concerned with others’ actions, and had weaker or 
no feelings of obligation compared to conditional and high cooperators. Low cooperators were 
similar to non-cooperators with regard to self-interest, but otherwise were more strongly 
motivated by feelings of obligation and perceptions of others’ actions. Low cooperators, 
however, also differed from conditional and high cooperators. Low cooperators were 
significantly more self-interested than conditional and high cooperators and less motivated by 
feelings of obligation. 
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4.3.1 Questionnaire Descriptive Results 
Table 1.5 reports questionnaire descriptive statistics. In general, participants in this 
study responded neutrally (i.e., near 3 on a 5-point Likert scale) to questionnaire items 
regarding own and others’ outcomes (Q03-Q06), actions (Q07-Q10), and obligations (Q11-Q16), 
with few exceptions. They responded more strongly, on average, to questionnaire items related 
to ownership (Q01 and Q02), prospective losses (Q17 and Q18), understanding and confusion 
(Q19-Q21), and satisfaction (Q22-Q23). Specifically, individuals were roughly neutral with 
regard to others’ earnings (Q04), competition (Q05), and pure self-interest (Q06), but clearly 
wanted to earn as many points as they could (Q03). Individuals were also generally neutral with 
regard to their own cooperative and non-cooperative choices and to others’ non-cooperative 
behavior (Q07, Q08, and Q10), but felt strongly and positively about others’ cooperative 
behavior (Q09). In addition, neutrality prevailed on average among responses to statements 
regarding one’s own and others’ obligations including one’s own reciprocal obligations, (Q11, 
Q12, Q13, and Q15). However, individuals generally agreed, albeit weakly, that other’s 
reciprocal obligations were important (Q14 and Q16). Individuals generally felt ownership of 
their personal endowments (Q01) but not of all possible project points (Q02). Finally, 
individuals generally were not concerned with prospective losses (Q17 and Q18), not confused 
during the study (Q19, Q20, and Q21), satisfied with the results of their decisions (Q22), and 
believed others were satisfied as well (Q23). 
 
4.3.2 Nonparametric Tests of Questionnaire Responses 
Averages, however, do not tell a complete story. Substantial heterogeneity is evident in 
the standard deviations and interquartile ranges given in Table 1.5. As shown in Table 1.6, 
aggregating questionnaire responses by cooperative type and conducting Kruskal Wallis tests 
revealed highly significant differences across cooperative types with regard to own and others’ 
outcomes (Q03-Q06), own actions (Q07-Q08), and own and others’ obligations (Q11-Q16). 
Individual questionnaire items related to ownership of one’s personal account (Q02), 
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understanding (Q19), and satisfaction (Q22) were also significantly different across cooperative 
types. 38  
Focusing on the three categories of questionnaire items where statistically significant 
differences were observed among all four cooperative types – namely outcomes, actions, and 
obligations – non-cooperators often distinguished themselves from at least one other type as 
more self-interested (Q03, Q06, and Q07), more competitive and less altruistic (Q05, Q04, and 
Q08), and less concerned with obligations (Q11-Q16). At the extreme, non-cooperators’ 
responses differed significantly from every other cooperative type on four measures (Q06, Q08, 
Q11, and Q12). Non-cooperators most strongly express pure self-interest while other types 
were roughly neutral or disagreed (Q06). Non-cooperators also disagreed with feeling good 
about allocating points to the project account, but low, conditional, and high cooperators were 
neutral or agreed (Q08). In addition, non-cooperators were the least concerned with their 
obligations to the project (Q11 and Q12). In contrast, other types were roughly neutral. 
Focusing still on the three categories of questionnaire items where statistically 
significant differences were observed among all four cooperative types, pairwise comparisons 
of cooperative types revealed a subtle gradient of self-interest to other-regarding among 
conditional, low, and high cooperators, where other-regarding refers to both preferences over 
others’ actions and outcomes and feelings of obligation. First, responses of low cooperators 
were sometimes similar to non-cooperators. Non-cooperators and low cooperators were 
similarly self-interested (Q03) and competitive (Q04 and Q05). Both non-cooperators and low 
cooperators also generally reported feeling better about allocating points to their personal 
accounts than conditional and high cooperators (Q07), and were least concerned with others 
fulfilling obligations to the project (Q13 and Q14). However, conditional cooperators were 
similar to low cooperators with regard to some self-interest and competition measures (Q03, 
Q05, and Q06), different on others (Q04 and Q07). Approximately neutral feelings about 
obligations, however, were nearly always similar for low and conditional cooperators (Q11, 
                                                     
38 For items Q02, Q13, Q19, and Q22, Kruskal Wallis tests among all four types were not significant when the 
Bonferonni correction for multiple comparisons was applied. The Bonferroni correction is a modification of the 
threshold for statistical significance, 𝛼, based on the number of measurements, 𝑛. In this case statistical 
significance at the 0.05 level requires a p-value less than 𝛼 𝑛⁄ = 0.05 23⁄ = 0.0022. 
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Q12, Q13, Q15, and Q16). Overall, low cooperators were sometimes similar to high cooperators 
with regard to self-interest (Q06 and Q07) and obligations (Q11-Q16), but conditional 
cooperators and high cooperators were statistically indistinguishable on every measure (Q03-
Q16). 
 
4.3.3 Exploratory factor analysis 
Questionnaire differences among cooperative types became more salient and easier to 
characterize by way of exploratory factor analysis (EFA). Exploratory factor analysis revealed 
three distinct factors underlying questionnaire responses. Those factors included feelings about 
own and others’ obligations, perceptions of others’ actions, and self-interest.  
Table 1.7 presents factors and factor loadings. Attending to one factor at a time, we see 
that four of the five questionnaire items in the first factor relate to feelings of obligation (Q11-
14) that are reminiscent of social norms and fairness, equity, and reciprocity preferences. The 
fifth questionnaire item (Q08) in the first factor relates to the notion of feeling good about 
doing good, a concept sometimes referred to as “warm glow,” “altruism,” or “impure altruism.” 
On average, responses to those questionnaire items were neutral (𝑀 = 3.03), but every 
indicator in the obligation factor differed significantly among cooperative types according to 
Kruskal Wallis tests (as shown in Table 1.6). 
Unsurprisingly, estimates of factor scores (i.e., the estimated value of the factor for each 
individual) were highly significantly different among cooperative types (ANOVA: 𝐹(3,255) =
22.37, 𝑝 < 0.0001 and Kruskal Wallis: 𝜒2(3, 𝑁 = 256) = 51.26, 𝑝 < 0.0001). Pairwise t-tests 
and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests of the first factor, given in Table 1.8, showed statistically 
significant differences between every pair of cooperative types except for conditional and high 
cooperators.39 Thus, even though participants on average did not report strong feelings of 
obligation, feelings of obligation distinguished non-cooperators from conditional, low, and high 
cooperators and differentiated low cooperators from conditional and high cooperators. Non-
cooperators appeared to be least motivated by feelings of obligation, and high and conditional 
                                                     
39 Controls for multiple comparisons (𝑛 = 6) were applied using the Bonferroni correction for t-tests and the 
Dwass, Steel, Critchlow-Fligner (DSCF) correction for Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests.  
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cooperators appeared to be most influenced by feelings of obligation. Low cooperators were in 
between. 
As shown in Table 1.7, the unifying concept in the questionnaire items that make up the 
second factor is perceptions of other actions (Q16, Q15, Q17, Q10, and Q9). In general, 
participants agreed weakly (𝑀 = 3.48) with negative feelings about others’ non-cooperative 
behavior. However, only the questionnaire items about feeling “cheated” (Q15 and Q16) 
differed significantly across cooperative types according to Kruskal Wallis tests, a result driven 
by non-cooperators who disagreed with feeling cheated and low and conditional cooperators 
who were approximately neutral or weakly agree with feeling cheated (see Table 1.6). Thus, 
while, the perception factor did differ significantly among cooperative types (ANOVA: 
𝐹(3,255) = 17.71, 𝑝 < 0.0001 and Kruskal Wallis: 𝜒2(3, 𝑁 = 256) = 19.19, 𝑝 < 0.0003), only 
pairwise differences between non-cooperators and each of the other types were present. 
Factor scores between low, conditional, and high cooperators did not differ significantly (see 
Table 1.8).  
Finally, five questionnaire items related to self-interest (Q03, Q06, and Q07) and 
competition (Q05) formed the third factor (see Table 1.7). In general, study participants agreed 
with self-interested and competitive statements (𝑀 = 3.78). As in the first factor, differences 
among cooperative types were highly significant among all four questionnaire items making up 
the third factor (see Table 1.6) as were factor scores (ANOVA: 𝐹(3,255) = 9.25, 𝑝 < 0.0001 
and Kruskal Wallis: 𝜒2(3, 𝑁 = 256) = 37.39, 𝑝 <0.0001). Pairwise tests showed that non-
cooperators and low cooperators were similarly self-interested and more self-interested than 
conditional cooperators and high cooperators who were statistically indistinguishable with 
regard to self-interest (see Table 1.8). 
These results make clear that at least three underlying factors drove decision-making in 
the experiment, namely feelings of obligation, perceptions of others’ actions, and self-
interest.40 These results also make clear strong associations between behavior and motives that 
                                                     
40 Furthermore, evidence from the process of factor model selection and Kruskal Wallis tests suggested that 
additional factors were also at work. Specifically, if more questionnaire items regarding reference dependence 
(Q01 and Q022) and warm glow (Q04 and Q08) preferences had been included in the questionnaire, two additional 
factors may have emerged that could have played a role in differentiating motives among cooperators. Evidence 
from discriminant and regression analyses support the future implementation of a more extensive questionnaire. 
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are not easily inferred, especially with regard to low-cooperators who distinguish themselves 
from each of the other cooperative types with regard to obligations. Low cooperators are more 
concerned with obligations that non-cooperators, but less than conditional and high 
cooperators. Low cooperators are also self-interested, much like non-cooperators, and but 
more self-interested than conditional and high cooperators.41  
 
4.4 Frame Immunity 
In this section, I briefly report two nested results that complement the core objectives 
of this research. First, overall the one-shot public good dilemma and the questionnaire showed 
no framing effects. The absence of framing effects in the one-shot dilemma is consistent with 
the notions that frames influence beliefs which influence cooperation, as hypothesized in 
Section 3.2.3, and frames act through beliefs, not through preferences (Ellingsen et al., 2012). 
Second, there was not a statistically significant association between cooperative type and 
frame. Thus, the identification of four cooperative types and three underlying motives as well 
as the systematics relationships between cooperative type and motives were not influenced by 
frame.  
Specifically, the Kruskal Wallis tests reported in Tables 1.9 and 1.10 show that behavior 
in the one-shot public good dilemma and the reactions reported via the questionnaire did not 
differ significantly across the four frames after the Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons was applied. Pairwise tests, controlling for multiple comparisons, also revealed 
that there were no framing effects between pairs of frames in the one-shot dilemma and in the 
questionnaire with one exception.42 Factors scores also did not differ among or between frames 
(Factor 1:  𝑋2 (3, 𝑁 = 256) = 3.59, 𝑝 = 0.3088; Factor 2: 𝑋2 (3, 𝑁 = 256) = 4.79, 𝑝 =
0.1876; Factor 3: 𝑋2 (3, 𝑁 = 256) = 0.5853, 𝑝 = 0.8998). Lastly, a Chi Square test 
                                                     
41 In addition, separate factor analyses for distinct subpopulations (i.e., women, men, trained, not trained, 
experienced, and not experienced) yielded similar factors and factor loadings. 
42 The exception is a statistically significant difference between take non-neutral and give neutral for Q09. 
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(𝑋2 (9, 𝑁 = 256) = 11.29, 𝑝 = 0.2566) and Fisher’s Exact test (𝑝 = 0.2651) showed no 
association between frame and cooperative type.43 
 
5 Conclusion 
Results of this study strongly support the conclusion that the decision-makers in this 
public good dilemma were heterogeneous, in behavior and in motives. This study revealed and 
modeled the within group behavior of four distinct, behavior-based types of decision-makers 
that expressed clearly discernible and different motives when engaged in a public good 
dilemma. These behavior-based cooperative types included non-cooperators who did not 
cooperate or cooperated at negligible levels regardless of peer behavior, conditional 
cooperators whose cooperation was on average less than their peers but increased in equal 
proportion as others’ possible average cooperation increased, and high cooperators who 
cooperated more on average than their peers with small increases in cooperation as others’ 
possible average cooperation increased. In addition, this study revealed a relatively large and 
robust group of low cooperators, not previously differentiated in the experimental literature. 
These low cooperators consistently cooperated at low levels regardless of others’ possible 
average cooperation. Conditional cooperators were the largest group (51%), but this previously 
unrecognized group of low cooperators (23%) was larger than the non-cooperator group 
(19%) and the high cooperator group (7%). Furthermore, the low cooperator type was a 
robust group. They consistently emerged as a statistically distinct group in group-based 
trajectory models with 4 or more groups, and low cooperators were highly significantly 
different from each of the other three cooperative types according to pairwise Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney tests of mean conditional cooperation.44 
                                                     
43 Recall that frames were assigned to experimental sessions with the expectation that subpopulations would be 
similar. While this held unequivocally for age and training in economics, there was a marginal and weak association 
between gender and frame (𝑋2 (3, 𝑁 = 256) = 6.09, 𝑝 = 0.1073) and a highly significant association between 
experience and frame (𝑋2 (3, 𝑁 = 245) = 13.35, 𝑝 = 0.0039). In response, multinomial logit regression models 
were employed to demonstrate further that frame did not influence the probabilities of belonging to a cooperative 
type. 
44 All six pairwise tests of mean conditional cooperation yielded 𝑝 < 0.0001, and all tests controlled for multiple 
comparisons using the Dwass, Steel, Critchlow-Fligner (DSCF) correction. 
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In addition to identifying cooperative types and assessing cooperative type for each 
individual, this study revealed subtle and systematic differences in motives among types that 
could not have been predicted and could not have been convincingly inferred from behavior via 
the notion of revealed preference. Overall, conditional, low, and high cooperators were more 
“other-regarding” than non-cooperators, but “other-regarding” proved to be different from 
“not self-interested.” Non-cooperators were more self-interested than conditional and high 
cooperators, but not more than low cooperators. In fact, low cooperators were self-interested 
just like non-cooperators, and more self-interested than conditional and high cooperators. 
Compared to non-cooperators, low, conditional, and high cooperators were all more concerned 
with others’ actions and had stronger feelings regarding their own and others’ obligations. 
However, low cooperators also distinguished themselves from conditional and high cooperators 
as less concerned with obligations. In a sense, low cooperators were a hybrid of non-
cooperators and conditional and high cooperators – a large, robust, cooperating, and therefore 
important hybrid who could be compelled to cooperate more via very different means than 
other types of decision-makers.  
Identification of low cooperators and the ways in which they are differently motivated 
are fundamental contributions of this research. Many previous attempts to classify 
heterogeneity share a limitation that a priori excludes low cooperators. Those studies pre-
specified the number and nature of types and presumed associations between behavior and 
motives. In those cases, low cooperators likely would have been “unclassified” or lumped with 
non-cooperating, free-riding, or individualistic types based on their low levels of cooperation 
and self-interested motives. Even Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), 
who did not pre-specify types or motives, did not identify low cooperators. Their classification 
methods allowed the differences among individuals identified as low cooperators to obscure 
the trend in low cooperator behavior. Namely, whether cooperation was triangular, hump-
shaped, or in other ways non-linear as others’ level of cooperation increased, cooperation 
among low cooperators overall tended to be low, but non-trivial. Furthermore, when I assessed 
type using Kurzban and Houser’s “statistical-type classification method” (see Section 2.3), most 
of the low cooperators identified in this study were instead classified as “free-riders.” 
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Although a unique contribution to the experimental literature, an analogous group of 
minimum threshold cooperators with a “buy-in” mentality have been differentiated and studied 
in the charitable giving literature (Rose-Ackerman, 1982) and more recently in the green-
electricity literature (Jacobsen, Kotchen, & Vandenbergh, 2012). Rose-Ackerman (1982) defined 
“buy-in” mentality in the context of charitable giving, where a minimum contribution led those 
with a “buy-in” mentality to feel entitled to the full range of services provided by the charity. 
Jacobsen et al. (2012) reinterpreted this concept in the context of green-electricity to represent 
households who feel as though they have “done their part” after purchasing green electricity.45 
In the context of this public good dilemma, low cooperators may be operating via a “buy-in” 
mentality as well, in the sense that they cooperate just enough to assuage feelings of obligation 
toward others that they might feel as beneficiaries of the public good. Similarly, one might 
characterize the mentality of low cooperators in terms of guilt aversion, a “desire not to let 
others’ down” (Dufwenberg et al., 2011), or as avoiding feeling bad about not cooperating (i.e., 
the “cold prickle”) rather than seeking to feel good about contributing to group well-being (i.e., 
“warm glow”) (Andreoni, 1995). 
Finally, framing is present in every decision and until now has received little, if any, 
attention in assessing cooperative type and motives. The final contribution of this study is that 
identification and assessment of cooperative types and motives achieved via group-base-
trajectory modeling and exploratory factor analysis were not sensitive to framing. Type and 
motives, as determined in this study, appear to be attributes of the individual, like gender or 
level of education, not of the frame.  
Within the context of existing policy and in environmental policy in particular, non-
cooperators and high cooperators seem to overshadow policy-making even though they made 
up only a quarter of study participants. The spectrum of approaches intended to provide and 
protect environmental goods is fairly narrow and dominated by regulations (a.k.a. mandatory 
standards and command-and-control), but also includes price-based policies (e.g., taxes, 
subsidies, and markets) and voluntary provision (e.g., charitable giving, environmental offsets, 
                                                     
45 In Jacobsen et al. (2012), 45% of 910 households participated minimally in the energy conservation program and 
therefore in a way that was consistent with a “buy-in mentality.” 
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payments for ecosystem services, participation in renewable energy programs). Regulations 
and price-based policies typically target firms and are based on the assumption that all 
decision-makers are self-interested, which is unequivocally false, or the notion that prioritizing 
the purely self-interested minority (i.e., the non-cooperators in this study) in policy design and 
implementation is optimal.  
In contrast, voluntary provision most often targets individuals, appealing to altruistic 
motives and therefore to a small minority of decision-makers (i.e., the high cooperators in this 
study) who engage in environmentally friendly behaviors at an material cost to themselves, 
without regard for their peers’ participation or lack thereof. Allcott (2011) presents a notable 
exception in which a non-price energy conservation program, run by the company OPOWER, 
employed “insights from behavioral science” and “carefully crafted psychological cues” such as 
social norms and competition to reduce household electricity consumption without price 
incentives or mandates. These tactics are likely to be especially effective with conditional 
cooperators, whose cooperation was on average less than their peers but increased in equal 
proportion as others’ possible average cooperation, and non-cooperators who were more 
competitive than other decision-makers. Having produced a comprehensive and tractable 
classification of decision-makers engaged in a public good dilemma, this study has real-world 
traction in the context of innovative policy-making as illustrated by the OPOWER example. 
Furthermore, by identifying four distinct behavioral types and differentiating motives, 
this study contributes to our existing understanding of heterogeneity among decision-makers 
engaged in public good dilemmas. Other studies that focused on heterogeneity among 
decision-makers showed that group composition (e.g., Burlando & Guala, 2005; Kurzban & 
Houser, 2005), interactions between different types of cooperators (Chaudhuri, 2011), and the 
strategic incentives that emerge in heterogeneous populations (Camerer & Fehr, 2006) greatly 
influence aggregate cooperation. While Kurzban and Houser (2005) demonstrated that greater 
proportions of cooperative types lead to more cooperation, Camerer and Fehr (2006) argued 
that strategic incentives can trigger cooperation even when cooperators are in the minority. 
Whether it is mass, strategy, or both, the development of a comprehensive, coherent, and a 
conceptually tractable representation of heterogeneous behavior and motives in social 
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dilemma experiments advances behavioral science, models of decision-making, and our 
understanding of real-world dilemmas. This study demonstrates that models of decision-
making that embrace heterogeneity are not only possible, but necessary. Similarly, policy-
making that reflects population heterogeneity will diverge from the existing a silver-bullet 
approach, in which a single intervention targets the majority of decision-makers or lowest 
common denominator (i.e., the least cooperative). Instead, policy-making will exploit the 
differences and interactions between different types of individuals by way of several 
simultaneous interventions, deliberately designed to complement each other. 
Important questions remain. Most importantly, recall from Section 2.3 that the 
association between cooperation in public good dilemmas and cooperative type determined via 
other methodologies was ambiguous at best. Is cooperative type, as determined in this study, 
relevant to public good dilemmas? To start, is there a demonstrable relationship between the 
cooperative types identified here and cooperation in repeated public good experiments? If so, 
how robust is that relationship? For example, even though frames did not influence the results 
of this study, every public good decision has a frame and therefore may be vulnerable to 
framing effects. When framing effects are present, does cooperative type moderate the effect 
of frame? In other words, is the effect of frame different for different types of decision makers? 
I explore these questions in my subsequent work (Jackman, 2016b). 
In addition, this study and the vast literature on social preferences resoundingly 
demonstrates that what individuals know or believe about others’ actions and outcomes in 
public good dilemmas influences how much individuals cooperate. Conditional cooperation is 
the quintessential example of this behavior. In this study, individuals were asked to report how 
much they would cooperate in response to every possible level of cooperation by others, but in 
real-world dilemmas and in most public good experiments, individuals do not know how much 
others cooperate when making their own decisions. If some individuals include in their decision 
process how much others cooperate, as they clearly appear to do, then forming expectations of 
others’ behavior is a critical piece of that process. Do different types of decision-makers form 
beliefs differently, or do they respond to the same beliefs differently when making cooperation 
decisions?  
38 
 
Finally, evidence from several studies suggests that framing effects emerge via the 
process of forming beliefs about others’ likely behavior (Dufwenberg et al. 2011; Ellingsen et al. 
2012; Sonnemans et al., 1998). In other words, different frames yield different beliefs about 
how much others cooperate. Could it also be true that for some types of decision-makers frame 
influences beliefs, but for other types, frame does not? These are some of the questions that 
motivated the design of the full experiment from which this study is derived. These are the 
kinds of questions regarding the interplay of heterogeneity, frame, beliefs, and cooperation in 
public good dilemmas that are explored in depth in Jackman (2016a).  
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Tables 
 
Table 1.1: Sample characteristics 
GN GNN TN TNN df F p
Age (in years) 3 1.04 0.3745
Number 252 61 64 63 64
Mean 20.54 20.15 20.23 21.44 21.31
Standard Deviation 4.16 1.68 3.47 2.99 6.68
N % GN GNN TN TNN df X
2
p
Gender 3 6.09 0.1072
Men 117 46% 25 37 30 25
Women 139 54% 39 27 34 39
No 94 37% 26 22 22 24 3 0.68 0.8784
Yes 157 63% 37 40 41 39
Don't know (excluded) 5 -- 1 2 1 1
3 13.35 0.0039 ***
No 94 38% 34 15 21 24
Yes 151 62% 26 44 42 39
Don't know (excluded) 11 -- 4 5 1 1
Frames ANOVA
Chi Square TestFrames
Experience 
Training 
 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Note 1: GN = give neutral, GNN = give non-neutral, TN = take neutral, and TNN = take non-neutral. 
Note 2: Age was not reported for 3 individuals, and one age was misreported (age = 92) and excluded. Most 
participants were in their late teens (18 or 19) and early twenties. Eight were over 25.  
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Table 1.2: Comparing the Bayesian Information Criterion for group-based trajectory models with linear trajectories 
Model Null ∆BIC (N=256) ∆BIC (N=5376)
3 2 528.18 519.86
4 3 534.89 526.57
5 4 74.80 66.48
6 5 425.63 417.31
7 6 81.52 73.20
8 7 50.58 42.26
9 8 65.10 56.78
10 9 322.38 314.06
Number of
Linear TrajectoriesGroups
 
 
Note 1: The “model” column gives the number of groups (i.e., cooperative types) in the model of interest. The 
“null” column gives the number of groups in the model to which the model of interest is compared (i.e., the 
simpler model). 
Note 2: BIC is reported for 𝑁 = 256 and 𝑁 = 5376, the first of which is the number of participants and the 
second is the number of total measurements (i.e., 21 measurements per person). In theory, 𝑁 represents the 
number of independent measurements. The number of participants underestimates that theoretical value. 
Because intra-individual measurements are not totally independent, the number of measurements over 
estimates that theoretical value. The true value falls somewhere in between (Nagin, 2005, p. 68). 
Note 3: In general, the pattern of changes in the BIC, group size, and group significance for linear, quadratic, and 
cubic models were very similar. 
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Table 1.3: Summary statistics for unconditional and conditional decisions 
Unconditional cooperation 8.16 6.8492 8.0 1.5 12.0
Mean conditional cooperation 6.79 4.4513 7.6 2.9 10.0
Conditional cooperation
Others' cooperation = 0 2.00 5.0289 0.0 0.0 0.0
Others' cooperation = 1 2.21 4.7954 0.0 0.0 1.0
Others' cooperation = 2 2.52 4.5512 1.0 0.0 2.0
Others' cooperation = 3 3.01 4.5249 1.5 0.0 3.0
Others' cooperation = 4 3.29 4.2946 2.0 0.0 4.0
Others' cooperation = 5 4.27 4.6047 4.0 0.0 5.0
Others' cooperation = 6 4.57 4.4072 5.0 0.0 6.0
Others' cooperation = 7 5.13 4.6251 5.0 0.0 7.0
Others' cooperation = 8 5.78 4.7600 7.0 0.0 8.0
Others' cooperation = 9 6.08 4.8968 8.0 0.0 9.0
Others' cooperation = 10 7.04 5.3058 9.0 0.0 10.0
Others' cooperation = 11 7.73 5.6950 9.5 1.5 11.0
Others' cooperation = 12 8.29 5.8096 10.0 2.5 12.0
Others' cooperation = 13 8.68 6.0674 10.0 3.0 13.0
Others' cooperation = 14 8.98 6.3884 10.0 2.0 14.0
Others' cooperation = 15 9.52 6.8215 10.0 2.0 15.0
Others' cooperation = 16 9.89 7.3032 11.5 2.0 16.0
Others' cooperation = 17 10.24 7.6876 12.0 1.0 17.0
Others' cooperation = 18 10.72 7.9900 13.5 1.0 18.0
Others' cooperation = 19 11.00 8.3321 14.5 1.0 19.0
Others' cooperation = 20 11.54 8.7885 15.0 0.0 20.0
Interquartile
RangeMedian
Standard
DeviationMean
 
 
Note 1: Mean conditional cooperation is the within-person mean of conditional cooperation according to each 
individual’s conditional decision table. 
Note 2: Others’ cooperation refers to the possible average level of cooperation by others. 
Note 3: Interquartile range consists of the middle quartiles. 
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Table 1.4: GBTM trajectory estimates for the four-group model 
Intercept -9.986 (0.732) *** -3.309 (0.204) *** 5.192 (0.289) *** 11.6774 (0.607) ***
Others' cooperation 0.214 (0.056) *** 1.180 (0.017) *** -0.082 (0.026) *** 0.4566 (0.051) ***
Group size
Probability of group membership 18.7% (2.444) *** 51.1% (3.154) *** 23.4% (2.674) *** 6.7% (1.585) ***
Proportion assigned to group 18.8% NA 51.2% NA 23.4% NA 6.6% NA
Group 4
Dependent variable: Conditional cooperation
Non-Cooperators
Group 1
Conditional Cooperators
Group 2 Group 3
Low Cooperators High Cooperators
 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Note 1: The model for each trajectory was a censored normal linear regression model where an uncensored, latent variable for conditional cooperation was 
regressed on the possible average levels of cooperation by others. Thus, coefficients correspond to the latent variable. 
Note 2: Conditional cooperation was measured at all possible average levels of cooperation ranging from 0 to 20 points. 
Note 3: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Note 4: Group size is measured in two ways, the probability of group membership and the proportion assigned to the group via posterior probabilities. 
Note 5: Goodness of fit for this model was assessed with the Bayesian Information Criteria. However, the nearly identical values for probabilities of group 
membership and proportion assigned to the group also demonstrate the goodness of fit of the four-group model.  
Note 6: Group corresponds to cooperative type. 
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Table 1.5: Questionnaire summary statistics 
Questionnaire Item with Organizational Headers
Reference Dependence
Q01 I felt ownership of all of the possible project points 2.50 1.20 2.0 2.0 3.0
Q02 I felt ownership of only my 20 points 4.20 1.06 5.0 4.0 5.0
Own and Others' Outcomes
Q03 I wanted to earn as many points as I could 4.77 0.54 5.0 5.0 5.0
Q04 I wanted others to earn as many points as they could 2.91 1.31 3.0 2.0 4.0
Q05 I wanted to earn more points than others earned 3.46 1.48 4.0 2.0 5.0
Q06 I felt responsible only for myself, not for others, and not for the project 3.35 1.36 4.0 2.0 5.0
Own and Other's Actions
Q07 Allocating points to my personal account made me feel good 3.54 1.27 4.0 3.0 5.0
Q08 Allocating points to the project account made me feel good 3.22 1.14 3.0 2.5 4.0
Q09 I felt good when others allocated points to the project account 4.26 0.95 5.0 4.0 5.0
Q10 I felt bad when others allocated points to their personal accounts 3.21 1.33 3.0 2.0 4.0
Own and Others' Obligatory Actions
Q11 I felt obligated to allocate points to the project account 2.74 1.35 3.0 2.0 4.0
Q12 I felt like I had to allocate as many points to the project account as others did 2.76 1.35 3.0 2.0 4.0
Q13 I felt that others were obligated to allocate points to the project account 2.97 1.42 3.0 2.0 4.0
Q14 I felt that others were obligated to allocate as many points to the project account as I did 3.44 1.38 4.0 2.0 5.0
Q15 I felt cheated when others allocated points to their personal accounts 2.94 1.39 3.0 2.0 4.0
Q16 I felt cheated when others allocated more points to their personal accounts than I did 3.24 1.41 4.0 2.0 4.0
Concern about Prospective Losses
Q17 I was worried that others would allocate nothing to the project account 3.73 1.36 4.0 3.0 5.0
Q18 I had to allocate points to my personal account because I expected the project account to be small 4.11 1.18 5.0 4.0 5.0
Summary Statistics (N =256)
SDMean Median
Interquartile 
Range
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Table 1.5 continued: Questionnaire summary statistics 
Questionnaire Item with Organizational Headers
Confusion and Understanding
Q19 I fully understood the decision situation throughout the study 4.05 0.98 4.0 4.0 5.0
Q20 I understood the decision situation better over time 4.10 1.08 4.0 4.0 5.0
Q21 I was confused throughout the study 1.68 0.98 1.0 1.0 2.0
Satisfaction
Q22 I was very satisfied with the results of the decision situations 3.24 1.11 3.0 3.0 4.0
Q23 I believe that others were very satisfied with the results of the decision situations 3.18 0.89 3.0 3.0 4.0
Summary Statistics (N =256)
SDMean Median
Interquartile 
Range
 
Note 1: Questionnaire responses scaled from 1 for Strongly Disagree (SD) to 5 for Strongly Agree (SA).  
Note 2: Organizational headers not shown to study participants. 
Note 3: Items in italics were included in the exploratory factor analysis (EFA). 
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Table 1.6: Questionnaire means by cooperative type with Kruskal Wallis statistics 
Questionnaire Item with Organizational Headers N  = 48 131 60 17 X 2 p
Reference Dependence
Q01 I felt ownership of all of the possible project points 2.33 a 2.43 a 2.67 a 2.88 a 5.86 0.1188
Q02 I felt ownership of only my 20 points 4.46 a 4.11 a,b 4.32 a,b 3.76 b 9.45 0.0239 **
Own and Others' Outcomes
Q03 I wanted to earn as many points as I could 4.92 a 4.73 a,b 4.87 a 4.35 b 16.64 0.0008 ***
Q04 I wanted others to earn as many points as they could 2.17 a 3.24 b 2.55 a 3.76 b 37.10 <.0001 ***
Q05 I wanted to earn more points than others earned 4.00 a 3.23 b,c 3.75 a,b 2.71 c 16.38 0.0010 ***
Q06 I felt responsible only for myself, not for others, and not for the project 4.25 a 3.01 b 3.55 b 2.76 b 34.72 <.0001 ***
Own and Other's Actions
Q07 Allocating points to my personal account made me feel good 3.94 a 3.25 b 3.97 a 3.18 a,b 20.83 0.0001 ***
Q08 Allocating points to the project account made me feel good 2.35 a 3.46 b,c 3.18 b 4.00 c 38.84 <.0001 ***
Q09 I felt good when others allocated points to the project account 4.21 a 4.28 a 4.20 a 4.47 a 3.43 0.3300
Q10 I felt bad when others allocated points to their personal accounts 2.92 a 3.37 a 3.08 a 3.29 a 4.59 0.2046
Own and Others' Obligations
Q11 I felt obligated to allocate points to the project account 1.81 a 3.05 b 2.67 b 3.29 b 34.05 <.0001 ***
Q12 I felt like I had to allocate as many points to the project account as others did 1.85 a 3.07 b 2.63 b 3.35 b 33.21 <.0001 ***
Q13 I felt that others were obligated to allocate points to the project account 2.44 a 3.13 b 2.93 a,b 3.41 a,b 10.03 0.0183 **
Q14 I felt that others were obligated to allocate as many points to the project account as I did 2.54 a 3.83 b 3.17 a,c 3.94 c,b 33.43 <.0001 ***
Q15 I felt cheated when others allocated points to their personal accounts 2.17 a 3.15 b 3.03 b 3.18 a,b 19.18 0.0003 ***
Q16 I felt cheated when others allocated more points to their personal accounts than I did 2.40 a 3.50 b 3.37 b 3.24 a,b 19.65 0.0002 ***
Concern about Prospective Losses
Q17 I was worried that others would allocate nothing to the project account 3.40 a 3.91 a 3.68 a 3.53 a 5.46 0.1412
Q18 I had to allocate points to my personal account because I expected the project account 4.38 a 4.00 a 4.15 a 4.12 a 4.66 0.1983
to be small
Krukal Wallis 
(N =256, df  = 3)NC CC LC HC
Means
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Table 1.6 continued: Questionnaire means by cooperative type with Kruskal Wallis statistics 
Questionnaire Item with Organizational Headers N  = 48 131 60 17 X 2 p
Confusion and Understanding
Q19 I fully understood the decision situation throughout the study 4.40 a 4.07 a,b 3.93 b 3.29 b 14.18 0.0027 ***
Q20 I understood the decision situation better over time 3.83 a 4.09 a 4.37 a 3.94 a 3.98 0.2638
Q21 I was confused throughout the study 1.58 a 1.62 a 1.87 a 1.76 a 4.02 0.2593
Satisfaction
Q22 I was very satisfied with the results of the decision situations 3.65 a 3.09 a 3.27 a 3.12 a 8.02 0.0456 **
Q23 I believe that others were very satisfied with the results of the decision situations 3.35 a 3.15 a 3.07 a 3.29 a 3.19 0.3636
NC CC LC HC
Means Krukal Wallis 
(N =256, df  = 3)
 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Note 1: Means based on a Likert scale from 1 for Strongly Disagree (SD) to 5 for Strongly Agree (SA). 
Note 2: NC=non-cooperator, CC=conditional cooperators, LC=low cooperator, and HC=high cooperator. 
Note 3: Organizational headers not shown to participants.  
Note 4: Items in italics were included in the exploratory factor analysis (EFA). 
Note 5: For items Q02, Q13, Q19, and Q22, Kruskal Wallis tests among all four types were not significant when the Bonferonni correction for multiple 
comparison was applied. The Bonferroni correction is a modification of the threshold for statistical significance, 𝛼, based on the number of measurements, 
𝑛. In this case statistical significance at the 0.05 level requires a p-value less than 𝛼 𝑛⁄ = 0.05 23⁄ = 0.0022. 
Note 6: The results of pairwise nonparametric tests between cooperative types are summarized by the superscripts appearing to the right of each mean. 
Within a row, when two types share superscripts, we cannot reject the hypothesis that medians are equal. Within a row, when two types do not share a 
superscript, the difference between medians is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. These pairwise tests employed the Dwass, Steel, Critchlow-Fligner 
(DSCF) multiple comparison analysis, which is based on pairwise two-sample Wilcoxon comparisons. 
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Table 1.7: Questionnaire factors and factor loadings 
Mean
Response
Own-Other 
Obligations
Others' 
Actions Self Interest
Factor 1: Feelings about own and others' obligations
Q11 I felt obligated to allocate points to the project account 2.74 0.7902 0.2825 -0.3377
Q12 I felt like I had to allocate as many points to the project account as others did 2.76 0.7543 0.2765 -0.2944
Q13 I felt that others were obligated to allocate points to the project account 2.97 0.6299 0.3476 -0.1679
Q14 I felt that others were obligated to allocate as many points to the project account as I did 3.44 0.6901 0.5867 -0.1831
Q08 Allocating points to the project account made me feel good 3.22 0.5737 0.3716 -0.3781
Factor 2: Perceptions of others' actions
Q16 I felt cheated when others allocated more points to their personal accounts than I did 3.24 0.4773 0.8643 -0.0758
Q15 I felt cheated when others allocated points to their personal accounts 2.94 0.4763 0.8041 -0.1358
Q17 I was worried that others would allocate nothing to the project account 3.73 0.2954 0.6216 -0.0871
Q10 I felt bad when others allocated points to their personal accounts 3.21 0.2775 0.5766 -0.1721
Q09 I felt good when others allocated points to the project account 4.26 0.0634 0.3615 0.0423
Factor 3: Self-interest
Q05 I wanted to earn more points than others earned 3.46 -0.2201 0.0385 0.7027
Q07 Allocating points to my personal account made me feel good 3.54 -0.2666 -0.1516 0.6703
Q06 I felt responsible only for myself, not for others, and not for the project 3.35 -0.5502 -0.1888 0.6177
Q03 I wanted to earn as many points as I could 4.77 -0.1319 -0.1014 0.3248
Questionnaire Item
Factor Loadings
 
Note 1: Mean response was based on a Likert scale from 1 for Strongly Disagree to 5 for Strongly Agree. 
Note 2: Items regarding confusion (Q19 – Q21), satisfaction (Q22 and Q23), and ownership (Q01 and Q02) were removed. 
Note 3: Item Q04 loaded on two factors and was removed. 
Note 4: Item Q18 was removed because absolute factor loadings were small (<0.3). 
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Table 1.8: Pair-wise comparisons of cooperative types 
t p t p t p
Non-Cooperators
Factor 1: Own-other obligations a,1 a,1 a,1
Factor 2: Others' actions a,1 b,2 3
Factor 3: Self-interest a,1 a,1
Conditional Cooperators
Factor 1: Own-other obligations b,1
Factor 2: Others' actions
Factor 3: Self-interest a,1
Low Cooperators
Factor 1: Own-other obligations b,3
Factor 2: Others' actions
Factor 3: Self-interest a,1
Comparison Cooperative Type
Conditional 
Cooperators
(N=131)
Low Cooperators
(N=60)
High Cooperators
(N=17)
-More motivated by 
obligations
-Less self-interested
B
as
el
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e 
C
o
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e 
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p
e
-More concerned with 
others' actions
-More concerned with 
others' actions
-Less self-interested -Less self-interested
-Less motivated by 
obligations
-More self-interested
-More motivated by 
obligations
-More motivated by 
obligations
-More motivated by 
obligations
-More concerned with 
others' actions
 
 
Note 1: Comments describe statistically significant differences in factors score of the comparison type (column) relative to the baseline type (row) according 
to paired t-tests and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney factor scores. 
Note 2: Superscript a, b, and c refer to statistically significant t-tests at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels with the Bonferroni correction for 𝑛 = 6 comparisons.  
Note 3: Superscript 1, 2, and 3 refer to statistically significant Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test with the Dwass, Steel, Critchlow-Fligner (DSCF) correction for 
multiple comparisons. 
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Table 1.9: Cooperation means by frame and Kruskal Wallis tests for framing effects 
 
 
Note 1: GN = give neutral, GNN = give non-neutral, TN = take neutral, and TNN = take non-neutral. 
Note 2: Mean conditional cooperation is the within-person mean of conditional cooperation according to each 
individual’s conditional decision table. 
Note 3: Others’ cooperation refers to all possible average level of cooperation by others. 
Note 4: The results of pairwise nonparametric tests between frames using the Dwass, Steel, Critchlow-Fligner 
(DSCF) multiple comparison analysis yielded no statistically significant differences at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 1.10: Questionnaire means by frame and Kruskal Wallis tests for framing effects 
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Table 1.10 continued: Questionnaire means by frame and Kruskal Wallis tests for framing effects 
 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Note 1: Questionnaire responses scaled from 1 for Strongly Disagree (SD) to 5 for Strongly Agree (SA). 
Note 2: GN=give neutral, GNN=give non-neutral, TN=take neutral, and TNN=take non-neutral 
Note 3: Organizational headers not shown to participants.  
Note 4: Items in italics were included in the exploratory factor analysis. 
Note 5: None of the questionnaire responses differed significantly across frame when the Bonferroni correction (𝛼 𝑛⁄ = 0.05 23⁄ = 0.0022) was applied. 
Note 6: The results of pairwise nonparametric tests between frames using the Dwass, Steel, Critchlow-Fligner (DSCF) multiple comparison analysis yielded 
only one statistically significant difference at the 0.05 level. Namely, questionnaire response to Q09 differed statistically between the take non-neutral and 
give neutral frames. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1.1: The experiment 
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  Language 
 
  Neutral Non-Neutral 
Action 
Give 
 
Give-Neutral 
(GN) 
 
 
Give Non-Neutral 
(GNN) 
Take 
 
Take Neutral 
(TN) 
 
 
Take Non-Neutral 
(TNN) 
 
Figure 1.2: 2 × 2 Factorial framing design 
Note 1: Action and language are the two experimental treatments used to create four different frames. 
Note 2: Each of the frames was assigned to a different set of 4 sessions. 
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Figure 1.3: Distributions of conditional cooperation and mean conditional cooperation 
Note 1: Each box and whisker plot represents the distribution of conditional cooperation for all 256 at each 
possible average level of cooperation by others. Boxes show the interquartile range (25th to 75th percentile). 
Whiskers extend to the maximum and minimum. The median is represented with a horizontal line, and the mean is 
represented with a diamond.  
Note 2: Mean conditional cooperation is the within-person mean of conditional cooperation according to each 
individual’s conditional decision table.  
Note 3: Average mean conditional cooperation was 6.79 points. 
61 
 
 Panel A Panel B 
 
  
Panel C Panel D 
  
Panel E Panel F 
  
 Possible Average Level of Cooperation by Others 
 
Figure 1.4: Unconditional and conditional cooperation for selected individuals 
Note 1: The dashed line represents unconditional cooperation. Dots represent conditional cooperation. 
Note 2: Individuals were selected to represent the four cooperative types that emerged via group-based trajectory 
modeling (GBTM).  
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Figure 1.5: Predicted and average conditional cooperation by cooperative type 
Note 1: Predicted values are based on the four-group linear trajectory model. 
Note 2: Individuals were assigned to cooperative type according to the highest posterior probability then average 
conditional cooperation was computed. 
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Chapter 2 
Heterogeneous Framing Effects in a Repeated Public Good Dilemma 
 
Abstract: This paper focuses on how give and take frames are constructed in a linear, repeated 
public good experiment, how those formulations influence behavior, and how framing effects 
differ among different types of decision makers. Previous framing studies create frame via a 
wide variety of techniques, often “stacking the deck” in favor of a framing effect. As a result, it 
is not often clear what element(s) of the framing design is (are) responsible for the framing 
effect. The inherent heterogeneity among decision-makers adds another layer of complexity to 
understanding framing. With few exceptions, framing and heterogeneity among decision 
makers in public good dilemmas have been examined separately. Where they have been jointly 
explored, results have been ambiguous. In this research, I establish frames via a 2 × 2 factorial 
design that decomposes frame along two dimensions, the action implicit in the decision (i.e., 
give or take) and the language used to describe the decision (i.e., neutral or non-neutral). Each 
of four frames was imposed on a different set of study participants, whose decision-making 
types were previously determined via a separate dilemma. Among the four types of decision-
makers, individuals who were expected not to cooperate cooperated trivially or not at all and 
demonstrated no sensitivity to framing. Individuals previously assessed as low, conditional, and 
high cooperators cooperated at distinct and non-trivial levels that declined over the course of 
the repeated dilemma. Where framing effects were observed, the two dimensions of frame did 
not uniformly influence every type of decision-maker. Non-neutral language yielded lower 
cooperation in the give treatment among conditional and low cooperators. Taking yielded 
lower cooperation in the neutral treatment among low cooperators. 
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1 Introduction 
Decades of research on decision-making in public good experiments resoundingly 
conclude that cooperation varies considerably in public good dilemmas, and individuals 
respond differently to different presentations of otherwise identical decision situations. With 
few exceptions, however, heterogeneity among decision makers and framing have been 
examined separately. Within those mostly separate bodies of research, existing studies that 
classified decision-makers into groups provided categories that were not fully representative of 
heterogeneity and/or did not predict cooperation in repeated public good dilemmas (Jackman, 
2016b). Among framing studies, frames often simultaneously differ along more than one 
dimension, combining notions of positive versus negative, gains versus losses, giving versus 
taking, and so on. Casting information in positive versus negative light, in terms of gains versus 
losses, or as giving versus taking generally leads to more or less cooperation. However, the 
complexity of public good frames and the layering of design elements to create frames 
confound understanding how different elements of the framing design influence behavior. 
Where heterogeneity and framing have been jointly explored, results have been ambiguous 
(e.g., Park, 2000; Sonnemans, Schram, & Offerman, 1998). 
Via a novel 2 × 2 factorial design that decomposed frame along two dimensions, action 
(i.e., give or take) and language (i.e., neutral or non-neutral), this research examines the 
differential effects of frame on different types of decision-makers in an incentivized, linear 
repeated public good experiment. This research distinguishes itself from previous work in three 
ways. First, independent of the repeated dilemma, decision makers were classified into four 
different types that proved to be highly predictive of behavior in the repeated public good 
dilemma. Individuals who were not expected to cooperate cooperated trivially or not at all. 
Individuals previously assessed as low, conditional, and high cooperators cooperated at distinct 
and non-trivial levels that declined over the course of the repeated dilemma. Second, different 
types of decision-makers responded to framing differently. Specifically, the decisions of 
individuals previously identified as non-cooperators did not differ across frames, but individuals 
previously identified as low, conditional, and high cooperators did. Third, framing effects 
emerged from the interaction of the two dimensions of frame and did not uniformly influence 
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every type of decision-maker. Non-neutral language yielded lower cooperation in the give 
treatment among conditional, low, and high cooperators. The take treatment yielded lower 
cooperation in the neutral treatment among low and high cooperators. 
This paper is the second in a series of three papers, all of which are based on the same 
multi-part linear public good experiment. The experiment included a one-shot public good 
dilemma, a repeated public good dilemma, and a questionnaire. It was designed to assess and 
classify heterogeneity in behavior and motives among decision-makers (paper 1), examine how 
framing effects differ for different types of decision-makers (paper 2), parse the role of 
reference dependence and the language in framing effects (paper 2), and examine the 
channel/mechanism through which frames operate and how those channels differ for different 
types of decision-makers (paper 3). In this paper, I address the second and third of these 
objectives. I analyze cooperation decisions in the repeated public good dilemma only and 
incorporate decision-maker types and motives as assessed in the first paper46 
In the following, I first describe the existing landscape of research upon which this study 
builds, including public good experiments, heterogeneity among decision-makers, and framing. 
I then describe the study participants, experimental design, and empirical methods. I present 
results, then close with a discussion and conclusions. 
 
2 Background 
Although stylized models, repeated public good experiments nevertheless capture the 
fundamental and essential elements of real-world public good dilemmas, like public education, 
disaster relief, defense, public radio, and environmental goods. In the laboratory and in the real 
world, public goods must be created or maintained by decision-makers subject to a conflict 
between own and group interests, and public goods are shared, without exclusion, by 
everyone. Real-world public goods are often provided through charitable giving, where appeals 
to social responsibility and social comparisons are important tools for motivating cooperation, 
or through policy. Mandates dominate in the policy sphere where price-based incentive also 
                                                     
46 These three papers make-up the three chapters of this dissertation. In this paper, papers 1 and 3 are cited as 
Jackman (2016b) and Jackman (2016a), respectively. 
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play a role in public goods provision. However, we are beginning to see private market 
interventions that echo approaches to charitable giving and leverage findings from behavioral 
research. Examples include voluntary green electricity programs that appeal to a sense of 
altruism or feelings of obligation (Jacobsen, Kotchen, & Vandenbergh, 2012) and voluntary 
energy conservation efforts motivated through injunctive and descriptive norms (Allcott, 2011). 
Framing is a potential tool for motivating greater provision of public goods that, in the context 
of an inherently heterogeneous populations of decision-makers, is not yet well-understood. 
This study moves that frontier. 
 
2.1 Public good experiments and heterogeneous cooperation 
Public good experiments are simultaneous games with more than two players that 
intend to reproduce the essential non-excludable and non-rival attributes of pure public 
goods.47 In the standard public good experiment,48 every individual decides how to distribute 
her personal endowment between herself and the group. Allocations to the group constitute 
“cooperation.” In the standard public good experiment with linear payoffs (𝑝𝑖), every individual 
(𝑖) decides how to distribute her personal endowment (𝑤𝑖) between herself and the group. 
Allocations to the group (𝑔𝑖) constitute cooperation and are increased by a positive factor, 𝑘, 
and then divided among 𝑛 participants. The result is a marginal per capita return (MPCR) of 
𝛾 = 𝑘 𝑛⁄ . Payoffs are typically given by the following: 
 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛾 ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1  (1) 
Under the usual assumptions of rational choice theory, the dominant strategy is to allocate 
nothing to the group even though everyone is better off if everyone cooperates. This is clearly 
not what we observe in real world situations where contributions to the Red Cross, purchases 
of carbon offsets, or voluntary participation in renewable electricity programs are common, nor 
in public good experiments where levels of cooperation differ significantly across individuals.49  
                                                     
47 Non-excludable means that everyone has access to the public good. Non-rival means that consumption by one 
individual does not affect others’ consumption. Cooperation consists of providing or maintaining the public good. 
48 I refer to public good dilemmas that match the rules and payoffs described here as “standard” and public good 
dilemmas that do not as “non-standard.” 
49 See Chauduri (2011) for a recent, selective survey of laboratory public good experiments and Ledyard (1995) for 
an older and exhaustive review of public good experiments. 
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The heterogeneity in cooperation observed in public good experiments (Chaudhuri, 
2011; Ledyard, 1995) combined with substantial evidence for a wide variety of preferences, 
decision rules, and beliefs (Della Vigna, 2009) very strongly suggests that different decision 
processes are underway for different types of decision-makers. Going back to 1996, “evidence 
from economics as well as psychological experiments on the voluntary provision of public goods 
indicates that substantial differences exist in the attitudes of subjects toward contributing” 
(Offerman, Sonnemans, & Schram, 1996). Many efforts to characterize heterogeneity have 
attempted to match behavior to preconceived categories of decision-makers that 
underrepresent their respective study populations and/or are not good predictors of behavior 
in repeated public good dilemmas (Jackman, 2016b). In contrast, Jackman (2016b) employed a 
combination of group-based trajectory modeling and exploratory factor analysis to identify four 
differently motivated, behavior-based types of decision-makers and assessed type for all of the 
participants in this study. This paper demonstrates that those types actually predict behavior in 
a repeated public good dilemma. In other words, different types of decision-makers as assessed 
in Jackman (2016b) behave in statistically distinct ways in a repeated public good dilemma. 
 
2.2 Framing and heterogeneous decision-makers 
Another robust finding of public good experiments is that decision-makers often 
respond differently to the same information based on how the decision is presented, a 
phenomenon called a “framing effect.” However, there are two important challenges to 
advancing the science. First, framing experiments almost always contrast frames that differ in 
more than one way, making it difficult to match the framing effect to its source. Second, most 
framing studies ignore heterogeneity among decision-makers, which could conceal effects and 
underlying mechanisms. 
To be clear, frames are created by presenting the same information differently. Framing 
effects are observed when decision-makers subject to different frames choose differently. 
These definitions may seem to imply that frames are “objective” and imposed on decision-
makers. However, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman made the important point that frames 
are also subjective and therefore based on individuals’ perceptions (Kahneman & Tversky, 
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1979; Tversky & Kahneman 1981, 1986, 1991). In other words, frame is defined as both the 
“formulation to which decision makers are exposed” and “the interpretation that they 
construct for themselves” (Dufwenberg, Gächter, & Hennig-Schmidt, 2011 citing Kahneman, 
2000, p. xiv). In this study, frame refers only to how the frame is constructed. 
The standard frame for a public good experiment describes the decision as a voluntary 
contribution or public good provision. Many dilemmas are presented as counterpoints to the 
voluntary contribution frame, including resource dilemmas (e.g., Parks, 1994), commons 
dilemmas (e.g., Apesteguia & Maier-Rigaud, 2006; Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Ostrom, 2006), 
take-some games (e.g., Bougherara, Denant-Boemont, & Masclet, 2011; Fleishman, 1988; 
Rutte, Wilke, & Messick, 1987; van Dijk & Wilke, 2000), and negative frames (e.g., Andreoni, 
1995; Park, 2000; Sonnemans et al., 1998; Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 1999). As in contribution 
experiments, these studies typically show that many individuals cooperate and cooperation 
varies considerably across individuals. However, cooperation in these counterpoint dilemmas 
tends to be lower even when, from the perspective of a perfectly rational actor, the decision 
situations were strategically identical to decision situations in contribution experiments. 
Framing studies that maintain the essential non-rival and non-excludable nature of 
public goods contrast giving versus taking, leaving versus keeping, being generous versus 
employing restraint, achieving gains versus avoiding losses, positive versus negative, doing good 
versus doing or preventing bad, cooperative versus competitive, and so on. Though the 
evidence is somewhat mixed, several patterns emerge: 1) contribution frames generally yield 
more cooperation than take frames (c.f., Bougherara et al., 2011; Brewer & Kramer, 1986; 
Cubitt, Drouvelis, & Gächter, 2011; Dufwenberg et al., 2011; Fleishman, 1988; Rutte et al., 
1987), 2) avoiding losses motivates more action than pursuing gains (e.g., Levin, Gaeth, 
Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998; Sonnemans et al., 1998), 3) 
positive frames yield more cooperation than negative frames (c.f., Andreoni, 1995; Cookson, 
2000; Levin et al., 2002; Levin et al., 1998; Park 2000; Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 1999), and 4) 
wording like “I” instead of “We” and labels like “Wall Street” and “Stock Market” instead of 
“Community” or no label at all yield different levels of cooperation (c.f., Cookson, 2000; 
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Dufwenberg et al., 2011; Ellingsen, Johannesson, Mollerstrom, & Munkhammer, 2012; 
Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004; Rege & Telle, 2004).50  
Scrutinizing the myriad ways frames are constructed in public good dilemmas reveals 
three differences typically present between contrasting frames: the size and/or location of the 
initial endowment, the words used to label and describe the decision, and the characterization 
of the externality resulting from decisions to provide or not to provide for the public good. The 
following examples illustrate these three attributes of framing design and how these 
approaches are intertwined. Andreoni (1995) contrasted cooperation in positive and negative 
frames of a standard repeated public good dilemma with equivalent linear payoffs. Frames 
differed in the imposition of positive versus negative externalities, which was the focus of the 
study, but initial allocations also differed. In both frames, an individual received an initial 
“budget” of 60 tokens; individuals in the negative frame also received 120 tokens in “automatic 
earnings.” Andreoni found more cooperation in the positive frame that he attributed to the 
positive framing of the externality. However, if individuals evaluate gains and losses relative to 
some reference value, then automatic earnings could have played a role in the framing effect in 
addition to or instead of the imposition of positive or negative externalities.  
In another example, Dufwenberg et al. (2011) examined framing according to a 2 × 2 
factorial design, give frame versus take frame and community labeling versus neutral labeling.51 
Focusing on the first dimension, in the give treatment, “every participant receive[d] an 
‘endowment’ of 20 Thaler” – their word for monetary units – and were instructed to 
“contribute” up to 20 Thaler to the project. In the take treatment, instructions stated that 
“there [were] 60 Thaler in a project of your group,” and individuals were instructed to “take” up 
to 20 Thaler from the project. Their frames differed in both the location of the initial 
endowment, and the words used to describe the decision. However, in addition to contrasting 
“give” and “take” across frames, “give” and “keep” were used interchangeably within frames, 
                                                     
50 Ellingsen et al., (2012), Liberman et al. (2004), and Rege & Telle (2004) were Prisoners’ Dilemma experiments. 
51 Neutral and community refer to the ways that Dufwenberg et al. (2011) labelled their experiment for different 
treatment groups. In some treatment groups, the experiment was labelled as a “the community experiment.” In 
other treatment groups, the experiment was labelled as “the experiment.” Note that quoted text is there English 
translation from German. 
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as were “take” and “leave.”52 Though logically equivalent, these language differences could 
comprise another difference between frames with important behavioral consequences (van 
Dijk & Wilke, 2000).  
Synthesizing the design lessons from Andreoni (1995) and Dufwenberg et al. (2011), the 
framing design implemented in this research first recognized the relationship between the 
location of the initial endowment and the action implied by locating the endowment with the 
individual (i.e., give) or with the group (i.e., take), making action the first dichotomous 
dimension of the framing design. This framing design also structured decisions so that the size, 
or perceived size, of the initial endowment was equal and not confounded by “initial earnings.” 
In addition, this framing design acknowledged the potential power of the words imbedded in 
the instructions and avoided the assumption that logically equivalent wording yields equivalent 
outcomes. Thus, language was identified as the second dichotomous dimension of frame. 
“Allocate” was used consistently in neutral treatments, and only the words “give” and “take” 
were used in non-neutral treatments.53 Furthermore, the framing design was intended to allow 
at most two differences between any two frames, a difference in action and/or in language. 
Thus, in every frame, the externality implicit in giving, not taking, or making allocations to the 
group was always characterized as weakly positive. The result was the 2 × 2 factorial framing 
design illustrated in Figure 2.1 and four frames – give neutral (GN), give non-neutral (GNN), 
take neutral (TN), and take non-neutral (TNN) – that were quite similar, but also held the 
potential for significantly different behavior.  
The 2 × 2 framing design in this study also acknowledged two related theories regarding 
the mechanisms underlying framing effects: 1) reference-dependence and loss aversion 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman 1981, 1986, 1991) and 2) valence-based 
attribute framing (Levin et al., 2002; Levin et al., 1998).54 Reference dependence and loss 
                                                     
52 Quoted text is from the English translation. 
53 To my knowledge, there is no evidence that “allocate” is neutral or more neutral than the words “give” or 
“take.” This is an assumption.  
54 Cookson (2000) describes the theory of reference dependence, per Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky 
and Kahneman (1991), as the “most well-developed theory of framing.” Levin et al. (1998) and Levin et al. (2002) 
provide a typology of framing effects in which they link the positive and negative ways in which frames are created 
(i.e., through attributes, goals, and risky choices) to different levels of cooperation. They attribute goal and risky 
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aversion state that “the carriers of value are gains and losses defined relative to a reference 
point” and “losses loom larger than gains” of the same magnitude (Tversky & Kahnman, 1991). 
Valence-based attribute framing “casts the same critical information in a positive or negative 
light” that evokes positive or negative associations (Levin et al., 1998).55  
Neither theory captures the full breadth and complexity of public good frames. Recall 
that public good frames incorporate at least three elements: the location of the initial 
endowment, the wording and labels used to describe the decision; and the characterization of 
the externality implicit in the public good. In addition, a persistent challenge for both theories is 
that reference points, gains and loss, and positive and negative associations ultimately depend 
upon the perceptions of decision-makers. By separating the effects of the location of the initial 
endowment from the effects of language, this framing design delineates the effects of 
reference points and valence in a way not previously explored in the framing literature. 
The second challenge for framing research is that few studies address the interaction of 
framing and heterogeneity among decision-makers. Exceptions include Park (2000), who 
replicated Andreoni’s (1995) warm-glow and cold prickle experiment, and incorporated value 
orientation determined via the Decomposed Game.56 Like Andreoni, Park found more 
cooperation in the positive frame. He also found that the negative frame was most salient 
among individuals with an individualistic orientation. Sonnemans et al. (1998) studied provision 
of a public good contrasted with prevention of a public bad via non-standard, step-level public 
good games. Value orientation was also assessed via the Decomposed Game. They observed 
greater cooperation in later rounds in the positive frame, but they also found little predictive 
value in value orientation. Parks (1994) casts some doubt on the applicability of the 
Decomposed Game to public good dilemmas. He found that value orientation determined via 
the Decomposed Game was not correlated with cooperation in a standard public good 
dilemma. Avoiding the apparent shortcomings of the Decomposed Game and based on the 
                                                     
choice framing effects to reference dependence, loss aversion, and prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
They ascribe attribute framing effects to associative processing. 
55 Cox and Beland (2013) offer an alternate definition of valence, namely “the emotional quality of an idea that 
makes it more or less attractive.”  
56 Value orientation corresponds to “preferences regarding one’s own welfare relative to the welfare of others” 
(Park 2000) and was assessed with Decomposed Game as in Liebrand (1984) and Offerman et al. (1996).  
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notion that the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior, Jackman (2016b) assessed 
heterogeneity in via the incentivized, two-stage, one-shot public good dilemma that preceded 
the repeated public good dilemma in this experiment.  
 
3 Methods 
This paper focuses on behavior in the repeated public good dilemma that is a core 
component of the experiment illustrated in Figure 2.2. The primary objectives of this research 
are to examine how the different elements of framing design influence behavior in the 
repeated public good dilemma and how framing effects differ for different types of decision-
makers in a repeated public good dilemma. An important, secondary objective includes testing 
if the typing strategy for decision-makers developed in Jackman (2016b), and based on the one-
shot public good dilemma, actually predicts behavior in the repeated public good dilemma.  
In the following, I describe the study participants, experiment, decision situation, 
framing design, and modeling and analyses. When I report statistics, I use an alpha level of 0.05 
for all statistical tests and describe results with p-values less than 0.05 as “statistically 
significant.” I use the phrases “highly significant” for p-values less than 0.01, “weakly 
significant” for p-values between 0.05 and 0.1, and “marginally significant” for p-values close to 
but greater than 0.1. All analyses for this paper were generated using SAS® software.57 
 
3.1 Study Participants 
Experimental subjects were recruited from an existing pool of potential participants 
using the School of Information On-line Recruitment System for Experimental Economics 
(ORSEE) at the University of Michigan. The vast majority of prospective participants were 
students. Prospective participants received an email inviting them to participate in a “decision-
making experiment” for which they would receive “$5 compensation for showing up” and 
“approximately $20 (including show-up compensation)” if they completed the experiment.  
                                                     
57 Version 9.4 for Windows, Copyright © 2002-2012 by SAS Institute Inc. SAS and all other SAS Institute Inc. 
product or service names are registered trademarks or trademarks of SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA. 
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In total, 256 adults participated in the experiment via 16 different sessions consisting of 
16 people per session. Each participant took part in only one session. As reported in Table 2.1, 
the average age of participants was 20.5 years (𝑁 = 252, 𝑆𝐷 = 4.16), 54 percent were women, 
37 percent reported having no training in economics, and 38 percent of participants reported 
having no previous experience with “a study like this one.” Table 2.1 also reports the 
distribution of participants among the four types of decision-makers assessed via the one-shot 
dilemma and Group-Based Trajectory Modeling (GBTM)58 in Jackman (2016b). Nineteen percent 
of participants were classified as non-cooperators (NC), 51 percent were conditional 
cooperators (CC), 23 percent were low cooperators (LC), and 7 percent were high 
cooperators.59 
Four sessions were assigned to each of the four frames in advance and with the 
expectation that the individuals assigned to each frame would, on average, be similar with 
regard to age, gender, training in economics, prior experience with studies like this one, and 
type of decision-maker. As reported in Table 2.1, participants’ age (𝐹(3, 𝑁 = 252) = 1.04, 𝑝 =
0.3745), training in economics (𝑋2 (3, 𝑁 = 251) = 0.68, 𝑝 = 0.8784), and cooperative type 
(𝑋2 (9, 𝑁 = 256) = 11.29, 𝑝 = 0.2566) did not differ significantly across the four frames, but 
there was a marginal association between gender and frame (𝑋2 (3, 𝑁 = 256) = 6.09, 𝑝 =
0.1073) and a highly significant association between experience and frame (𝑋2 (3, 𝑁 = 245) =
13.35, 𝑝 = 0.0039). Subsequent analyses controlled for these differences. 
 
                                                     
58 Group-Based Trajectory Modeling (GBTM) was developed by Daniel S. Nagin, Bobby L. Jones, and others to 
empirically identify groups of individuals with similar patterns of behavior over time (Jones & Nagin, 2007; Jones, 
Nagin, & Roeder, 2001; Nagin, 1999, 2005). It is an empirical method that simultaneously 1) identifies groups of 
individuals with similar patterns of behavior, 2) estimates the likelihoods that an individual belongs to each group, 
and 3) models within-group behavior. Technically, GBTM is a specialized form of “finite mixture modeling” that 
simultaneously a) estimates a maximum likelihood model, b) the likelihoods of membership in each group, and c) 
the cooperation trajectory for each group via a double-limit censored normal regression model (a.k.a., double limit 
Tobit model). 
59Jackman (2016b) also showed that motives differed systematically among the four types of decision-makers. 
Specifically, non-cooperators reported more self-interest, less concern with others’ actions, and weaker or no 
feelings of obligation compared to conditional and high cooperators. Low cooperators were similar to non-
cooperators with regard to self-interest, but otherwise were more strongly motivated by feelings of obligation and 
perceptions of others’ actions. Low cooperators, however, also differed from conditional and high cooperators. 
Low cooperators were significantly more self-interested than conditional and high cooperators and less motivated 
by feelings of obligation. 
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3.2 The Experiment 
The full experiment consisted of five components – instructions, practice questions, a 
one-shot public good dilemma, a repeated public good dilemma, and a questionnaire. See 
Figure 2.2 for an illustration of the experiment and the Appendix for the researcher script and 
participant instructions. The experiment was conducted via 16 separate sessions. Every session 
included exactly 16 people, and each participant took part in only one session. Each of the four 
frames was assigned to a different set of four sessions. The experiment was programmed and 
conducted using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) in the School of Information 
experimental laboratory at the University of Michigan. 
Each session commenced when recruits arrived at the waiting room. The first 16 recruits 
to arrive participated in the session. Additional recruits were paid $5 for showing up and left. 
Study participants were then invited into the computer laboratory where each individual chose 
to sit at one of 16 desktop computers separated by partitions. Participants were provided with 
written, frame-specific instructions stating that “the experiment consist[ed] of a series of 
decision situations” and explaining the decision situation and payoffs (see the Appendix). 
Instructions were also read aloud. To further ensure participants understood the decision 
situation and before the experiment could proceed, all participants were required to answer 
ten practice questions correctly.  
At this point, the one-shot public good dilemma60 proceeded in randomly assigned 
anonymous groups of four. In the one-shot public good dilemma, participants encountered two 
formulations of the same decision situation, an unconditional decision in which participants did 
not know others’ decisions and 21 decisions conditioned on the hypothetical average decisions 
of others. To conclude the one-shot dilemma, each participant was shown his decision, his 
earnings, and the average decision of others in his four-person group.  
The repeated public good dilemma, which is the focus of this paper, proceeded in 
randomly re-matched, anonymous groups of four. It began with onscreen instructions that 
                                                     
60 The one-shot dilemma was patterned after the “P-experiment” employed by Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) 
and Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr, (2001). In Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), the one-shot dilemma preceded 
repeated dilemma decisions for some subjects and followed repeated dilemma decisions for others. They found no 
statistically significant difference in cooperation between subjects who encountered the one-shot dilemma before 
or after the repeated dilemma. 
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were also read aloud. Before the repeated dilemma commenced, participants were informed 
that they would encounter the same decision 10 times as part of different anonymous groups 
of four that would be randomly assigned and reassigned for each decision. Participants then 
responded to a series of ten identical decision situations, called rounds. Cooperation decisions 
in each round were made simultaneously, without knowledge of the current decisions of other 
group members. Individuals also provided estimates for the average level of others’ decisions 
and approximations of others’ estimates (i.e., first and second order beliefs). Each individual’s 
decision, points earned, average decision of other group members, and additional points 
corresponding to the accuracy of estimates were provided after each round. 
Following the repeated dilemma, participants then completed a questionnaire that 
measured reactions to the experiment and collected demographic information. At the end of 
the experiment, points were converted to dollars and paid to participants. On average, 
participants earned $15 from their decisions plus $5 for showing up. The experiment took 
approximately one hour. 
 
3.3 Decision Situation and Framing  
In every decision in the experiment, every participant was randomly assigned to an 
anonymous group of four individuals and given decision-making power over an initial 
endowment of 20 points. Every decision required each individual to choose how to split her 
endowment between herself and the group knowing that individuals kept everything they 
allocated to themselves, and group members benefited equally from allocations to the group. 
Consistent with other linear public good experiments, payoffs were given by Equation (1), 
repeated below: 
 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛾 ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1  (1) 
where 𝜋𝑖  represents points earned by person 𝑖, and 𝑔𝑖 represents person 𝑖’s allocation to the 
group. In other words, 𝑔𝑖 represents cooperation by person 𝑖. Each individual’s initial 
endowment was 𝑤𝑖 = 20, groups were of size 𝑛 = 4, and the marginal per capita return 
(MPCR) was 𝛾 = 0.4 as in Fischbacher and Gächter (2010). 
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The decision situation in this study was presented in four different ways according to 
two experimental treatments, according to the 2 × 2 factorial framing design illustrated in 
Figure 2.1. The design distinguishes 1) the action implied by the location of the initial 
endowment from the 2) the language used to describe the action. Neutral frames were nearly 
identical, differentiated only by the location of the initial endowment. The word “allocate” was 
used in both neutral frames to describe the action taken. “Allocate” was replaced with “give” 
and “take” to create the non-neutral frames. The result was four frames, give neutral (GN), give 
non-neutral (GNN), take neutral (TN), and take non-neutral (TNN). The following makes the 
differences among frames more clear 
The give treatment located the initial endowment with the individual (i.e., in “personal 
accounts”) and instructions stated the following: “To start, your personal account contains 20 
points. Every individual has 20 points in their personal account that they can distribute 
between their personal account and the project account in any way they like.” In contrast, take 
treatments located the initial endowment with the group (i.e., in the “project account”) and 
instructions stated the following: “To start, the project account contains 80 points. Every 
individual may distribute 20 of the project points between their personal account and the 
project account in any way they like.” In neutral frames, “allocate to” was used to describe the 
action, whereas “give to” and “take from” were used in non-neutral treatments. Therefore in 
the neutral treatment individuals were asked how many points they would “allocate” to the 
“project account” or to her “personal account”. In the non-neutral treatments, individuals were 
asked how many points they would “give” to the project account or “take” from the project 
account. 
Payoffs were always calculated in accordance with Equation (1) regardless of frame. 
Equation (1) reflects the framing of the give treatment, but payoffs were presented to 
participants via Equation (1a) in the give neutral frame and Equation (1b) in the give non-
neutral frame. 
 
Total 
points-income 
= 
(20 – points you allocated to the project account) + 
0.4 × sum of all points allocated to the project account 
(1a) 
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Total 
points-income 
= 
(20 – points you gave to the project account) +  
0.4 × sum of all points given to the project account 
(1b) 
 
For each individual, the points he “allocated” or “gave” to the project account comprised his 
cooperation. 
Payoffs in the take treatment are the same as in Equation (1), but are more faithfully 
represented in Equation (2)  
 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 + 𝛾[∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 − ∑ 𝑥𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 ] (2) 
where 𝜋𝑖  represents earnings for person 𝑖, and 𝑥𝑖  represents points allocated by person 𝑖 to his 
personal account. The same parameters apply; the initial endowment is given by 𝑤𝑗 = 20, 
group size is 𝑛 = 4, and marginal per capita return is 𝛾 = 0.4. Importantly, Equation (2) is 
equivalent to Equation (1) via the relationship, 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖 where 𝑔𝑖 represents person 𝑖’s 
cooperation. In the experiment, payoffs were presented as in Equation (2a) in the take neutral 
frame and Equation (2b) in the take non-neutral frame. 
 
Total 
points-income 
= 
points you allocated to your personal account +  
0.4 × (80 – sum of all points allocated to personal accounts) 
(2a) 
 
Total 
points-income 
= 
points you took from the project account +  
0.4 × (80 – sum of all points taken from the project account) 
(2b) 
 
For each individual, points not “allocated to personal accounts” or not “taken from the project 
account” make up her cooperation. 
In all other regards, oral and written instructions were nearly identical in all frames. 
Following Dufwenberg et al.’s (2011) example, the externality generated via the public good 
was always presented positively but weakly. Specifically, all frames included the following 
statement: “You will earn points from both accounts in every decision situation. You are the 
only one who will earn points from your personal account. However, everyone will profit 
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equally from the total amount in the project account.” In addition, wording very strictly 
excluded any use of arguably equivalent terminology. For example, “keep” and “leave” were 
never used in place of “give” and “take” since “keep” and “leave.”  
 
3.4 Modeling and Analyses 
Modeling and analyses consisted of two components, nonparametric tests and various 
specifications of a linear unobserved effects panel data model. In the following, I first describe 
the data. Then I examine the objectives, advantages, and limitations of non-parametric tests 
and linear unobserved effects panel data models.  
 
3.4.1  Data 
Table 2.2 presents the three level hierarchy of the data, the dependent variable, the 
independent variables at each level (i.e., covariates), and the time-constant, unobserved effects 
for session and individual. The units of analysis were the 256 study participants (𝑁 = 256) 
nested within 16 clusters (𝑆 = 16 ) that correspond to session. Each session was comprised of 
16 individuals (𝑀𝑠  =  16). Each of the four different frames was applied to four sessions. 
Cooperation was the dependent variable of interest and was measured for each individual over 
the 10 rounds of the repeated public good dilemma, where round is analogous to time (𝑡 =
0, … ,9). Session level covariates included the two experimental treatments, action (i.e., give or 
take) and language (i.e., neutral or non-neutral), that together created frames. Individual level 
covariates included type of decision-maker, gender, training in economics, and prior experience 
with behavioral experiments. Type of decision-maker was previously assessed in Jackman 
(2016b). Study participants self-reported gender, training in economics, and prior experience 
with behavioral experiments in the questionnaire. The result was a balanced cluster sample 
with unit-specific, balanced panel data and two sources of correlation – among individuals 
within the same session and among repeated measures within individuals. 
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3.4.2 Nonparametric Tests 
Nonparametric tests were used to test for statistically significant differences in 
cooperation between or among groups. The Kruskal Wallis test compares the medians of a non-
normal dependent variable (i.e., cooperation) for more than two categories of an independent 
variable (i.e., frame and cooperative types). The Kruskal Wallis test reduces to the Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test for dichotomous independent variables (i.e., action, language, gender, 
experience, and training). Pairwise tests between two frames employed the Dwass, Steel, 
Critchlow-Fligner (DSCF) multiple comparison analysis (Critchlow & Fligner, 1991; Dwass, 1960; 
Steel, 1960), which is based on pairwise two-sample Wilcoxon comparisons. Nonparametric 
tests were conducted using SAS software and the procedure NPAR1WAY with the WILCOXON 
and DSCF options. 
There are challenges that nonparametric analyses do not address. Kruskal Wallis and 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests only allow us to reject the hypothesis that the groups being 
compared are drawn from the same non-normal distribution.61 They also do not estimate 
effects, do not control for known differences in the demographics of treatment groups, and 
cannot incorporate unobservable effects associated with session and individual. Linear 
unobserved effects panel data models overcome these challenges as well as allow for 
robustness checks. However, nonparametric tests do not require any assumptions of normality, 
asymptotic or otherwise; they are conceptually quite simple; and they lend weight to the 
findings of the unobserved effects model, which are quite complex and arguably require 
normality assumptions (West, Welch, & Gałecki, 2015, p. 17), at least asymptotically 
(Wooldridge, 2010, pp. 7-9). 
 
3.4.3 Linear unobserved Effects Panel Data Model and Estimation62 
The aim of the unobserved effects model was to quantify the relationship between 
cooperation (𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑠𝑖𝑡) and the observed, explanatory variables of time (𝑡), action 
                                                     
61 These tests assume the same spread and non-normal distribution. 
62 Linear unobserved effects panel data models (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 281) often go by at least two other names, 
random effects models and linear mixed models (West et al., 2015). Implementation is identical, but the 
underlying normality assumptions are more restrictive. 
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(𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠), language (𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠), and type of decision-maker (𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑖) while also controlling for the 
time-constant, observed variables of gender (𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖), training in economics (𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖), and 
prior experience with studies like this one (𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖). In addition to observed explanatory variables, 
the linear unobserved effects panel data model explicitly included unobserved, time-constant 
variables for session (𝜎𝑠) and individual (𝜐𝑖).  
In this model, unobserved effects were treated as random variables, consistent with the 
notion that these unobserved effects represent “omitted variables or neglected heterogeneity” 
(Wooldridge, 2010, p. 286).63 For example, session effects (𝜎𝑠) captured unobservable but 
palpable differences among sessions such as mood and energy level that were most evident in 
the waiting room. Individual effects (𝜐𝑖) captured time-constant, unobserved effects associated 
with each individual such as cognitive ability, country of origin, and socio-economic status. In 
addition, unobserved effects were assumed to have zero correlation with observed explanatory 
variables, and as such, estimation assumed a “random effects framework.” Therefore, the 
unobserved effects are most appropriately identified as “random session effects” and “random 
individual effects” (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 286).64 
Analyses focused on four specifications of the model, all of which include unobserved 
effects for session and individual. Three model specifications included demographic 
information, and one did not. The preferred specification of the model is given by the following: 
𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + (3) 
 𝛽2𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + 𝛽4𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + 
 𝜷𝟓𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖 + 
 𝜷𝟔𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖 + 
 𝜷𝟕𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 × 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖 + 
 𝜷𝟖𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 × 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖 + 
                                                     
63 Unobserved effects do not merely account for associations among individuals within session and among 
repeated measures for each individual as would be the case with cluster robust standard errors. 
64 This assumption is correct in an experimental context where the session level covariates are the experimental 
treatments (𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 and 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠) and appropriate for well delineated individual level covariates (𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑖 , 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖, 
𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖, and 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖). This assumption contrasts with the so-called “fixed effects” framework in which unobserved 
effects may be correlated with observed explanatory variables. Importantly, in “modern econometric parlance”, 
“fixed effects” implies that time-constant unobserved effects are correlated arbitrarily with observed explanatory 
variables (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 286).  
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 𝜷𝟗𝑡 ∗ 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖 + 
 𝜎𝑠 + 𝜐𝑖 + 
 𝜀𝑠𝑖𝑡 
where 𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the number of points, out of 20, that person 𝑖 in session 𝑠 allocated 
to the group project at time 𝑡. Individuals are indexed by 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 with 𝑁 = 256 study 
participants. Sessions are indexed by 𝑠 = 1, … , 𝑆 with 𝑆 = 16. The ten rounds of the repeated 
public good dilemma are represented by time, 𝑡 = 0, … ,9. 𝜀𝑠𝑖𝑡 represents idiosyncratic error.  
Note that with the exception of time, all observed variables are categorical. Therefore, 
all of the regression coefficients, except the intercept and the coefficient on 𝑡, represent a net 
effect, or some part thereof, relative to the reference type (i.e., non-cooperator), action (i.e., 
give), and language (i.e., neutral). In particular, 𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 and 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 are indicator (i.e., dummy) 
variables for action and language, respectively, where give (i.e., 𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 = 0)and neutral (i.e., 
𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 = 0) are the reference values (i.e., omitted variables). 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖  represents a vector of 
three indictor (i.e., dummy) variables for conditional, low, and high cooperators where non-
cooperator is the reference type (i.e., omitted variable). Thus every coefficient on 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖  and 
every interaction thereof, is also a vector. I have bolded 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖  and all associated coefficients 
to denote that these are vectors.65 By removing terms that evaluate to 0, each cell in Table 2.3 
simplifies Equation (3) for each type, action, and language combination. Figure 2.3 illustrates 
the relationships between type and frame combinations and net effects. Inspection of Table 2.3 
and Figure 2.3 makes clear that, with few exceptions, single regressions coefficients do not fully 
represent framing effects. Most regression coefficients represent only a portion of the 
difference in cooperation between any two frames and/or types. 
All specifications of the linear unobserved effects panel data model were estimated 
using SAS software and the MIXED procedure with observed effects in the MODEL statement 
and unobserved effects in the RANDOM statements. Estimation employed the restricted 
maximum likelihood method (METHOD = REML). Individuals’ repeated measures were assumed 
                                                     
65 Non-cooperators have 𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑖 = (0,0,0)′, conditional cooperators have 𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑖 = (1,0,0)′, low cooperators have 
𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑖 = (0,1,0)′, and high cooperators have 𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑖 = (0,0,1)′. Corresponding coefficients on 𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑖  and 
interactions with 𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑖  are given by 𝜷𝟓 = (𝛽5
1, 𝛽5
2, 𝛽5
3), 𝜷𝟔 = (𝛽6
1, 𝛽6
2, 𝛽6
3), 𝜷𝟕 = (𝛽7
1, 𝛽7
2, 𝛽7
3), 𝜷𝟖 = (𝛽8
1, 𝛽8
2, 𝛽8
3), 
and 𝜷𝟗 = (𝛽9
1, 𝛽9
2, 𝛽9
3). 
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to be correlated and best represented via first order autoregressive correlation matrix 
(TYPE=AR(1) in the REPEATED STATEMENT). I invoked the EMPIRICAL option to allow for 
heteroscedasticity-robust inference.  
 
4 Results 
In addition to demonstrating the presence of framing effects, this paper focuses on 
three nested results: 1) framing effects differ among types of decision-makers, 2) framing 
effects emerge as the result of the interaction between the action (i.e., give versus take) and 
language (i.e., neutral versus non-neutral) used to create frames, and 3) the interaction effect is 
not uniform among types. In the following, I first provide a general description of cooperation 
in the repeated public good dilemma. Then I examine framing effects beginning with the results 
of nonparametric tests and concluding with the results of the linear unobserved effects panel 
data model. 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.4 provides descriptive statistics for mean per person cooperation – an 
individual’s average level of cooperation over the ten rounds of the repeated public good 
dilemma – for all study participants and by frame. Table 2.4 also provides descriptive statistics 
for mean per person cooperation by type of decision-maker, gender, training, and experience. 
Figures 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 illustrate the distribution of cooperation in every round overall, by 
frame, and by type of decision-maker. Clearly, many individuals cooperated at non-trivial 
levels;66 cooperation declined over the course of the repeated public good dilemma overall, for 
each frame, and for each cooperative type; 67 and cooperation varied considerably, overall, for 
each frame, and for each type. The important takeaway here is that participants in this study 
                                                     
66 Average cooperation in every round was non-trivial (statistically distinct from 0) overall, for every frame, and for 
every cooperative type according to Wilcoxon Signed Rank Sum Tests. However, we can clearly see in Figures 2.4, 
2.5, and 2.6 that the median, which may be a better measure of center, did reach zero overall and for most 
subgroups.  
67 The decline in cooperation was statistically significant overall, for each frame, for each cooperative type, and for 
every demographic group. The decline in cooperation was evaluated via fixed effects analysis (Allison, 2005; 
Wooldridge 2010, pp. 300-302) clustered by individual with robust standard errors. Fixed effects analyses were 
implemented using SAS software with the  GLM and  GLIMMIX procedures.  
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behaved in much the same way as observed in other public good experiments. There appears 
to be no reason to suspect that results in this study are anomalous. 
In addition, the first three columns of Table 2.4 under the heading “All Frames” show 
that mean per person cooperation differed significantly among types of decision-makers 
(𝜒2(3, 𝑁 = 256) = 58.09, 𝑝 < 0.0001), a result made even more evident in Figure 2.6. 
Pairwise tests showed that all differences in mean per person cooperation between types were 
significant except for conditional versus high cooperators. Furthermore, mean per person 
cooperation among men and women appeared to be similar (𝜒2(1, 𝑁 = 256) = 0.09, 𝑝 =
0.7695), training in economics was associated with lower cooperation (𝜒2(1, 𝑁 = 251) =
5.41, 𝑝 = 0.0200), and experience appeared not to influence cooperation (𝜒2(1, 𝑁 = 244) =
0.97, 𝑝 = 0.3235). Finally, Table 2.4 also provides descriptive statistics for all participants and 
for each demographic category by frame. These results show that the differences among types 
and between men and women, trained and untrained, and experienced and unexperienced 
were not consistent across frames.68 However, looking within demographic categories and 
across frames, we see that give neutral was the most cooperative frame overall and for every 
subgroup except non-cooperators and individuals with no training in economics.  
 
4.2 Framing Effects 
4.2.1 Nonparametric Tests 
Nonparametric tests support the following three conclusions. First, there was a 
statistically significant framing effect.69 Second, unpacking results according to the 2 × 2 
factorial framing design suggests that locating the initial endowment in personal accounts (i.e., 
giving) had a positive effect on cooperation, but the introduction of non-neutral language, (i.e., 
“give” or “take” instead of “allocate”) reduced cooperation. However, action and language 
                                                     
68 For example, when comparing individuals with and without training, mean and median mean per person 
cooperation were lower among individuals without training in the take-neutral frame, but individuals without 
training were more cooperative in all other frames and overall than individuals with training. 
69 This contrasts with results for the one-shot game where no framing effects were found (Jackman, 2016b). 
Framing effects were not expected for the conditional decision table because the conditional decision table did not 
require individuals to form beliefs about others’ cooperation. In contrast, framing effects were expected in the 
repeated public good dilemma because individuals did form beliefs about others’ cooperation. However, the 
hypothesis that belief formation is necessary for framing effects was not tested. 
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interact. The effect of language differed between give and take treatments, and the effect of 
action differed between neutral and non-neutral treatments. Specifically, non-neutral language 
reduced cooperation in the give treatment but had no discernible effect in the take treatment. 
The take treatment reduced cooperation in the neutral treatment, but had no discernible effect 
in the non-neutral treatment. Third, the effect of frame was quite different for different types 
of decision makers. Non-cooperators – who were more self-interested, unconcerned with 
others’ actions, and unmotivated by feelings of obligation (Jackman, 2016b) – were not 
sensitive to frame. In contrast, conditional and low cooperator types – who were mindful of 
others’ actions (Jackman, 2016b) – were sensitive to frame. 
Specifically, the Kruskal Wallis test reported in the first row of Table 2.4 provides very 
strong evidence of framing effects among all four frames. Pairwise tests between every 
combination of frames, adjusted for multiple comparisons, and denoted by superscripts “a” and 
“b,” show that participants in the give neutral frame cooperated significantly more than 
individuals in the other frames, and cooperation in the give non-neutral, take neutral, and take 
non-neutral frames was statistically indistinguishable. In fact, nonparametric analyses that 
excluded the give neutral frame provided no evidence of framing effects. Figure 2.5 illustrates 
the difference in the distribution of cooperation across frames, particularly how the give 
neutral frame stands out from the others.  
Kruskal Wallis tests within demographic categories also revealed framing effects. In 
most categories, mean per person cooperation differed significantly among frames; give neutral 
was the most cooperative frame; and when pairwise differences between frames were 
significant, the give neutral frame was always implicated. Focusing on framing effects within 
cooperative types, nonparametric tests suggest that non-cooperators and high cooperators 
were not influenced by frame,70 but Kruskal Wallis tests were significant for conditional and low 
cooperators. Pairwise tests showed that conditional and low cooperators cooperated less when 
non-neutral language was employed in the give treatment. Narrowing to just low cooperators, 
                                                     
70 Differences in mean and median across frames for high cooperators were dramatic, but not significant, possibly 
due to the limited statistical power available with only seventeen high cooperators. 
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we also see that low cooperators in the neutral treatment cooperated significantly more when 
giving than when taking.  
 
4.2.2 Linear Unobserved Effects Panel Data Model 
Tables 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 present results of four specifications of the linear unobserved 
effects panel data model. Each table serves different purpose. In short, Table 2.5 provides 
estimates of effects relative to reference points and variance parameter estimates. Therefore, it 
primarily shows that results are robust and variance within and between sessions was 
significant. Via Type III F-tests, Table 2.6 supports the selection of the specification I as the most 
preferred and very concisely reveals that the three-way interaction of action, language, and 
type drives framing effects. Table 2.7 estimates framing effects according to that three way 
interaction as well as their significance. For all three tables, specification I matches the model as 
given in Equation (3), Section 3.4.3. Specifications II, III, and IV include demographic variables, 
and estimation excluded 15 participants who did not report gender, training, and/or 
experience.  
Before delving into details, first notice that estimates are clearly robust. The sign, 
magnitude, and significance of estimates in Table 2.5 and 2.7 are consistent across 
specifications. The significance of Type III F-tests given in Table 2.6 are also consistent across 
specifications. Note especially that robustness spans specifications with and without 
demographic variables, demonstrating that the “uneven” distribution of men and women and 
of experienced and inexperienced participants reported in Table 2.1 did not undermine 
analyses. Robustness is accompanied, unsurprisingly, by statistically significant variance 
parameters documented in Table 2.5. As expected, cooperation varied significantly across 
sessions and among individuals within session, and there was significant unexplained variance 
(i.e., idiosyncratic error).71 
                                                     
71 Inspection of outliers revealed that some behavior was nonlinear, and the behavior of some individuals 
appeared to be at odds with their type. For example, some conditional cooperators did not cooperate even when 
others in their group(s) did. Other outliers appeared to be engaged in an effort to influence others’ behavior by 
cooperating at very high levels or executing a tit-for-tat strategy in early rounds before defecting for the remaining 
rounds. 
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Second, recall from Section 3.4.3 that regression coefficients in Table 2.5 must be 
interpreted relative to reference categories, that is, the non-cooperator type in the give action 
and neutral language. As such, they represent one of three possible effects – an effect for a 
reference category only, a net effect, or some portion of a net effect. Thus, the regression 
coefficients and corresponding statistics in Table 2.5 suggest, but do not reveal, the level of 
interaction at which framing effects are evident and significant. In contrast, the Type III F-tests 
reported in Table 2.6 show that the three-way interaction of action, language, and type is a 
weakly significant predictor of cooperation.72 In other words, the interaction of action and 
language yielded framing effects that differed across types of decision makers. In addition, 
these Type III F-tests, supported by likelihood ratios tests, revealed that two, three, and four-
way interactions with time, action, language, and type were not statistically significant. Thus, 
Specifications III and IV were not preferred.73 Controlling for the level of other factors, Type III 
F-tests also show that models that included demographic were inferior, a result also supported 
by likelihood ratio tests. 
Third, despite the challenge of interpreting results in Table 2.5, these results 
nevertheless set the stage for identifying framing effects due to the three-way interaction of 
action, language, and type and via mean differences. To that end, revisit Table 2.3. Each cell in 
Table 2.3 simplifies Equation (3) for each type, action, and language combination. For example, 
the upper, left cell contains only the relevant (i.e., nonzero) terms for the non-cooperator type 
in the give neutral frame. Focusing on the non-cooperator type in the first row of Table 2.3, we 
see that the model reduces to the following for each of the four frames: 
Give Neutral:  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 (4a) 
Give Non-Neutral:  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽3 (4b) 
Take Neutral:  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽2 (4c) 
                                                     
72 Type III F-tests test for the presence of an effect for one factor while controlling for the level of other factors. 
These “tests correspond to hypotheses about the linear functions of true parameters and are evaluated using the 
sum of squares of the estimated parameters” (SAS Institute, Inc., 2008, p. 271). “When no missing cells exist in the 
factorial model [as is the case here] Type III SS coincide with the Yates’ weighted squares-of-means technique” 
(SAS Institute, Inc., 2008, p. 284). 
73 Likelihood ratios tests were conducted on a series of nested model specifications in accordance with West et al., 
(2015, pp. 34-36, 77-80) with a significance threshold of 0.05.  
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Take Non-Neutral:  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 + 𝛽4 (4d) 
Equations 4a through 4d make clear that 𝛽1 is the slope for the non-cooperator type, 
and within the non-cooperator type, 𝛽0 is the intercept for give neutral only. According to rows 
1 and 2 in Table 2.5, both the intercept and slope for non-cooperators in the give neutral frame 
are highly significant. Non-cooperators in the give neutral frame initially cooperated at a low 
but highly significant level that decreased at a slow but highly significant rate. For non-
cooperators only, 𝛽2 represents the effect of locating the initial endowment in the project 
account instead of in personal accounts in the neutral language treatment (i.e., 𝑇𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁|𝑁𝐶). 
Similarly,  𝛽3 represents the effect on cooperation of non-neutral language relative to neutral 
language in the give treatment (i.e., 𝐺𝑁𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁|𝑁𝐶). According to rows 3 and 4 in Table 2.5, 
neither difference is significant.  
Similarly, the coefficient on the interaction of action and language also is not significant 
(see Table 2.5 row 5). In isolation, however, 𝛽4 reflects a partial, net effect and is not especially 
meaningful; it is merely a part of the difference in the intercept for the non-cooperator type 
between take non-neutral and any of the other frames. Like 𝛽4, none of the remaining 
coefficients in Table 2.5 independently indicate a framing effect or lack thereof. Thus, to test 
the significance of the difference in cooperation between frames, I estimated mean differences 
and employed joint tests to evaluate statistical significance.  
Table 2.7 presents estimated mean differences and the results of joint tests that 
concisely reveal heterogeneity in framing effects among types and differential effects of the 
action and language treatments. Results of the linear unobserved effects panel data model 
were mostly consistent with nonparametric tests. There was no framing effect among non-
cooperators, a weak framing effect among conditional cooperators, and significant framing 
effects among low cooperators. High cooperators were the exception. Non-parametric tests 
revealed no framing effects among high cooperators, but the linear unobserved effects panel 
data model did. Wherever a significant pairwise effect was present, the give neutral frame was 
implicated.  
Specifically, conditional cooperators in the give treatment cooperated less in the non-
neutral treatment than in the neutral treatment, a result that was weakly significant in the first 
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specification without correction for multiple comparisons (𝐺𝑁𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁|𝐶𝐶 =  −2.18, 𝑝 =
0.0749) and weakly significant with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons in the 
second specification (𝐺𝑁𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁|𝐶𝐶 =  −2.84, 𝑝 = 0.0250). Similarly, low cooperators in the 
give treatment cooperated less in the non-neutral treatment than in the neutral treatment (I: 
𝐺𝑁𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁|𝐿𝐶 =  −3.21, 𝑝 = 0.0082; II: 𝐺𝑁𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁|𝐿𝐶 =  −3.28, 𝑝 = 0.0058), a result that 
was significant at the 0.05 level with the within-type Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons. In addition, low cooperators in the neutral treatment cooperated less when 
taking than when giving (I: 𝑇𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁|𝐿𝐶 =  −2.75, 𝑝 = 0.0078; II: 𝑇𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁|𝐿𝐶 =  −2.75, 
𝑝 = 0.0079), a result that was significant at the 0.05 level with the within-type Bonferroni 
correction. Finally, and keeping in mind that model results for high cooperators are based on 
very few data, high cooperators in the give treatment cooperated less in the non-neutral 
treatment (I: 𝐺𝑁𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁|𝐻𝐶 =  −5.19, 𝑝 = 0.0028; II: 𝐺𝑁𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁|𝐻𝐶 =  −4.75, 𝑝 =
0.0020), and high cooperators in the neutral treatment cooperated less in the take treatment 
(I: 𝑇𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁|𝐻𝐶 =  −3.94, 𝑝 = 0.0252; II: 𝑇𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁|𝐻𝐶 =  −3.30, 𝑝 = 0.0117).  
 
4.3 Type Predicts Cooperation and Elucidates the Framing Effect 
A secondary result of this paper is that the typing strategy implemented via the one-
shot dilemma and group-based trajectory modeling in Jackman (2016b) proved to be a strong 
predictor of cooperation in the repeated dilemma. Returning to Table 2.3 and focusing on the 
first column, the linear unobserved effects panel data model reduces to the following for each 
type of decision-maker in the give neutral frame: 
Non-Cooperator:   𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 (5a) 
Conditional Cooperator:  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽5
1 + 𝛽9
1𝑡 (5b) 
Low Cooperator:  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽5
2 + 𝛽9
2𝑡 (5c) 
High Cooperator:  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽5
3 + 𝛽9
3𝑡 (5d) 
Coefficients in Table 2.5 corresponding to conditional cooperators, low cooperators, and high 
cooperators are given by 𝛽5
1, 𝛽5
2, and 𝛽5
3, and the interaction of time and non-reference types 
are given by 𝛽9
1, 𝛽9
2, and 𝛽9
3. All are highly significant. Therefore, intercepts are higher and 
slopes are steeper for all types relative to the non-cooperator type.  
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In fact, type alone was unequivocally a significant predictor of cooperation. Type I F-
tests (i.e., sequential sum of squares) for type and for time interacted with type were highly 
significant (I: 𝐹(3, 2300) = 39.08, 𝑝 < 0.0001; II: 𝐹(3, 2165) = 25.85, 𝑝 < 0.0001). Type 
actually elucidates the framing effect in this study. Not only did the model specification without 
type prove to be inferior via a likelihood ratio tests,74 but when type was excluded from the 
linear unobserved effects panel data model, Type III F-tests of action, language, and their 
interaction were not significant.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Just about anyone – marketers, advertisers, speech writers, and friends as well as those 
who study communication, literature, and rhetoric, among others – will agree that “it’s not just 
what you, it’s how you say it” where “it” is a complicated message that includes nuanced 
information about own and others’ actions, outcomes, obligations, expectations, and more. 
This paper gives new insight into the behavioral consequences of different presentations of a 
repeated public good decision among different types of decision makers. It also reveals 
important interactions between reference-dependence and valence, and calls into question 
spontaneous valence assumptions that may in fact be normative, not real.  
Results of this study showed that there was a strong framing effect overall in which 
participants subject to the give neutral frame were significantly more cooperative than 
individuals in the other three frames. Cooperation among the remaining three frames (i.e., give 
non-neutral, take neutral, and take non-neutral) was statistically indistinguishable. In addition, 
conditional cooperators, low cooperators, and high cooperators responded to framing 
differences whereas non-cooperators did not. Furthermore, framing effects could not be 
attributed solely to either dimension of the framing design; the interaction of action and 
language yielded framing effects that differed across types of decision-makers.  
These results were purely descriptive and were intended to be. They simply described 
the relationship between the ways frames were created and the behavioral responses of 
                                                     
74 A likelihood ratio test of the first specification of the unobserved effects model versus a nested specification that 
excludes type indicated that the nested specification was inferior (𝑝 < 0.0001). 
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different types of decision-makers. However, via this theory-based framing design and 
behavior-based categorization of subject heterogeneity, results also provide insight into the 
underlying decision-processes at work. Results strongly suggest important interactions between 
reference-dependent decision-making and valence-based attribute framing, and a relationship 
between framing effects and regard for others’ action or outcomes. Considered in light of the 
applied literature, results also suggest relevance to field experiments and real-world public 
good dilemmas and policy. 
To better understand the interaction of reference-dependent decision-making and 
attribute framing, consider four hypothetical two-frame studies. First, imagine that this study 
had been limited to the give neutral and take neutral frames only, and results were based on 
the data collected in the give neutral and take neutral frames. In every regard except the 
location of the initial endowment, these frames were identical. However, the cooperation in 
the give neutral and take neutral frames differed significantly, a result that could be attributed 
entirely to the location of the initial endowment. In addition, the framing effect in this 
hypothetical, two-frame study would have been driven by low cooperators, a previously 
undifferentiated group of decision-makers. 
Continuing on this tack, now imagine a study with only the give neutral and give non-
neutral frames. The initial endowment was located in personal accounts in both frames, and 
differed only in the use of the word “allocate” instead of “give.” Based on the data from the 
give neutral and give non-neutral frames, individuals in the neutral frame of this hypothetical, 
two-frame study would have cooperated more on average than individuals in the non-neutral 
frame but only among conditional and low cooperators.75 To anyone who subscribes to the 
notion of attribute framing and perceives the word “give” as having purely positive 
associations, replacing the arguably neutral word “allocate” with the presumably positive word 
“give” should have led to more cooperation, not less. Instead, the word “give” appears to have 
carried a negative valence with negative associations and/or evoked a feeling of loss that led to 
                                                     
75 Even though the linear unobserved effects panel data model indicated statistically significant differences in 
cooperation between the give neutral and take neutral frames for high cooperator, I am ignoring high cooperators 
here. There were only 17 high cooperators out of 256 participants, and non-parametric tests revealed no framing 
effects among high cooperators. 
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lower levels of cooperation. In contrast, there was no effect of language in the take frames, 
suggesting that the word “take” had neither positive nor negative associations relative to the 
word “allocate” or that the effect of non-neutral language was undiscernibly small relative to 
the effect of presenting individuals’ endowments as part of the project account.  
To conclude this thought experiment, imagine a study that consisted of only the give 
non-neutral and take non-neutral frames. Instructions for this study would have been a close 
approximation to the English language translation of Dufwenberg et al.’s (2011) neutral give 
and take frames with the critical difference that this hypothetical experiment would have been 
a repeated dilemma. Because researchers observe framing effects more often in repeated 
games (Cubbit & Drouvelis, 2011) and because frames differ on more than one dimension, I 
would have predicted a significant framing effect. However, there was no statistically significant 
difference in cooperation between the give non-neutral and take non-neutral frames. Could the 
negative effect of non-neutral language counteract the positive effect of reference point in the 
give frame? In other words, could the effect of valence and reference-dependence have 
opposite signs, leading to an insignificant net effect? In light of what this thought experiment 
has revealed already, this seems plausible. 
In addition, the difference in framing effects among different types of decision makers is 
notable in and of itself because this study joins a very small number of previous studies that 
simultaneously examine framing effects and subject heterogeneity (e.g., Sonnemans et al., 
1998; Park, 2000; Parks, 1994). However, this study also stands out because the categorization 
of decision-makers implemented here yields types that unequivocally predict behavior in the 
repeated public good dilemma. Thus, the type and corresponding motives, assessed in Jackman 
(2016b), were relevant to the repeated public good dilemma. Only individuals who were 
motivated by perceptions of others’ actions and outcomes were influenced by frame (i.e., 
conditional, low, and high cooperators). In addition, framing effects differed between low 
cooperators, who were more self-interested and less motivated by feelings of obligation, and 
conditional and high cooperators, who were less self-interested with stronger feelings of 
obligation.  
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Since participants who were sensitive to framing were also individuals who were more 
inclined to report some regard for others’ actions and/or outcomes, these results also appear 
to be consistent with the notion that expectations of others’ cooperation, also called first order 
beliefs, are an intermediary between frame and cooperation (Dufwenberg et al., 2011; Ellingsen 
et al. 2012; Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010; Sonnemans et al., 1998; Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 
1999).76 Because framing effects differed for differently motivated cooperators, the indirect 
effect of beliefs could differ for different dimensions of frame and for different types of 
decision-makers. These are the questions I explore in Jackman (2016a). 
Finally, this study focused very intentionally on behavior in a public good dilemma as a 
highly stylized model for real-world public goods. In the laboratory environment, this study 
provides evidence that even very subtle differences in frame can yield significant differences in 
cooperation and that framing effects are the result of interacting design elements. These 
results suggests that bundling subtle and significant framing differences into the social, political, 
cultural, and ecological context of a field experiment or real-world policy could lead to a 
collection of increases and decreases in cooperation, for which the net effect could not be 
known in advance.  
For example, Spence and Pidgeon (2010) tested gain and loss frames in the context of 
climate change mitigation and found that “gain frames were superior to loss frames in 
increasing positive attitudes toward climate change mitigation … that [were] partially 
suppressed by lower fear responses and poorer information recall.” Loss aversion predicts the 
more positive response to the gain frame, risky choice framing could explain the negative effect 
                                                     
76 Indeed, in a one-shot public good dilemma, Dufwenberg et al. (2011) found a positive correlation between 
cooperation and beliefs and a stronger association between beliefs and cooperation than between frames and 
cooperation. They concluded that frames influence cooperation through “a subtle interplay of framing, beliefs, and 
choice.” Similarly, Sonnemens et al. (1998) attributed framing effects in repeated, step-level dilemmas to the 
dynamic environment in which beliefs about others were evolving over time in response to information about 
others’ cooperation. In a similar vein, Willinger and Ziegelmeyer (1999) concluded that the framing effects in the 
later rounds of positively versus negatively framed dilemmas to different, context-dependent reactions to others’ 
contributions. Those different “reactions” may have consisted largely of different context-dependent beliefs that 
precipitate different choices. In fact, in a contribution-framed, repeated public good dilemma Fischbacher and 
Gätcher (2010) actually demonstrated that information about others’ cooperation is an important factor in belief 
formation, and beliefs are important predictors of behavior. Via a Prisoners’ Dilemma experiment, Ellingsen et al. 
(2012) described social frames as coordination devices, concluding that frames “enter people’s beliefs rather than 
their preferences.” 
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of fear, and positive associations in the gain frame may have relaxed focus leading to poorer 
recall. Arguably, these are reasonable conclusions in hindsight, but could we have predicted 
these results in advance? Could we predict the net effect? And could very subtle changes in 
policy-frames tweak these interactions and yield different net effects? If framing is among the 
overlooked low hanging fruit in policy-driven public goods provision,77 then understanding 
interactions within the framing design and in the relevant context are important trajectories for 
future research that must include laboratory and field studies. 
 
                                                     
77 Cox and Beland (2013) argued that policy entrepreneurs are already employing frame as a policy tool. For 
example, they found that as the emotional quality (what they call valence) of sustainability increased, “policy 
entrepreneurs have used the idea [well beyond its origins in environmental policy]” to reframe problems and 
promote reforms in policy areas like pension reform, public finance, labor markets, and energy security. 
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Tables 
 
Table 2.1: Participant characteristics 
Total GN GNN TN TNN df F p
Age 3 1.04 0.3745
Number 252 61 64 63 64
Mean 20.54 20.15 20.23 21.44 21.31
Standard Deviation 4.16 1.68 3.47 2.99 6.68
Fisher's 
Exact
Total % GN GNN TN TNN df X
2
p p
Type 9 11.29 0.2566 0.2651
NC 48 19% 9 11 14 14
CC 131 51% 40 37 28 26
LC 60 23% 13 14 16 17
HC 17 7% 2 2 6 7
Gender 3 6.09 0.1072 *
Men 117 46% 25 37 30 25
Women 139 54% 39 27 34 39
3 0.68 0.8784
No 94 37% 26 22 22 24
Yes 157 63% 37 40 41 39
Don't know (excluded) 5 -- 1 2 1 1
3 13.35 0.0039 ***
No 94 38% 34 15 21 24
Yes 151 62% 26 44 42 39
Don't know (excluded) 11 -- 4 5 1 1
Training
Experience
Frames ANOVA
Frames Chi Square Test
 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.10 percent level. 
 
Note 1: GN = give neutral, GNN = give non-neutral, TN = take neutral, and TNN = take non-neutral. 
Note 2: NC = non-cooperator. CC = conditional cooperator, LC = low cooperator, and HC = cooperator. 
Note 3: Age was not reported for 3 individuals, and one age was misreported (age = 92) and excluded. Most 
participants were in their late teens (18 or 19) and early twenties. Eight were over 25.  
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Table 2.2: Data structure 
     Level of Data Variables  Unobserved Effects 
Level 3: Cluster of Units 
(𝑆 = 16) 
(𝑀𝑠 = 16) 
Cluster ID: 
Covariates: 
session (𝑠) 
action (𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠) 
language (𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠) 
 
session (𝜎𝑠) 
Level 2: Unit of Analysis 
(𝑁 = 256) 
Unit ID: 
Covariates: 
individual (𝑖) 
type (𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑖) 
gender (𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖) 
training (𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖) 
experience (𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖) 
 
individual (𝜐𝑖) 
Level 1: Round 
(𝑇 = 10) 
Round: 
Dependent Variable: 
time (𝑡 = 0, … ,9) 
cooperation (𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑠𝑖𝑡) 
 
 
 
Note 1: 𝑆 is the number of clusters/sessions, indexed by 𝑠. 𝑀𝑠 is the number of units/individuals in every cluster. 𝑁 
is the number of units/individuals in the study, indexed by 𝑖. 𝑇 is the number of rounds, indexed by 𝑡 = 0, … 9, for 
which measurements were made for every individual.
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Table 2.3: Linear unobserved effects panel data model by type and frame 
  
Type Action and Language (𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 and 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠) 
(𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑖) Give Neutral Give Non-Neutral Take Neutral Take Non-Neutral 
Non 
Cooperator 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 
 
 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 
𝛽3  
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 
𝛽2  
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 
𝛽2 + 𝛽3+𝛽4  
Conditional 
Cooperator 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 
𝛽5
1 + 𝛽9
1𝑡 
 
 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 
𝛽5
1 + 𝛽9
1𝑡 + 
𝛽3 + 𝛽7
1  
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 
𝛽5
1 + 𝛽9
1𝑡 + 
𝛽2 + 𝛽6
1  
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 
𝛽5
1 + 𝛽9
1𝑡 + 
𝛽2 + 𝛽3 + 𝛽4 + 𝛽6
1 + 𝛽7
1 + 𝛽8
1  
Low 
Cooperator 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 
𝛽5
2 + 𝛽9
2𝑡 
 
 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 
𝛽5
2 + 𝛽9
2𝑡 + 
𝛽3 + 𝛽7
2  
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 
𝛽5
2 + 𝛽9
2𝑡 + 
𝛽2 + 𝛽6
2  
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 
𝛽5
2 + 𝛽9
2𝑡 + 
𝛽2 + 𝛽3 + 𝛽4 + 𝛽6
2 + 𝛽7
2 + 𝛽8
2  
High 
Cooperator 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 
𝛽5
3 + 𝛽9
3𝑡 
 
 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 
𝛽5
3 + 𝛽9
3𝑡 + 
𝛽3 + 𝛽7
3  
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 
𝛽5
3 + 𝛽9
3𝑡 + 
𝛽2 + 𝛽6
3  
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 
𝛽5
3 + 𝛽9
3𝑡 + 
𝛽2 + 𝛽3 + 𝛽4 + 𝛽6
3 + 𝛽7
3 + 𝛽8
3  
 
Note 1: This is the linear unobserved effects panel data model by type and frame as specified in Equation (3) in Section 3.4.3. 
Note 2: Give is the reference action, neutral is the reference language, and non-cooperator is the reference type. 
Note 3: Coefficients on 𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑖  and interactions with 𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑖  are given by 𝜷𝟓 = (𝛽5
1, 𝛽5
2, 𝛽5
3), 𝜷𝟔 = (𝛽6
1, 𝛽6
2, 𝛽6
3), 𝜷𝟕 = (𝛽7
1, 𝛽7
2, 𝛽7
3), 𝜷𝟖 = (𝛽8
1, 𝛽8
2, 𝛽8
3), and 𝜷𝟗 =
(𝛽9
1, 𝛽9
2, 𝛽9
3). 
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Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics for mean per person cooperation and non-parametric tests for framing effects 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median X
2
p
All (N =256) 256 3.98 2.85 64 5.49 4.95 a 64 3.19 2.05 b 64 3.55 2.20 b 64 3.68 3.30 b 13.08 0.0045 ***
Type (N =256) ***
NC 48 1.13 0.00 9 0.66 0.00 a 11 0.86 0.00 a 14 1.06 0.40 a 14 1.72 0.65 a 1.88 0.5976
CC 131 4.97 4.20 40 6.47 5.20 a 37 4.06 2.90 b 28 4.83 4.05 a,b 26 4.13 4.40 a,b 8.22 0.0416 **
LC 60 3.20 2.25 13 5.18 5.40 a 14 2.45 1.80 b 16 2.61 2.00 b 17 2.85 1.80 a,b 10.49 0.0148 **
HC 17 7.09 8.00 2 9.75 9.75 a 2 5.15 5.15 a 6 5.87 6.10 a 7 7.94 10.00 a 2.29 0.5141
Gender (N =256)
Men 117 3.99 2.50 25 5.34 2.80 a 37 3.64 2.00 a 30 3.56 2.10 a 25 3.21 1.30 a 1.66 0.6452
Women 139 3.97 3.20 39 5.59 5.20 a 27 2.57 2.10 b 34 3.54 2.60 b 39 3.98 3.50 a,b 14.91 0.0019 ***
Training (N =251, "Don't know" excluded) **
No 94 4.66 3.65 26 5.57 4.90 a 22 3.41 2.95 a 22 3.49 1.90 a 24 5.75 5.40 a 11.13 0.0110 **
Yes 157 3.63 2.30 37 5.26 4.90 a 40 3.21 2.00 a,b 41 3.64 2.50 a,b 39 2.50 1.30 b 8.71 0.0334 **
Experience (N =244, "Don't Know" excluded)
No 94 4.17 3.15 34 6.00 4.85 a 15 3.48 2.90 a,b 21 2.14 1.90 b 24 3.76 3.50 a,b 10.09 0.0179 **
Yes 151 3.92 2.90 26 4.88 4.95 a 44 2.74 2.00 b 42 4.34 2.75 a,b 39 3.73 3.20 a,b 6.80 0.0785 *
Frame Kruskal Wallis
All Frames GN GNN TN TNN (df  = 3)
 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.10 percent level. 
 
Note 1: GN = give neutral, GNN = give non-neutral, TN = take neutral, and TNN = take non-neutral. 
Note 2: NC = non-cooperator. CC = conditional cooperator, LC = low cooperator, and HC = cooperator. 
Note 3: Mean per person cooperation is an individual’s average level of cooperation over the ten rounds of the repeated public good dilemma. 
Note 4: Statistics and significance for Kruskal Wallis tests among all four frames appear at the far right.  
Note 5: The results of pairwise nonparametric tests between frames are summarized by the superscripts appearing to the right of each median. Within a row, 
when two frames do not share a superscript, the difference between medians is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. These pairwise tests employed the 
Dwass, Steel, Critchlow-Fligner (DSCF) multiple comparison analysis, which is based on pairwise two-sample Wilcoxon comparisons.  
103 
 
Table 2.5: Estimates and variance parameters for the linear observed effects panel data model 
Solution for Observed Effects Est. (SE) Est. (SE) Est. (SE) Est. (SE)
Intercept 1.83 (0.46) *** 2.39 (0.56) *** 2.33 (0.71) *** 1.92 (0.33) ***
Round/Time (t  = 0, …, 9) -0.21 (0.07) *** -0.23 (0.08) *** -0.22 (0.13) * -0.13 (0.04) ***
Action (reference = Give) 0.16 (0.37) 0.15 (0.43) 0.45 (0.77) 0.45 (0.62)
Language (reference = Neutral) 0.26 (0.55) 0.32 (0.61) 0.03 (0.88) 0.58 (1.40)
Action X Language 0.41 (0.94) 0.69 (1.22) 0.84 (1.62) 1.31 (2.37)
Type (reference = Non-Cooperator)
Conditional Cooperator (CC) 7.13 (1.31) *** 7.04 (1.36) *** 7.08 (1.38) *** 7.44 (1.39) ***
Low Cooperator (LC) 5.81 (0.97) *** 5.63 (1.07) *** 5.62 (1.06) *** 6.32 (0.84) ***
High Cooperator (HC) 12.58 (1.60) *** 11.76 (1.42) *** 11.67 (1.42) *** 14.60 (0.81) ***
Action, Language, & Type
Action X CC -1.67 (1.55) -1.83 (1.58) -1.83 (1.58) -1.57 (1.86)
Action X LC -2.91 (0.99) *** -2.90 (1.04) *** -2.90 (1.04) *** -3.07 (0.89) ***
Action X HC -4.11 (1.77) ** -3.46 (1.23) *** -3.46 (1.23) *** -6.39 (2.30) ***
Language X CC -2.45 (1.40) * -3.16 (1.59) ** -3.16 (1.59) ** -3.67 (2.07) *
Language X LC -3.47 (1.50) ** -3.60 (1.47) ** -3.60 (1.47) ** -4.33 (2.53) *
Language X HC -5.45 (1.54) *** -5.07 (1.33) *** -5.07 (1.33) *** -9.07 (1.52) ***
Action X Language X CC 0.90 (1.73) 1.29 (1.90) 1.29 (1.90) 0.46 (2.87)
Action X Language X LC 3.44 (1.93) * 3.36 (1.87) * 3.36 (1.87) * 2.61 (3.51)
Action X Language X HC 6.52 (2.92) ** 5.63 (2.67) ** 5.63 (2.67) ** 9.28 (4.46) **
Time & Type
Time X CC -0.38 (0.10) *** -0.35 (0.11) *** -0.36 (0.10) *** -0.44 (0.17) ***
Time X LC -0.25 (0.11) ** -0.25 (0.12) ** -0.25 (0.12) ** -0.40 (0.11) ***
Time X HC -0.80 (0.24) *** -0.76 (0.26) *** -0.74 (0.26) *** -1.39 (0.04) ***
Time, Action, & Language No No Yes Yes
Time, Action, Language, & Type No No No Yes
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes
Observations
Residual Log Likelihood
Variance Parameters Est. (SE) Est. (SE) Est. (SE) Est. (SE)
Session Intercept 2.42 (1.29) ** 2.66 (1.39) ** 2.66 (1.39) ** 2.66 (1.39) **
Individual w/in Session Intercept 9.30 (1.06) *** 8.54 (1.03) *** 8.54 (1.03) *** 8.52 (1.03) ***
AR(1) Row( Correlation) 0.27 (0.03) *** 0.26 (0.03) *** 0.26 (0.03) *** 0.26 (0.03) ***
Residual 11.93 (0.42) *** 12.11 (0.44) *** 12.1 (0.44) *** 12.15 (0.44) ***
I IVIIIII
2410241024102560
13097.813103.413106.113108.6
 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.10 percent level. 
 
Note 1: Specification I matches the model as presented in Equation 3 in Section 3.4.3. Estimates include all 256 
participants with 10 measures per participant. 
Note 2: Specifications II, III, and IV excluded 15 participants with missing demographic information and 
therefore included 10 measurements for each of 241 participants. 
Note 3: All specifications included unobserved effects for session and individuals within session. 
Note 4: Standard errors are robust. 
Note 5: To facilitate comparison across specifications, -2 residual log likelihood was estimated via the maximum 
likelihood method with the 241 participants for whom full demographic information was reported. 
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Table 2.6: Type III F-tests for the linear unobserved effects panel data model 
 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.10 percent level. 
 
Note 1: Specification I matches the model as presented in Equation 3 in Section 3.4.3. 
Note 2: Specification I includes all 256 participants. Specification II includes only the 241 participants for which 
gender, training, and experience information was available. 
Note 3: Type III F-tests test for the presence of an effect for one factor while controlling for the level of other 
factors, where in this case “factors” are categorical variables and two-, three-, and four-way interactions of 
categorical variables. These “tests correspond to hypotheses about the linear functions of true parameters and 
are evaluated using the sum of squares of the estimated parameters” (SAS Institute, Inc., 2008, p. 271). “When 
no missing cells exist in the factorial model [as is the case here] Type III SS coincide with the Yates’ weighted 
squares-of-means technique” (SAS Institute, Inc., 2008, p. 284). The advantage of the Type III F-test, relative to 
other F-tests, is that it is valid in the presence of significant interactions. The limitation is that Type III F-tests for 
main effects generally should not interpreted when significant interaction effects are present. In keeping with 
this convention, these F-tests revealed weakly significant framing effects resulting from the interaction of 
language and action and type (i.e., Language X Action X Type). Type III F-tests also revealed highly significant 
interaction of time and type (i.e., Time X Type). 
Note 3: These tests were used in combination with likelihood ratio tests to compare different specifications of 
the unobserved effects model. The first specification was most preferred.  
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Table 2.7: Estimated mean differences between frames within type per the 
linear unobserved effects panel data model 
 
a Significant at the 0.10 level with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons within type. 
b Significant at the 0.05 level with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons within type. 
          c Significant at the 0.05 level with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons across all types. 
 
Note 1: Specification I matches the model as presented in Equation 3 in Section 3.4.3. 
Note 2: Specification I includes all 256 participants. Specification II includes only the 241 participants for which 
gender, training, and experience information was available. 
Note 3: Estimates are mean differences. 
Note 4: Four hypotheses were tested within each type of decision-maker. With a Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons within type (𝑚 = 4), the 𝛼 = 0.01 threshold for significance becomes 𝛼 𝑚⁄ = 0.01 4⁄  =
 0.0025, the 𝛼 = 0.05 threshold for significance becomes 𝛼 𝑚⁄ = 0.05 4⁄  =  0.0125, and the 𝛼 = 0.10 
threshold becomes 𝛼 𝑚⁄ = 0.10 4⁄  =  0.0250. 
Note 5: Across types of decision-makers, sixteen hypothesis were tested. With a Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons across all types (𝑚 = 16), the 𝛼 = 0.05 threshold for significance becomes 𝛼 𝑚⁄ =
0.05 16⁄  =  0.003125, and the 𝛼 = 0.10 threshold becomes 𝛼 𝑚⁄ = 0.1 16⁄  =  0.00625.  
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Figures 
  Language 
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Give-Neutral 
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Take Neutral 
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Take Non-Neutral 
(TNN) 
 
Figure 2.1: 2 × 2 Factorial framing design 
Note 1: Action and language are the two experimental treatments used to create four different frames. 
Note 2: Each of the frames was assigned to a different set of 4 sessions. 
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Figure 2.2: The experiment 
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Figure 2.3: Diagram of the linear unobserved effects panel data model 
Note 1: Give is the reference action, neutral is the reference language, and non-cooperator is the reference type.  
Note 2: Net effects are represented by arrows between types (between boxes) or frames (within boxes) and correspond to Equation (3) (Section 3.4.3). 
Note 3: Check marks indicate differences that were at least weakly significant according to pairwise nonparametric tests (Section 4.2.1) and/or the first or 
second specification of the linear unobserved effects panel data model (Section 4.2.2). 
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of cooperation in every round for all participants 
Note 1: Boxes represent the middle quartiles for cooperation for each round of the repeated public good dilemma. 
The horizontal line in each box represents the median. Boxes without a horizontal line have median equal to zero. 
The diamond represents mean. The whiskers extend to the maximum and minimum. 
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Give Neutral (𝑁 = 64) 
 
Give Non-Neutral (𝑁 = 64) 
 
Take Neutral (𝑁 = 64) 
 
Take Non-Neutral (𝑁 = 64) 
 
Round 
Figure 2.5: Distribution of cooperation in every round by frame 
Note 1: Boxes represent the middle quartiles for cooperation for each round of the repeated public good dilemma. The horizontal line represents the median, 
and the diamond represents mean. Boxes without horizontal lines have median equal to zero. The whiskers extend to the maximum and minimum levels of 
cooperation. 
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Non-Cooperators (𝑁 = 48) 
 
Conditional Cooperators (𝑁 = 131) 
 
Low Cooperators (𝑁 = 60) 
 
High Cooperators (𝑁 = 17)l 
 
Round 
Figure 2.6: Distribution of cooperation in every round by cooperative type 
Note 1: Boxes represent the middle quartiles for cooperation for each round of the repeated public good dilemma. 
The horizontal line represents the median, and the diamond represents mean. Boxes without horizontal lines have 
median equal to zero. The whiskers extend to the maximum and minimum.
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Chapter 3 
The Beliefs Pathway of Framing Effects in a Repeated Public Good Dilemma 
 
Abstract: A persistent challenge for framing researchers is that decision processes 
depend upon the perceptions of decision-makers. Previous studies strongly suggest that beliefs 
about others’ cooperation provide insight into underlying decision processes, and framing 
passes through beliefs in decision process where framing effects are observed. However, none 
of these studies provides a pathway analysis of that mechanism, and none addresses how those 
pathways differ among different type of decision-makers. This study examines framing effects 
and the relationships between beliefs and cooperation among different types of decision 
makers in a repeated linear public good dilemma. Using moderation and mediation analyses, I 
show that frames influence beliefs and beliefs influence cooperation. However, the relevance 
of beliefs differs among types of decision-makers. For conditional cooperators, who made up 
51% of the study population, frame unequivocally exerts influence on cooperation through 
beliefs; there was no evidence that frame influences cooperation independent of beliefs for 
conditional cooperators. In contrast, for the study participants who were not expected to 
cooperate, mediation analyses provides no evidence of a beliefs pathway even though their 
estimates of others’ cooperation were quite good and appeared to be sensitive to framing. For 
other types of decision-makers, evidence for a beliefs pathway was mixed. This study also 
shows that in general individuals cooperated slightly less on average than they believed others 
would, but this result differed across types of decision makers. Individuals previously identified 
as high cooperators (7%) cooperated more on average than they believed others would. 
Individual previously identified as non-cooperators (19%) cooperated much less on average 
than they believed others would. 
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1 Introduction 
Although greatly simplified representations of real-world public good dilemmas, 
repeated public good experiments capture the essential elements of real-world public good 
decisions. In the laboratory and in the real world, public goods must be created or maintained 
by decision-makers subject to a conflict between own and group interests. Real-world public 
goods are sometimes provided voluntarily or through charitable giving, where appeals to social 
responsibility, social comparisons, gains to society, and the benefits to individuals are important 
tools for motivating cooperation. Public goods are more often and primarily provided through 
public policy mandates and less often through price-based incentives.  
In the policy sphere, we are beginning to see interventions that employ findings from 
behavioral research. Examples include voluntary green electricity programs that appeal to 
altruism, feelings of obligation, and environmental benefits (e.g., Jacobsen, Kotchen, & 
Vandenbergh, 2012) and voluntary energy conservation efforts motivated through information 
about others’ energy consumption, normative declarations, and competition (e.g., Allcott, 
2011). These emerging techniques overtly exploit what decision-makers know or believe about 
others. They employ framing by casting pro-environment behaviors and outcomes in a positive 
light. And by simultaneously invoking several different approaches, they implicitly leverage 
heterogeneity among decision-makers.  
In support of policy innovations, the objectives of this research are to understand how 
frames influence cooperation and beliefs about others’ cooperation overall and among 
different types of individuals, and under what conditions (i.e., for what types and in which 
frames) the cooperation decision passes through beliefs. This research examines the differential 
effects of frame on cooperation and beliefs about others’ cooperation among different types of 
decision-makers in a laboratory setting using an incentivized repeated, linear, public good 
experiment.  
This paper is the third in a series of three papers, all of which are based on the same 
multi-part linear public good experiment. The experiment included a one-shot public good 
dilemma, a repeated public good dilemma, and a questionnaire. It was designed to assess and 
classify heterogeneity in behavior and motives among decision-makers (paper 1), examine how 
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framing effects differ for different types of decision-makers (paper 2), parse the role of 
reference dependence and the language in framing effects (paper 2), and examine the 
channel/mechanism through which frames operate and how those channels differ for different 
types of decision-makers (paper 3). In this paper, I address the last of these objectives. I analyze 
cooperation decisions and beliefs about others’ decisions in the repeated public good dilemma 
only and incorporate decision-maker types and motives as assessed in the first paper.78 
Public good experiments are simultaneous games with more than two players that 
intend to reproduce the essential non-excludable and non-rival attributes of pure public 
goods.79 In the standard experiment with linear payoffs (𝜋𝑖), every individual (𝑖) decides how to 
distribute her personal endowment (𝑤𝑖) between herself and the group. Allocations to the 
group (𝑔𝑖) constitute “cooperation” and are increased by a positive factor, 𝑘, and then divided 
among 𝑛 participants. The result is a marginal per capita return (MPCR) of 𝛾 = 𝑘 𝑛⁄ . Linear 
payoffs are typically given by the following: 
 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛾 ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1  (1) 
Under the usual assumptions of rational choice theory, the dominant strategy is to allocate 
nothing to the group even though everyone is better off if everyone cooperates. This is clearly 
not what we observe in real world situations or in public good experiments where levels of 
cooperation vary considerably across individuals.80 
Heterogeneity in cooperation among participants in public good experiments is well 
documented (Chaudhuri, 2011; Ledyard, 1995). Classifications of decision-makers typically 
attempt to match behavior to preconceived categories of decision-makers, efforts that 
ultimately underrepresent their respective study populations and/or do not predict 
cooperation in a repeated public good dilemma (Jackman, 2016a). In contrast, Jackman (2016a) 
employed a combination of group-based trajectory modeling and exploratory factor analysis to 
identify four differently motivated, behavior-based types of decision-makers among the 
                                                     
78 These three papers make-up the three chapters of this dissertation. In this paper, papers 1 and 2 are cited as 
Jackman (2016a) and Jackman (2016b), respectively. 
79 Non-excludable means that everyone has access to the public good. Non-rival means that consumption by one 
individual does not affect others’ consumption. Cooperation consists of providing or maintaining the public good. 
80 See Chauduri (2011) for a recent, selective survey of laboratory public good experiments and Ledyard (1995) for 
an older and exhaustive review of public good experiments. 
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participants in this study. Types included non-cooperators (NC, 19%, 𝑁 = 48), conditional 
cooperators (CC, 51%, 𝑁 = 131), low cooperators (LC, 23%, 𝑁 = 60), and high cooperators 
(HC, 7%, 𝑁 = 17). Jackman (2016b) demonstrated that those types predict cooperation in a 
repeated public good dilemma.81  
Another robust finding of public good experiments is that decision-makers often 
respond differently to the same information based on how the decision is presented; this 
phenomenon is called a “framing effect.”82 Though the evidence is somewhat mixed, several 
patterns emerge for experimental frames: 1) contribution frames generally yield more 
cooperation than take frames (c.f., Bougherara, Denant-Boemont, & Masclet, 2011; Brewer & 
Kramer, 1986; Cubitt, Drouvelis, & Gächter, 2011; Dufwenberg, Gächter, & Hennig-Schmidt, 
2011; Fleishman, 1988; Rutte, Wilke, &Messick, 1987), 2) avoiding losses motivates more action 
than pursuing gains (e.g., Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 
1998; Sonnemans, Schram, & Offerman, 1998), 3) positive frames yield more cooperation than 
negative frames (c.f., Andreoni, 1995; Cookson, 2000; Levin et al., 2002; Levin et al., 1998; Park 
2000; Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 1999), and 4) wording like “I” instead of “We” and labels like 
“Wall Street” and “Stock Market” instead of “Community” or no label at all yield different levels 
of cooperation (c.f., Cookson, 2000; Dufwenberg et al., 2011; Ellingsen, Johannesson, 
Mollerstrom, & Munkhammer, 2012; Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004; Rege & Telle, 2004).83  
Explanations for framing effects vary, but most invoke at least one of two related 
theories: 1) reference-dependence, loss aversion, and prospect theory84 and 2) valence-based 
                                                     
81 Jackman (2016b) analyzed cooperation in the same repeated public good dilemma, focusing specifically on 
cooperation, framing effects, and the difference in framing effects among different types of cooperators. This 
paper extends Jackman’s (2016b) results to beliefs as well as examines the relationships between beliefs and 
cooperation and the circumstances under which those relationships differ. 
82 Frames are created by presenting the same information differently. However, frame is defined as both the 
“formulation to which decision makers are exposed” and “the interpretation that they construct for themselves” 
(Dufwenberg et. al,2011 citing Kahneman, 2000, p. xiv). Framing effects are observed when decision-makers 
subject to different frames respond differently. In this study, the phrases “frame” and “subjective frame” 
distinguish the frames imposed by researchers from the subjective frames that individuals construct for 
themselves. 
83 Ellingsen et al., (2012), Liberman et al. (2004), Rege & Telle (2004), and Ross & Ward (1996) were Prisoners’ 
Dilemma experiments. 
84 According to prospect theory, decisions occur in two stages, framing and valuation, where framing in this 
context refers to how individuals decide on the “acts, contingencies, and outcomes that are relevant to the 
decision” (Kahneman& Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). The valuation stage invokes the notions of 
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framing.85 Despite the robustness and endurance of these theories, a persistent challenge for 
framing researchers is that decision processes, which include how individuals select reference 
points, how they measure gains and losses, and what they evaluate as positive versus negative, 
ultimately depend upon the perceptions of decision-makers. Without the ability to observe 
“subjective frame”, results from a series of public good experiments suggest that beliefs about 
others’ cooperation provide some insight into underlying decision processes and are an 
important intermediary in understanding framing effects.  
For example, Jackman (2016a; 2016b) found that individuals who were sensitive to 
framing were also more motivated by others’ actions and/or outcomes, which in a 
simultaneous dilemma like this one, almost certainly includes beliefs about others’ decisions. In 
a one-shot public good dilemma, Dufwenberg et al. (2011) found a stronger association 
between beliefs and cooperation than between frames and cooperation, and concluded that 
frames influence cooperation through “a subtle interplay of framing, beliefs, and choice.” 
Similarly, Sonnemans et al. (1998) attributed framing effects in repeated, step-level dilemmas 
to the dynamic environment in which beliefs about others were evolving over time in response 
to information about others’ cooperation. In a similar vein, Willinger and Ziegelmeyer (1999) 
concluded that the framing effects emerged in response to different, context-dependent 
reactions to others’ contributions. Those different “reactions” may have consisted largely of 
different beliefs that precipitated different choices. In fact, in the contribution-framed, 
repeated public good dilemma upon which this study was based, Fischbacher and Gätcher 
(2010) demonstrated that information about others’ cooperation was an important factor in 
belief formation, and beliefs are important predictors of behavior. Via a Prisoners’ Dilemma 
experiment, Ellingsen et al. (2012) described social frames as coordination devices, concluding 
that frames “enter people’s beliefs rather than their preferences.” 
                                                     
reference dependence and loss aversion, which together mean that “the carriers of value are gains and losses 
defined relative to a reference point” and “losses loom larger than gains” of the same magnitude (Tversky & 
Kahnman, 1991). 
85 Levin et al. (1998) and Levin et al. (2002) categorized valence-based framing effects into a three part typology 
consisting of attribute framing, goal framing, and risky choice framing each due to different underlying 
mechanisms. They ascribed attribute framing effects to associative processing in which positive associations yield 
more action and negative associations yield less action. They attributed goal framing effects to reference 
dependence and loss aversion and risky choice framing effects to prospect theory. 
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These results strongly suggest that framing passes through beliefs in decision processes 
where framing effects are observed. However, none of these studies provides a pathway 
analysis of that mechanism, and none addresses how those pathways differ among different 
types of decision makers. Through the combined use of simple non-parametric tests and recent 
advances in the marriage of moderation and mediation models, this study does.  
This research 1) provides evidence that frames indirectly influenced cooperation 
through beliefs about others’ cooperation, and 2) shows that this beliefs pathway was present 
for individuals previously assessed as conditional cooperators but absent for individuals 
previously assessed as non-cooperators. This work also 3) demonstrates framing effects in 
cooperation and in beliefs that differed across types of decision-makers; 4) shows that study 
participants cooperated somewhat less on average than their expectations of others, although 
this effect differed by type of decision-maker; and 5) reveals that individuals who were 
expected to cooperate very little or not at all provided the best estimates of others’ 
cooperation, while more cooperative types tended to overestimate others’ cooperation. 
Methodologically, this research distinguishes itself from previous work in at least three 
ways. First, separately from the repeated public good dilemma, decision-makers were classified 
into four differently motivated, behavior-based types (Jackman, 2016a) that predict 
cooperation in the repeated public good dilemma (Jackman, 2016b). Second, the public good 
decision was presented in four different ways to four different sets of individuals according to a 
novel 2 × 2 factorial framing design that decomposes frame into the action implied by the 
location of the initial endowment and the language used to describe the action. Third, this 
study treated beliefs about others as an outcome variable in non-parametric tests and as an 
intermediary in moderation and mediation analyses (a.k.a. path analysis, conditional process 
analysis). 
In the following, I describe the study participants, experimental design, and empirical 
methods. I present results, and conclude with a discussion of results and next steps. 
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2 Methods 
This study employed non-parametric tests and moderation and mediation analyses. 
Results derive from cooperation and stated beliefs in the repeated public good dilemma, a core 
component of the full experiment illustrated in Figure 3.1. The frames examined in this study – 
give neutral (GN), give non-neutral (GNN), take neutral (TN), and take non-neutral (TNN) that – 
correspond to the 2 × 2 factorial framing design illustrated in Figure 3.2 and are described in 
depth in Section 2.3. Each study participant’s decision-making type was assessed previously in 
Jackman (2016a) based on their choices in the one-shot public good dilemma that preceded the 
repeated dilemma. Types include non-cooperators who cooperated at trivial levels or not at all 
regardless of others’ average cooperation; conditional cooperators who approximately 
matched others’ average cooperation; low cooperators who cooperated at low but non-trivial 
levels regardless of others’ average cooperation; and high cooperators who cooperated at high 
levels regardless of others’ average cooperation.  
When I report statistics, I use an alpha level of 0.05 for all statistical tests and describe 
results with p-values less than 0.05 as “statistically significant.” I use the phrases “highly 
significant” for p-values less than 0.01, “weakly significant” for p-values between 0.05 and 0.1, 
and “marginally significant” for p-values close to but greater than 0.1. All analyses for this paper 
were generated using SAS® software.86  
 
2.1 Study Participants 
Experimental subjects were recruited from an existing pool of potential participants 
using the School of Information On-line Recruitment System for Experimental Economics 
(ORSEE) at the University of Michigan. Prospective participants received an email inviting them 
to participate in a “decision-making experiment” for which they would receive “$5 
compensation for showing up” and “approximately $20 (including show-up compensation)” if 
they completed the experiment.  
                                                     
86 Version 9.4 for Windows, Copyright © 2002-2012 by SAS Institute Inc. SAS and all other SAS Institute Inc. 
product or service names are registered trademarks or trademarks of SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA. 
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In total, 256 adults participated in the experiment via 16 different sessions consisting of 
16 people per session. Each participant took part in only one session. As reported in Table 3.1, 
the average age of participants was 20.5 years (𝑁 = 252, 𝑆𝐷 = 4.16), 46 percent were women, 
37 percent reported having no training in economics, and 38 percent of participants reported 
having no previous experience with “a study like this one.”87 Table 3.1 also reports the 
distribution of participants among four types of decision-makers. Per Jackman (2016a), 19 
percent of participants in this study were non-cooperators who were not expected to 
cooperate in the repeated dilemma; 51 percent were conditional cooperators who were 
expected to match approximately their beliefs about others’ cooperation; 23 percent were low 
cooperators who were expected to cooperate consistently at low levels; and 7 percent were 
high cooperators who were expected to cooperate more than they believed others would. 
Four sessions were assigned to each of the four frames in advance, with the expectation 
that the individuals assigned to each frame would, on average, be similar with regard to age, 
gender, training in economics, prior experience with studies like this one, and type of decision-
maker. As reported in Table 3.1, participants’ age (𝐹(3, 𝑁 = 252) = 1.04, 𝑝 = 0.3745), training 
in economics (𝑋2 (3, 𝑁 = 251) = 0.68, 𝑝 = 0.8784), and cooperative type (𝑋2 (9, 𝑁 = 256) =
11.29, 𝑝 = 0.2566) did not differ significantly across the four frames, but there was a marginal 
association between gender and frame (𝑋2 (3, 𝑁 = 256) = 6.09, 𝑝 = 0.1073) and a highly 
significant association between experience and frame (𝑋2 (3, 𝑁 = 245) = 13.35, 𝑝 = 0.0039). 
Subsequent analyses controlled for these differences. Specifically, regression analyses were 
robust across model specifications with and without demographic variables. 
 
2.2 The Experiment 
The full experiment illustrated in Figure 3.1 consisted of five components – instructions, 
practice questions, a one-shot public good dilemma, a repeated public good dilemma, and a 
questionnaire. A complete script and instructions for the experiment are given in the Appendix.  
                                                     
87 These study participants were quite young; based on age, most were born in the late 1990’s and only 8 were 
over the age of 25. Most had studied economics, and most had participated previously in a study like this one. 
While a microcosm of decision-makers in general, which is a challenge for many laboratory experiments, these 
results, at minimum, cast light onto a very interesting microcosm of educated, late generation millennials. 
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The experiment was conducted via 16 separate sessions. Every session included exactly 
16 people, and each participant took part in only one session. Each of the four frames was 
assigned to a different set of four sessions. The experiment was programmed and conducted 
using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) in the School of Information experimental 
laboratory at the University of Michigan. 
Each session commenced when recruits arrived at the waiting room. The first 16 recruits 
to arrive participated in the session. Additional recruits were paid $5 for showing up and then 
were dismissed. Study participants were invited into the computer laboratory where each 
individual chose to sit at one of 16 desktop computers separated by partitions. Participants 
were provided with written, frame-specific instructions explaining the decision situation and 
incentives (see Appendix). Instructions clearly stated that “the experiment consist[ed] of a 
series of decision situations.” Instructions were also read aloud. To further ensure participants 
understood the decision situation and before the experiment could proceed, all participants 
were required to answer ten practice questions correctly.  
At this point, the one-shot public good dilemma proceeded in randomly assigned 
anonymous groups of four.88 In the one-shot public good dilemma, participants encountered 
two formulations of the same decision situation, an unconditional decision in which 
participants did not know others’ decisions and 21 decisions conditioned on the hypothetical 
average decisions of others. To conclude the one-shot dilemma, each participant was shown 
her decision, her earnings, and the average decision of others in her four-person group.  
The repeated public good dilemma, the focus of this paper, proceeded in randomly re-
matched, anonymous groups of four. It began with onscreen instructions that were also read 
aloud. Instructions advised participants that there would be 10 rounds in this stage of the 
experiment. Then participants were presented with a series of ten identical decision situations, 
called rounds. Cooperation decisions in each round were made simultaneously, without 
knowledge of the current decisions of other group members. Individuals also provided 
                                                     
88 The one-shot dilemma was patterned after the “P-experiment” employed by Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) 
and Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr, (2001). In Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), the one-shot dilemma preceded 
repeated dilemma decisions for some subjects and followed repeated dilemma decisions for others. They found no 
statistically significant difference in cooperation in the repeated dilemma between subjects who encountered the 
one-shot dilemma before or after the repeated dilemma. 
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estimates for the average decision of the other three members of their 4-person group, called 
first order beliefs, and approximations of the average estimate of the three other members of 
their 4-person group, called second order beliefs.  
Using the give neutral frame and italics to highlight the phrases that differ among 
frames, cooperation decisions were collected via the question, “How many points will you 
allocate to the project account?” To measure first order beliefs, individuals were asked, “How 
many points on average do you think others will allocate to the project account?” To measure 
second orders beliefs, individuals were asked, “On average, what do you think the other three 
members of your group will estimate for others’ average allocations to the project account?” 
Therefore, first order beliefs reflect an individual’s expectations of others and their estimate of 
others’ cooperation. In this research, I explore the role of first order beliefs in decision 
processes, specifically the role of beliefs as an intermediary between frame and cooperation. 
Second order beliefs are conceptually quite different.89 Specifically, second order beliefs reflect 
an individual’s assessment of others’ ability to accurately estimate others’ behavior and are not 
relevant to the objectives of this study.90 
Decisions were incentivized by the payoff function given in Equation (1), which is further 
discussed in Section 2.3. Providing correct estimates of others’ decisions and of others’ 
estimates was encouraged by awarding additional points for correctness. After each round, 
each individual’s decision, points earned, average decision of other group members, and 
additional points based on the accuracy of his estimates were provided on the computer 
screen.  
Following the repeated dilemma, participants then completed a questionnaire that 
measured reactions to the experiment and collected demographic information. At the end of 
the experiment, points were converted to dollars and paid to participants. On average, 
                                                     
89 According to Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests, mean per person second order beliefs were statistically 
significantly greater than mean per person first order beliefs (𝑆 = 4483, 𝑝 < 0.0001). Fixed effects regression also 
support the conclusion that first and second order beliefs were conceptually distinct; both variables were 
statistically significant as was their interaction. 
90 This notion of second order beliefs is quite different from Dufwenberg et al.’s (2012) notion of second order 
beliefs. 
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participants earned $15 from their decisions plus $5 for showing up. The experiment took 
approximately one hour. 
 
2.3 Decision Situation and Framing  
In every decision in the experiment, every participant was randomly assigned to an 
anonymous group of four individuals and given decision-making power over an initial 
endowment of 20 points. Every decision required each individual to choose how to split her 
endowment between herself and the group knowing that individuals kept everything they 
allocated to themselves, and group members benefited equally from allocations to the group. 
Consistent with other linear public good games, payoffs were given by Equation (1), repeated 
below: 
 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛾 ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1  (1) 
where 𝜋𝑖  represents points earned by person 𝑖, and 𝑔𝑖 represents person 𝑖’s allocation to the 
group. In other words, 𝑔𝑖 represents cooperation by person 𝑖. Each individual’s initial 
endowment was 𝑤𝑖 = 20, groups were of size 𝑛 = 4, and the marginal per capita return 
(MPCR) was 𝛾 = 0.4 as in Fischbacher and Gächter (2010).  
The decision situation in this study was presented in four different ways according to 
the 2 × 2 factorial framing design illustrated in Figure 3.2. This design distinguishes 1) the 
action implied by the location of the initial endowment from 2) the language used to describe 
the action. Neutral frames were nearly identical, differentiated only by the location of the initial 
endowment. The word “allocate” was used in both neutral frames to describe the action taken. 
“Allocate” was replaced with “give” and “take” to create the non-neutral frames. The result was 
four frames, give neutral (GN), give non-neutral (GNN), take neutral (TN), and take non-neutral 
(TNN). The following discussion of will make this more clear. 91 
The give treatment located the initial endowment with the individual (i.e., in “personal 
accounts”), and instructions stated the following: “To start, your personal account contains 20 
points. Every individual has 20 points in their personal account that they can distribute 
                                                     
91 There is no evidence, to my knowledge, that the word “allocate” is neutral relative to the words “give” and 
“take.” In this context, neutral is shorthand for the uniformity of the language used in the neutral frames.  
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between their personal account and the project account in any way they like.” In contrast, take 
treatments located the initial endowment with the group (i.e., in the “project account”) and 
instructions stated the following: “To start, the project account contains 80 points. Every 
individual may distribute 20 of the project points between their personal account and the 
project account in any way they like.” In neutral frames, “allocate to” was used to describe the 
action; “give to” and “take from” were used in non-neutral treatments. Therefore in the neutral 
treatment individuals were asked how many points they would “allocate” to the “project 
account” or to her or his “personal account”. In contrast, in the non-neutral treatments, 
individuals were asked how many points they would “give” to the project account or “take” 
from the project account. 
Payoffs were always calculated in accordance with Equation (1) regardless of frame. 
Equation (1) reflects the framing of give treatments, but payoffs were presented to participants 
via Equation (1a) in the give neutral frame and Equation (1b) in the give non-neutral frame. 
Total 
points-income 
= 
(20 – points you allocated to the project account) + 
0.4 × sum of all points allocated to the project account 
(1a) 
 
Total 
points-income 
= 
(20 – points you gave to the project account) +  
0.4 × sum of all points given to the project account 
(1b) 
 
For each individual, the points she or he “allocated” or “gave” to the project account comprised 
her or his cooperation.  
Payoffs in the take frames are the same as in Equation (1), but are more faithfully 
represented in Equation (2)  
 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 + 𝛾[∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 − ∑ 𝑥𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 ] (2) 
where 𝜋𝑖  represents earnings for person 𝑖, and 𝑥𝑖  represents points allocated by person 𝑖 to 
her/his personal account. The same parameters apply: the initial endowment is given by 𝑤𝑗 =
20, group size is 𝑛 = 4, and marginal per capita return is 𝛾 = 0.4. Importantly, Equation (2) is 
equivalent to Equation (1) via the relationship, 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖 where 𝑔𝑖 represents points 
allocated to the project account by person 𝑖 (i.e., cooperation for person 𝑖). In the experiment, 
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payoffs were presented as in Equation (2a) in the take neutral frame and Equation (2b) in the 
take non-neutral frame. 
Total 
points-income 
= 
points you allocated to your personal account +  
0.4 × (80 – sum of all points allocated to personal accounts) 
(2a) 
 
Total 
points-income 
= 
points you took from the project account +  
0.4 × (80 – sum of all points taken from the project account) 
(2b) 
 
For each individual, points not “allocated to personal accounts” or not “taken from the project 
account” make up her or his cooperation. 
In all other regards, oral and written instructions were nearly identical in all frames. 
Following Dufwenberg et al.’s (2011) example, the externality generated via the public good 
was always presented positively but weakly. Specifically, all frames included the following 
statement: “You will earn points from both accounts in every decision situation. You are the 
only one who will earn points from your personal account. However, everyone will profit 
equally from the total amount in the project account.” In addition, wording very strictly 
excluded any use of arguably equivalent terminology. For example, “keep” and “leave” were 
never used in place of “give” and “take” since “keep” and “leave” may have different behavioral 
consequences (van Dijk & Wilke, 2000).  
 
2.4 Modeling and Analyses 
In addition to descriptive statistics, modeling and analyses consisted of two 
components: nonparametric tests and moderation and mediation analyses. In the following, I 
first describe the data. Then I examine the objectives, advantages, and limitations of non-
parametric tests. Third, I discuss moderation and mediation models and how they are 
combined to reveal the beliefs pathway for framing effects.  
 
2.4.1  Data 
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Table 3.2 describes the structure of the data. The units of analysis were the 256 unique 
study participants (𝑁 = 256) nested within 16 clusters (𝑆 = 16 ) that correspond to 
experimental session. Each session was comprised of 16 individuals (𝑀𝑠  =  16). Each of the 
four different frames was applied to four sessions via the 2 × 2 factorial combinations of the 
experimental treatments, action (𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠) and language (𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠). Cooperation and first and 
second order beliefs were measured for each individual in all 10 rounds of the repeated public 
good dilemma, which proceeded in randomly re-matched groups of four (see Figure 3.1 and 
Section 2.2). For each individual, mean per person cooperation (𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑖) was calculated 
by averaging cooperation over all ten rounds. Mean per person first order beliefs (𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐹𝑂𝐵𝑖) 
and mean per person second order beliefs (𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑂𝐵𝑖) were also calculated. Demographic 
variables for each individual (𝑖) included one categorical variable for the four types of decision-
makers (𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖), and three dichotomous variables for gender (𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖), training in 
economics (𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖), and prior experience with a study like this one (𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖). Type was assessed 
in Jackman (2016a) using behavior recorded during the one-shot public good dilemma, and 
demographic information was collected in the questionnaire that bracketed the repeated public 
good dilemma in this experiment (see Figure 3.1).  
 
2.4.2 Nonparametric Tests 
Nonparametric tests were used to test for statistically significant differences in mean 
per person cooperation and beliefs between or among groups.92 Specifically, Kruskal Wallis 
tests were used to compare the medians of non-normal dependent variables (i.e., mean per 
person cooperation and beliefs) for more than two categories of an independent variable (i.e., 
frame and type). Pairwise tests between frames and between types employed the Dwass, Steel, 
Critchlow-Fligner (DSCF) multiple comparison analysis (Critchlow & Fligner, 1991; Dwass, 1960; 
Steel, 1960), which is based on pairwise two-sample Wilcoxon comparisons. In general, the 
Kruskal Wallis test reduces to the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test in the two-category case. All 
                                                     
92 Non-parametric tests for mean per person cooperation and mean per person beliefs were consistent with results 
by round.  
126 
 
non-parametric tests were conducted using SAS software via the procedure NPAR1WAY with 
the WILCOXON and DSCF options. 
Nonparametric tests are conceptually quite simple; and most important, they guided 
subsequent analyses and lend weight to the findings of the moderation and mediation analyses. 
Nonetheless, there are challenges that nonparametric analyses do not address. Kruskal Wallis 
tests do not estimate treatment effects, do not control for known differences in the 
demographics of treatment groups, do not control for within session correlation, and do not 
reveal the direct effects of frame on cooperation and indirect effects of frame on cooperation 
through beliefs. Moderation and mediation analyses overcome these challenges.  
 
2.4.3 Moderation, Mediation, and Conditional Process Analyses 
Moderation and mediation analyses are used to test hypotheses regarding the 
circumstances under which relationships between variables hold – moderation – and the 
mechanisms or pathways by which variables exert influence – mediation (Hayes, 2013, p. 3). 
Moderation is also known as interaction (Hayes, 2013, p. 8). Mediation analysis partitions the 
effects of independent variables on an outcome variable into indirect and direct effects and 
compares those effects to total effects. Conditional process analysis combines moderation and 
mediation to test hypotheses regarding the circumstances under which those mechanisms or 
pathways differ (Hayes, 2013, p. 327).93  
In this paper, moderation, meditation, and conditional process analyses were 
implemented to test three relationships among action, language, type, mean per person 
cooperation, and mean per person first order beliefs.94 Because first and second order beliefs 
ultimately proved to be so closely correlated (see Section 3) and results for mean per person 
                                                     
93 There is an important distinction and some debate in the methodology literature regarding what comprises 
mediated moderation versus moderated mediation (Hayes, 2013, p. 9-10). These distinctions relate to 
appropriately matching the model type (i.e., moderated mediation versus mediated moderation) to research 
questions. However, in this case, the mathematical specifications are identical. As a result, I avoid jargon and 
therefore avoid the possible debate by describing interactions and direct, indirect, and total effects rather than 
labeling models that combine moderation and mediation analyses, as well as invoke the more general terminology, 
conditional process analysis. 
94 Results reported in this paper are consistent with results of linear unobserved effects panel data models 
(LUEPDMs). LUEPDMs include every measure of cooperation and first order beliefs for every individual as well as 
unobserved effects for sessions and individuals.  
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second order beliefs were similar to results for mean per person first order beliefs, the 
following model specifications include only mean per person first order beliefs. 
First, I examined how language (i.e., non-neutral versus neutral) influenced mean per 
person cooperation and mean per person first order beliefs in give versus take treatments using 
the model illustrated in Figure 3.3. In the moderation model depicted in the top panel, the 
relationship between language and the dependent variable (i.e., cooperation or beliefs) is 
represented by the horizontal arrow. Moderation in this context means that the effect of 
language on the dependent variable depends upon action. Moderation is represented by the 
arrow pointing from action to the horizontal arrow. Statistically, moderation is simply an 
interaction. Thus, language moderated by action and action moderated by language are 
equivalent, and both formulations correspond to the statistical model given in the lower panel 
of Figure 3.3 and specified in Equation (3). 
 𝑌𝑖𝑠 = 𝑖𝑖𝑠 + 𝑐1𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 + 𝑐2𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + 𝑐3𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠 (3) 
𝑌𝑖𝑠 represents mean per person cooperation (𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑠) or mean per person first order 
beliefs (𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐹𝑂𝐵𝑖𝑠). The intercept and error term are represented by 𝑖𝑖𝑠 and 𝜀𝑖𝑠, respectively. 
Note that 𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 and 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 are indicator (i.e., dummy) variables for action and language 
respectively where give (i.e., 𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 = 0) and neutral (i.e., 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 = 0) are the reference values 
(i.e., omitted variables). Therefore, regression coefficients on action and language represent an 
effect relative to the reference action (i.e., give) and language (i.e., neutral).  
Second, I examined the effects of language moderated by action on mean per person 
cooperation through mean per person first order beliefs by partitioning the total effect, 𝑐, into 
indirect, 𝑎𝑏, and direct, 𝑐′, effects such that 𝑐 = 𝑐′ + 𝑎𝑏. Thus, the indirect effect, 𝑎𝑏, 
comprises the portion of the total effect arising from the pathway of influence from language 
onto beliefs, 𝑎, and from beliefs onto cooperation, 𝑏. The direct effect, 𝑐′, comprises the 
portion of the total effect that is independent of the influence of beliefs on cooperation. 
Indirect and direct effects are illustrated in the upper panel of Figure 3.4. The indirect 
effect, 𝑎𝑏, consists of two components represented by the upward sloping arrow between 
language and first order beliefs and the downward sloping arrow between first order beliefs 
and cooperation. The direct effect, 𝑐′, is represented by the horizontal arrow between language 
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and cooperation. The relationships between language and beliefs and between language and 
cooperation are both moderated by action, and depicted by the arrows originating from 
action.95 
The indirect and direct effects are given by Equations (4) and (5).  
 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐹𝑂𝐵𝑖𝑠 = 𝑖𝑖𝑠
𝑀 + 𝑎1𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 + 𝑎2𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + 𝑎3𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠
𝑀 (4) 
 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑠 = 𝑖𝑖𝑠
𝑌 + 𝑐1
′ 𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 +  𝑐2
′ 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + 𝑐3
′ 𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + 𝑏𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐹𝑂𝐵𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠
𝑌  (5) 
Total effects are given by equation (6),  
 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑠 = 𝑖𝑖𝑠
𝑇 + 𝑐1𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 + 𝑐2𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + 𝑐3𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠
𝑇  (6) 
Thus, the indirect effect, 𝑎2𝑏, estimates the difference in cooperation between non-
neutral and neutral language in the give treatment that results from the influence of language 
on beliefs, which in turn influences cooperation. It is equivalent to the estimated difference 
between cooperation in the give non-neutral and give neutral frames (𝐺𝑁𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁). The direct 
effect, 𝑐2
′ , estimates the difference in cooperation between non-neutral and neutral language in 
the give treatment that is independent of the influence of beliefs on cooperation. The direct 
effect is the difference in cooperation between the give non-neutral and give neutral frames 
(𝐺𝑁𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁) that is in no way attributable to the influence of beliefs on cooperation.  
The third relationship examined explored if and how the beliefs pathway established via 
the above model differed for different types of decision makers. This model adds the 
categorical variable type (𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖) to the above model as an additional moderator as depicted in 
Figure 3.5 and given by Equations (7), (8), and (9).  
 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐹𝑂𝐵𝑖𝑠 = 𝑖𝑖𝑠
𝑀 + 𝑎1𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 + 𝑎2𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + 𝑎3𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + (7) 
 𝒂𝟒𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝒊 + 𝒂𝟓𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝒊 +  𝒂𝟔𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 × 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝒊 + 
 𝒄𝟕
′ 𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 × 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝒊 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠
𝑀 
 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑠 = 𝑖𝑖𝑠
𝑌 + 𝑐1
′ 𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 +  𝑐2
′ 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + 𝑐3
′ 𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + (8) 
 𝒄𝟒
′ 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖 + 𝒄𝟓
′ 𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖 +  𝒄𝟔
′ 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 × 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖 + 
 𝒄𝟕
′ 𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 × 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖 + 
                                                     
95 This model assumes a causal relationship from language through first order beliefs to cooperation (𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺 →
𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐹𝑂𝐵 → 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃) that is consistent with the experimental nature of this study, the design of the 
decision situation in which individuals are asked to estimate other’s decisions before submitting their own 
decisions, as well as the generally accepted theory of social preferences in which individuals include a valuation of 
others’ actions or outcomes in their decision processes. 
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 𝑏1𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐹𝑂𝐵𝑖 + 𝒃𝟐𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐹𝑂𝐵𝑖 × 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠
𝑌  
Total effects are illustrated in the lower panel of Figure 3.5 and are given by the 
coefficients in Equation (9). 
 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑠 = 𝑖𝑖𝑠
𝑇 + 𝑐1𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 + 𝑐2𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + 𝑐3𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + (9) 
 𝒄𝟒𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖 + 𝒄𝟓𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖 + 𝒄𝟔𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 × 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖 + 
 𝒄𝟕𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 × 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠
𝑇  
Note that 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖  represents a vector of three indictor (i.e., dummy) variables for conditional, 
low, and high cooperators where non-cooperator is the reference type (i.e., omitted variable). 
Thus, 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖, the two- and three-way interactions with 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖, and their coefficients are 
vectors that I represent with bold type-face. Regression coefficients on 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖  and interactions 
with 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖  represent effects, or some part thereof, relative to the reference category or 
reference categories.96 
These models were implemented as generalized estimating equations (GEE) clustered 
on session. Model estimation was conducted using SAS software and the procedure GENMOD 
with the REPEATED statement to calculate cluster-robust standard errors (CRSE). 
 
3 Results 
These approaches provide new insight into how frames differently influence 
cooperation and beliefs about others’ cooperation, how those framing effects differ for 
different types of decision-makers, and under what conditions (i.e., for what types and in which 
frames) framing effects pass through beliefs. To begin, I report descriptive statistics and results 
of non-parametric tests for cooperation, first order beliefs, and second order beliefs. Because 
only cooperation and first order beliefs are relevant to the objectives of this research 
moderation and mediation analyses included only cooperation and first order beliefs. 
 
  
                                                     
96 Interpretation of total, indirect, and direct effects is identical to the previous model, but requires attention to 
non-cooperator as the reference category for type. As with give and neutral reference values for action and 
language, using other reference values for type was investigated; those alternate specifications and results were 
equivalent. However, using non-cooperator as the reference category for type yielded the most illustrative results. 
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3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 3.6 plots the average and median cooperation, first order beliefs, and second 
order beliefs for all 256 study participants. In general, cooperation and beliefs declined over 
time; on average, cooperation and beliefs were non-trivial; cooperation and first and second 
order beliefs track one another; and cooperation was less than beliefs in every round except 
the first. Results were similar by frame and by type as shown in Figures 3.7 and 3.8. In addition 
to plotting cooperation and beliefs, Figures 3.7 and 3.8 also include average cooperation for all 
256 participants. 
Consistent with Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), Figure 3.6 reveals that study 
participants were “imperfect conditional cooperators.” Their cooperation appeared to be 
conditioned on but also somewhat less than their beliefs about others’ cooperation. In fact, 
cooperation strongly correlated with first order beliefs in every round (𝑟(254) > 0.47, 𝑝 <
0.0001) and Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests showed that mean per person cooperation was 
statistically significantly less than mean per person first order beliefs (𝑆 = 6249, 𝑝 < 0.0001); 
average (median) mean per person first order cooperation was 0.65 (1.6) points less than 
average (median) mean per person first order beliefs.  
These results held for every frame, but not for every type. Among non-cooperators, 
mean per person cooperation was not strongly correlated with mean per person first order 
beliefs (𝑟(46) = 0.31, 𝑝 = 0.0327). The differences between mean per person cooperation 
and mean per person first order beliefs for non-cooperators was not only highly significant 
according to Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests (𝑆 = 518, 𝑝 < 0.0001), the difference between 
beliefs and cooperation was much larger for non-cooperators than for all study participants, 
2.68 points on average (3.20 points in the median). For high cooperators mean per person 
cooperation and mean per person first order beliefs were strongly and significantly correlated 
(𝑟(15) = 0.72, 𝑝 = 0.0011), but high cooperators cooperated more, not less, than they 
believed others would. Among high cooperators, mean per person cooperation was 2.16 points 
greater on average (2.9 points in the median) than mean per person first order beliefs. 
Focusing on average first order beliefs as an estimate of others’ average cooperation, 
consider how well study participants estimated others’ behavior. As reported above, study 
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participants generally overestimated others’ cooperation. However, comparing average 
estimates of others’ behavior for each type of decision maker to actual average cooperation of 
all participants, shows that non-cooperators and low cooperators provided very good estimates 
on average, but conditional and high cooperators overestimated others’ behavior. Actual 
average (median) mean per person cooperation was 3.98 (2.85) points. Average mean per 
person first order beliefs for non-cooperators and low cooperators were 3.81 (3.20) and 3.90 
(3.30) points, respectively, and 5.23 (5.20) and 4.93 (5.10) points for conditional and high 
cooperators, respectively.  
Table 3.3 condenses Figures 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 into descriptive statistics for mean per 
person cooperation, mean per person first order beliefs, and mean per person second order 
beliefs, for all study participants across frames and for each type of decision-maker across 
frames. Overall, study participants’ average mean per person cooperation was 3.98 points and 
median mean per person cooperation was 2.85 points. Mean per person beliefs were higher. 
Across frames, mean per person cooperation and mean per person beliefs were largest for 
individuals in the give neutral frame overall and for each type of decision-maker. Across 
cooperative types, high cooperators cooperated the most. Non-cooperators cooperated least. 
Mean per person beliefs were also highest for high cooperators, and lowest for non-
cooperators, but the range of mean per person beliefs among types of decision-makers was 
smaller than the range of mean per person cooperation among types of decision-makers. 
 
3.2 Non-parametric tests 
Table 3.3 also shows the results of non-parametric tests among and between frames for 
all participants and within type. Kruskal Wallis tests for all participants showed statistically 
significant differences among frames in mean per person cooperation and mean per person 
first and second order beliefs. Frame appears to have influenced cooperation and beliefs. 
According to pairwise non-parametric tests, framing effects were driven by the give neutral 
frame, which almost always yielded the highest levels of cooperation and beliefs. 
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However, framing effects differed across types. Specifically, framing effects in mean per 
person cooperation were significant among conditional cooperators and low cooperators,97 
framing effects in mean per person first and second order beliefs were significant among 
conditional cooperators, and framing effects were significant in mean per person second order 
beliefs for low cooperators. Kruskal Wallis tests were not statistically significant for non-
cooperators and high cooperators, not in mean person cooperation and not in mean per person 
beliefs. Where pairwise tests were significant, the give neutral frame often yielded the highest 
levels of cooperation and differed significantly from other frames in pairwise tests. 
Focusing on trends, rather than statistical significance, the give neutral frame produced 
the highest levels of cooperation for every type except non-cooperators. The give neutral frame 
also produced the highest beliefs for every type of decision-maker, without exception. In other 
words, framing effects in mean per person cooperation appear to be present for conditional, 
low, and high cooperators. Framing effects in mean per person first and second order beliefs 
are evident for every type of decision-maker. The “failure” to detect these framing effects may 
be due to the small number of each type (i.e., 48 non-cooperators, 60 low cooperators, and 17 
high cooperators) and not due to the absence of framing effects.  
Among different types of decisions makers, non-cooperators distinguished themselves 
from the other types in mean per person cooperation but conditional cooperators distinguished 
themselves from other types in mean per person beliefs. Focusing on the left-most columns of 
Table 3.3 under the heading “All Frames”, mean per person cooperation differed significantly 
among types of decision-makers (𝜒2(3, 𝑁 = 256) = 58.09, 𝑝 < 0.0001). In addition, pairwise 
tests showed that mean per person cooperation among non-cooperators was statistically 
significantly different from each of the other types.98 Mean per person first order beliefs 
(𝜒2(3, 𝑁 = 256) = 17.46, 𝑝 = 0.0006) and mean per person second order beliefs 
(𝜒2(3, 𝑁 = 256) = 13.00, 𝑝 = 0.0046) also differed among all four types of decision-makers. 
                                                     
97 Non-parametric tests results for mean per person cooperation are identical to results reported in Jackman 
(2016b) and consistent with the results of linear unobserved effects models also reported in Jackman (2016b). 
98 Mean per person cooperation also differed between low cooperators and high cooperators, but both low 
cooperators and high cooperators were not statistically significantly different from conditional cooperators. 
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In pairwise tests, mean per person beliefs among conditional cooperators differed significantly 
from non-cooperators and low cooperators, but not from high cooperators. 
 
3.3 Moderation and Mediation 
The descriptive statistics and results of non-parametric tests provide a road map for the 
moderation and mediation analyses that follow. First, framing effects were significant in mean 
per person cooperation and mean per person first order beliefs, suggesting strong relationships 
between frame (i.e. action, language, and their interaction) and cooperation and between 
frame and beliefs. Second, the give neutral frame drove the framing effects in mean per person 
cooperation and in mean per person beliefs and therefore implicates the interaction of action 
and language in producing framing effects. Third, first order beliefs and cooperation were 
strongly and significantly correlated.  
Altogether, these results suggest that the effect of non-neutral language on cooperation 
and on beliefs differs in the give and take treatments, frame influences beliefs, and beliefs 
influence frame. In the language of moderation and mediation, action appears to moderate the 
effect of language on cooperation and on beliefs as illustrated in Figure 3.3, specified in 
Equation (3), and described in Section 3.3.1. Frame appears to indirectly influence cooperation 
through beliefs as illustrated in Figure 3.4, specified in Equations (4), (5), and (6), and described 
in Section 3.3.2.  
Returning to descriptive statistics and non-parametric tests for motivation, recall that 
framing effects differed among types and for cooperation versus beliefs (see Table 3.3),99 and 
beliefs and cooperation were strongly correlated for every type except non-cooperators. These 
results show that the effect of action, language and their interaction on beliefs and cooperation 
differed across types, and suggested that action and language exerted an effect on cooperation 
                                                     
99 Framing effects in cooperation were clearly evident among conditional and low cooperators with give neutral as 
the most cooperative frame, and results were similar but not significant among high cooperators. Framing effects 
in beliefs were also clearly evident among conditional cooperators and weakly among low cooperators; for 
conditional and low cooperators beliefs were highest in the give neutral frame. Again, high cooperators 
demonstrated the same pattern of results, though effects were not statistically significant. Non-cooperators also 
appeared to form beliefs differently in different frames in much the same ways as other types of decision-makers. 
Among non-cooperators, beliefs in the give neutral frame were higher than in other frames. 
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through beliefs (i.e., mediation) for conditional cooperators, but not for non-cooperators (i.e., 
moderation). In other words, type moderates the indirect, direct, and total effects of frame on 
cooperation through beliefs, as illustrated in Figure 3.5, specified in Equations (7), (8), and (9), 
and described in Section 3.3.3. 
 
3.3.1 Non-neutral language yielded lower levels of cooperation and first order beliefs in the 
give treatment 
Table 3.4 reports the results of the moderation analysis illustrated in Figure 3.3 and 
tests the hypothesis that action moderates the effect of language on mean per person 
cooperation and on mean per person first order beliefs.100 Neither the location of the initial 
endowment nor the use of the words “give” or “take” instead of “allocate” fully accounted for 
the differences in cooperation among different frames. How do we know? Model specifications 
that included the interaction of action and language were preferred, and the effect of non-
neutral language on mean per person cooperation and mean per person first order beliefs was 
negative and statistically significant in the give frame only.  
To interpret Table 3.4, first note that mean per person cooperation was the dependent 
variable in the first three model specifications (I, II, and III), and mean per person first order 
beliefs was the dependent variable in the last three model specifications (I, II, III). Second, 
specification III and VI were preferred according to the Quasilikelihood under the Independence 
model Criterion (QIC),101 but specifications II and V, which exactly match Equation (3), yielded 
nearly identical results. Third, independent variables were all dichotomous and therefore 
                                                     
100 The results in Table 3.4 were consistent 1) in magnitude but not statistical significance with ordinary least 
square models, 2) in magnitude and statistical significance with linear unobserved effects models that included 
unobserved random effects for each session, and 3) in statistical significance with linear unobserved effect panel 
data models that included repeated measures for each individual (i.e., cooperation and first order beliefs were the 
dependent variables, not the means), unobserved random effects for each individual, and unobserved random 
effects for each session. 
101 Since the generalized estimating equations (GEE) method used here is not a likelihood-based method, the 
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) statistic used for comparing models fit with likelihood-based methods is not 
available. Instead, model fit is given by the Quasilikelihood under the Independence model Criterion (QIC) statistic. 
QICu approximates QIC when the GEE model is correctly specified. QICu, defined as 𝑄 + 2𝑝, adds a penalty (2𝑝) to 
the quasilikelihood (𝑄), where 𝑝 is the number of parameters in the model. When using QIC or QICu to compare 
two structures or two models, the model with the smaller statistic is preferred (SAS Institute, Inc., n.d.). 
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coefficients represent effects relative to references categories (i.e., give, neutral, man, no 
training, and no experience).  
Understanding regression coefficients reported in Table 3.4 was simplified through 
mean differences also reported in Table 3.4. Statistically significant differences were found 
between the give neutral and give non-neutral frames for mean per person cooperation and 
mean per person first order beliefs, but not between other frames. Figure 3.9 illustrates these 
results for specifications II and V via the statistically significant slope of the give line for 
cooperation and beliefs. Figure 3.9 also makes clear the relationships between regression 
coefficients and mean differences. In particular, the slope of the give line corresponds to the 
coefficient on language and the mean difference between give non-neutral and give neutral. 
 
3.3.2 Non-neutral language in the give treatment exerts an effect on mean per person 
cooperation through mean per person first order beliefs 
Table 3.5 reports the results of the mediation analysis illustrated in Figure 3.4 and 
specified in Equations (4), (5), and(6) in which frame (i.e. action, language, and their interaction) 
influenced cooperation through beliefs.102 Note that pairs of columns report estimates without 
demographic variables, as specified in Equations (4), (5), and (6), and with demographic 
variables. In every pair of results, the specification with demographic variables was preferred 
according to the QIC, but results were nearly identical without demographic variables. For 
simplicity, results focus on specifications without demographic variables. Figure 3.10 illustrates 
results for the give treatment, where statistically significant effects were found. 
These results reveal a core finding of this paper. From a simple mediation analysis, non-
neutral language in the give treatment appears to have indirectly influenced mean per person 
cooperation through mean per person first order beliefs. In other words, using the word “give” 
instead of “allocate” led to lower expectations of others’ cooperation that then precipitated 
lower levels of cooperation. As can be seen in Table 3.5 and Figure 3.10, non-neutral language 
in the give treatment reduced beliefs (𝑎 = −2.65, 𝑝 = 0.0204), and lower beliefs led to lower 
                                                     
102 The results reported in Table 3.5 are consistent with linear unobserved effects panel data models that include 
every measure of cooperation and first order beliefs for every individual as well as unobserved effects for sessions 
and individuals. 
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levels of cooperation (𝑏 = 1.11, 𝑝 < 0.0001) yielding the indirect effect (𝑎𝑏 = −2.94, 𝑝 =
0.3321).103 Though the indirect effect is not statistically significant, results reveal that the 
statistically significant and negative total effect of language on mean per person cooperation in 
the give treatment (𝑐 = −2.30, 𝑝 = 0.0317) vanished when mean per person first order beliefs 
was introduced as an intermediary (𝑐′ = 0.65, 𝑝 = 0.1597).104 In other words, there was no 
evidence of a direct effect of language on mean per person cooperation in the give treatment 
independent of the effect of language on mean per person first order beliefs in the give 
treatment.105 
In detail, the first two columns of results in Table 3.5 correspond to Equation (5) and are 
identical to estimates in Table 3.4, but here they serve a different purpose. Here, they are 
components of the indirect effects (i.e., 𝑎1 = −2.15
∗, 𝑎2 = −2.65
∗∗, and 𝑎3 = 2.97) that 
quantify the relationships between frame (i.e., action, language, and their interaction) and 
mean per person first order beliefs. Recall that because variables are dichotomous, the 
statistically significant coefficient on language shows that non-neutral language yielded mean 
per person beliefs that were 2.65 points lower than neutral language in the give treatment. This 
difference corresponds to the estimate of mean differences reported at the bottom of Table 3.5 
(𝐺𝑁𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁 = −2.65∗∗),106 and corresponds to the upward sloping arrow in Figure 3.10 
between “Non-Neutral” and “First Order Beliefs.” 
                                                     
103 The 𝑝-value reported here employs the Sobel test. The Sobel test – also known as the product of coefficients 
approach, delta method, and normal theory approach – is conservative. The standard error of the product, 𝑎𝑏, is 
given by 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑏 = √𝑎2𝑠𝑒𝑏
2 + 𝑏2𝑠𝑒𝑏
2 and test statistic, 𝑍 =
𝑎𝑏
𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑏
  (Hayes, 2013, pp. 102-105). 
104 Recall that total (𝑐), direct (𝑐′), and indirect (𝑎𝑏) effects are related as follows: 𝑐 = 𝑐′ + 𝑎𝑏. The indirect effect 
is 𝑎𝑏; 𝑎 and 𝑏 are components of the indirect effect. 
105 The statistical significance of 𝑎 and 𝑏 are not especially relevant; statistical significance of 𝑎𝑏 typically is (Hayes, 
2013, p.201). Nevertheless, the marked different in sign and statistical significance in the relationship between 
frame and cooperation when the mechanism through beliefs is not taken into account (i.e., total effects) versus 
when the mechanism through beliefs is take into account (direct effects), led me to conclude in the absence of a 
statistically significant indirect effect, that non-neutral language in the give treatment influenced cooperation 
through beliefs.  
106 Note that mean differences also show that mean per person first order beliefs were lower in the take neutral 
frame were than in the give neutral frame, but only weakly (𝑇𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁 = −2.15∗). In other words, in the neutral 
language treatment, taking yielded lower beliefs than giving. In general, 𝐺𝑁𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁 corresponds to the effect of 
the non-neutral language versus neutral language on the dependent variable in the give treatment. 𝑇𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁 
corresponds to the effect of taking versus giving in the neutral treatment. 𝑇𝑁𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁𝑁 corresponds to the effect 
of taking versus giving in the non-neutral treatment. 𝑇𝑁𝑁 − 𝑇𝑁 corresponds to the effect of non-neutral language 
versus neutral language in the take treatment.  
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The last two columns of results in Table 3.5 correspond to Equation (6) and are identical 
to specifications II and III in Table 3.4. Again, they serve a different purpose here. Here these 
results represent the total effects of language on mean per person cooperation (i.e., 𝑐1 = 1.95, 
𝑐2 = −2.30
∗∗, and 𝑐3 = 2.43) where the only statistically significant difference occurred 
between the give non-neutral and give neutral frames (𝐺𝑁𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁 = −2.30∗∗). The total 
effects in Figure 3.10 are labelled accordingly. 
Finally, the third and fourth columns of Table 3.5 correspond to Equation (5). These 
results report the direct effects (𝑐1
′ = 0.46, 𝑐2
′ = 0.65, and 𝑐3
′ = −0.88∗) of language 
moderated by action on mean per person cooperation and the second component of the 
indirect effect (𝑏 = 1.11∗∗∗). Mean differences show no statistically significant differences 
between any frames. Figure 3.10 shows and labels these findings for the give treatment. 
 
3.3.3 Mediation differs across types of decision-makers 
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 report indirect, direct, and total effects for the model depicted in 
Figure 3.5, and specified with Equations (8), (9), and (10). Results for conditional cooperators 
are depicted in Figure 3.11.107 These results reveal the final contribution of this paper. Namely, 
non-neutral language in the give treatment appears to have exerted an effect on mean per 
person cooperation through mean per person first order beliefs for conditional cooperators.  
Focusing on conditional cooperators in the give treatment, refer to Figure 3.11 and 
Table 3.8 which condenses relevant results from Tables 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7. Among conditional 
cooperators non-neutral language reduced beliefs (𝑎 = −3.09, 𝑝 = 0.0023), and lower beliefs 
led to lower levels of cooperation (𝑏 = 1.27, 𝑝 < 0.0001) yielding the indirect effect (𝑎𝑏 =
−3.94, 𝑝 = 0.2077). Though the indirect effect is not statistically significant, Table 3.8 and 
Figure 3.11 show that the statistically significant and negative effect of language on mean per 
person cooperation (𝑐 = −2.41, 𝑝 = 0.0294), that was evident in the absence of the beliefs 
pathway changed sign when mean per person first order beliefs was introduced as an 
intermediary (𝑐′ = 1.51, 𝑝 = 0.0132). In other words, even though the total effect of non-
                                                     
107 The results reported in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 are consistent with linear unobserved effects panel data models that 
include every measure of cooperation and first order beliefs for every individual as well as unobserved effects for 
sessions and individuals. 
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neutral language on cooperation was negative among conditional cooperators, the direct effect 
of language on cooperation when the beliefs pathway was taken into account was positive. 
Among conditional cooperators, using the word “give” instead of “allocate,” increased 
cooperation when the beliefs pathway was taken into account. But, using the word “give” 
instead of “allocate” substantially lowered estimates of others’ cooperation and subsequently 
their own level of cooperation, yield a total effect that was negative. 
Among non-cooperators, indirect, direct, and total effects were not statistically 
significant, and there was no evidence of a beliefs pathway for non-cooperators. Among low 
and high cooperators, however, evidence was mixed. Indirect effects were not significant, and 
direct and total effects were significant, negative, and of similar magnitude.108 
 
4 Conclusion 
A persistent challenge for framing researchers is that decision processes depend upon 
the perceptions of decision-makers. Previous studies suggest that beliefs about others’ 
cooperation provide insight into underlying decision processes and are an important 
intermediary in understanding framing effects (Dufwenberg et al., 2011; Ellingsen et al. 2012; 
Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010; Sonnemans et al., 1998; Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 1999). None of 
these studies, however, tested for a beliefs pathway between frame and cooperation. The 
primary contribution of this research is that frames influenced cooperation through beliefs. 
Specifically, using the word “give” instead of “allocate” when the initial endowment was 
located in personal accounts, lowered expectations for others’ cooperation that in turn led to 
lower levels of cooperation. Furthermore, when analyzed by type of decision-maker, the beliefs 
pathway was evident among individuals previously assessed as conditional cooperators, but not 
for individuals previously assessed as non-cooperators. Results were mixed for other types of 
decision-makers. 
This research also demonstrated framing effects in cooperation and in beliefs that 
differed across types of decision-makers; mean per person cooperation differed significantly 
                                                     
108 There is evidence that taking exerts influence on mean per person cooperation in the non-neutral treatment 
through mean per person first order beliefs among low cooperators and among high cooperators (𝑇𝑁𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁𝑁).  
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among frames for conditional and low cooperators, and mean per person first order beliefs 
differed significantly among frames only for conditional cooperators. However, the give neutral 
frame yielded the highest levels of cooperation for every type except non-cooperators and 
highest expectations of others’ cooperation for every type, without exception. Jackman (2016b) 
attributed framing effects to a combination of reference dependence, where locating the initial 
endowment in personal accounts yielded higher levels of cooperation that was then diminished 
by the surprisingly negative valence of the word “give” relative to the word “allocate.” 
Mediation analysis in this paper may offer additional insight into this counter-intuitive result. 
When the initial endowment was located in personal accounts, the total effect of the word 
“give” was negative and significant, but the effect when the beliefs pathway was taken into 
account was positive and significant. Perhaps the word “give” does evoke positive 
associations,109 and a positive direct effect on cooperation, but individuals do not ascribe those 
positive associations and outcomes to others.  
In addition, this study showed that overall study participants cooperated somewhat less 
than they expected others to cooperate. This result is consistent with Fischbacher and 
Gächter’s (2010) finding that on average people are “imperfect conditional cooperators;” they 
cooperate somewhat less than they expect others to cooperate. This study extends those 
results. In this study, conditional and low cooperators were “imperfect conditional 
cooperators” and cooperated slightly less than they expected others to cooperate. High 
cooperators cooperated more than they expected others to cooperate, and non-cooperators 
cooperated very little or not at all even though their estimates of others’ cooperation were well 
above zero.  
In fact, individuals who were expected to cooperate at low levels or not at all, provided 
the best estimates of others’ cooperation, while more cooperative types tended to 
overestimate others’ cooperation. This is consistent with Orbell and Dawes (1991), as cited by 
Ledyard (1995), who reported that cooperators expect more cooperation than defectors. 
Explanations dating back to the 1970’s relate to the idea that people believe others are like 
themselves and/or overemphasize similarities between themselves and others, such as 
                                                     
109 This is an example of attribute framing per Levin et al. (1998). 
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cognitive misers (Orbell & Dawes, 1991), false consensus (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977), and 
egocentrism. However, the dramatic difference and low correlation between cooperation and 
beliefs among non-cooperators in this research suggest that non-cooperators know that other 
decision-makers are not like themselves. 
Furthermore, this study revealed a beliefs pathway between frame and cooperation 
that was clearly evident among conditional cooperators and not among non-cooperators. The 
question of how beliefs are formed, how they evolve over time, and how information received 
over time influences beliefs and cooperation remain open questions. While it has long been 
suggested that beliefs are a product/result of prior beliefs and information about others, such 
as a weighted average,110 how frames differently influence the evolution of beliefs and/or how 
beliefs differently evolve over time for different types of decision-makers is a fruitful and 
unexplored avenue of research that follows from this research. 
Finally and revisiting the relevance of this research to policy innovation, note that 
conditional cooperators make up the majority of decision-makers here and in other 
experiments (Chaudhuri, 2011). Based on these findings, frame-based policies intended to 
inform or raise expectations for cooperation among other participants could motivate a very 
large number of decision-makers. This research also suggests that such efforts could influence 
other cooperators as well. Thus, more research into how frames can raise expectations of 
others’ cooperation is clearly warranted. However, narrow policy inceptions of this and related 
research could ignore a large minority of decision-makers that includes self-interested, 
competitive types, altruistic types, and individuals with a buy-in mentality, all of whom might 
cooperate more given appropriately designed and complementary incentives. This research 
also showed that the language dimension of frame passed through beliefs when individuals 
were giving, not when they were taking; and the effect of giving versus taking did not pass 
through beliefs. Thus, the beliefs pathway of valence-based framing almost certainly is not the 
only viable pathway for leveraging framing in policy design.  
                                                     
110 Ledyard (1995) noted that this idea dates back to Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977) who studied a 
commons dilemma situation. 
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Tables 
 
Table 3.1: Participant characteristics 
GN GNN TN TNN df F p
Age (in years) 3 1.04 0.3745
Number 252 61 64 63 64
Mean 20.54 20.15 20.23 21.44 21.31
Standard Deviation 4.16 1.68 3.47 2.99 6.68
N % GN GNN TN TNN df X
2
p
Gender 3 6.09 0.1072
Men 117 46% 25 37 30 25
Women 139 54% 39 27 34 39
No 94 37% 26 22 22 24 3 0.68 0.8784
Yes 157 63% 37 40 41 39
Don't know (excluded) 5 -- 1 2 1 1
3 13.35 0.0039 ***
No 94 38% 34 15 21 24
Yes 151 62% 26 44 42 39
Don't know (excluded) 11 -- 4 5 1 1
Frames ANOVA
Chi Square TestFrames
Experience 
Training 
 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.10 percent level. 
 
Note 1: GN = give neutral, GNN = give non-neutral, TN = take neutral, and TNN = take non-neutral. 
Note 2: NC = non-cooperator. CC = conditional cooperator, LC = low cooperator, and HC = cooperator. 
Note 3: Age was not reported for 3 individuals, and one age was misreported (age = 92) and excluded. Most 
participants were in their late teens (18 or 19) and early twenties. Eight were over 25.  
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Table 3.2: Data Structure 
    Level of Data Variables  
Level 2: Cluster of Units 
(𝑆 = 16) 
(𝑀𝑠 = 16) 
Cluster ID: 
Covariates: 
session (𝑠) 
action (𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠) 
language (𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠) 
 
Level 1: Unit of Analysis 
(𝑁 = 256) 
Unit ID: 
Covariates: 
 
 
 
Continuous Variables: 
individual (𝑖) 
type (𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑖) 
gender (𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖) 
training (𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖) 
experience (𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖) 
mean cooperation (𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑖) 
mean first order beliefs (𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐹𝑂𝐵𝑖) 
mean second order beliefs (𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑂𝐵𝑖) 
 
Note 1: 𝑆 is the number of clusters/sessions, indexed by 𝑠. 𝑀𝑠 is the number of units/individuals in every cluster. 𝑁 
is the number of units/individuals in the study, indexed by 𝑖. Mean cooperation and mean first and second order 
beliefs are per person averages over the ten rounds of the repeated public good dilemma. 
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics for mean per person cooperation, first order beliefs, and second order beliefs by frame and type  
with non-parametric tests for framing effects 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median X
2
p
All (N =256)
Mean Cooperation 256 3.98 2.85 64 5.49 4.95 a 64 3.19 2.05 b 64 3.55 2.20 b 64 3.68 3.30 b 13.08 0.0045 ***
Mean FOB 256 4.63 4.45 64 6.29 6.80 a 64 3.64 3.30 b 64 4.14 3.55 b 64 4.46 4.60 b 38.62 <.0001 ***
Mean SOB 256 4.82 4.60 64 6.58 6.90 a 64 4.03 3.75 b 64 4.23 3.90 b 64 4.45 4.25 b 44.24 <.0001 ***
Type (N =256)
Non-Cooperators
Mean Cooperation 48 1.13 0.00 9 0.66 0.00 a 11 0.86 0.00 a 14 1.06 0.40 a 14 1.72 0.65 a 1.88 0.5976
Mean FOB 48 3.81 3.20 9 4.92 5.40 a 11 2.74 3.00 a 14 3.85 3.30 a 14 3.89 3.60 a 5.20 0.1575
Mean SOB 48 4.26 3.75 9 5.66 6.40 a 11 4.00 3.80 a 14 4.14 3.65 a 14 3.69 3.30 a 4.09 0.2524
Conditional Cooperators
Mean Cooperation 131 4.97 4.20 40 6.47 5.20 a 37 4.06 2.90 b 28 4.83 4.05 a.b 26 4.13 4.40 a.b 8.22 0.0416 **
Mean FOB 131 5.23 5.20 40 6.91 7.20 a 37 3.82 3.70 b 28 4.60 4.55 b,c 26 5.35 5.90 a,c 30.94 <.0001 ***
Mean SOB 131 5.34 5.40 40 7.06 7.10 a 37 4.01 3.80 b 28 4.60 4.70 b 26 5.37 5.85 a,b 35.13 <.0001 ***
Low Cooperators
Mean Cooperation 60 3.20 2.25 13 5.18 5.40 a 14 2.45 1.80 b 16 2.61 2.00 b 17 2.85 1.80 a,b 10.49 0.0148 **
Mean FOB 60 3.90 3.30 13 5.38 6.40 a 14 3.43 3.20 a 16 3.84 3.10 a 17 3.19 2.80 a 6.84 0.0773 *
Mean SOB 60 4.13 3.65 13 5.78 6.60 a 14 3.67 3.35 b 16 3.98 3.35 a,b 17 3.38 3.30 b 10.12 0.0176 **
High Cooperators
Mean Cooperation 17 7.09 8.00 2 9.75 9.75 a 2 5.15 5.15 a 6 5.87 6.10 a 7 7.94 10.00 a 2.29 0.5141
Mean FOB 17 4.93 5.10 2 6.00 6.00 a 2 6.75 6.75 a 6 3.42 3.15 a 7 5.40 5.30 a 5.00 0.1715
Mean SOB 17 4.90 4.30 2 6.20 6.20 a 2 7.25 7.25 a 6 3.40 3.05 a 7 5.14 4.60 a 5.26 0.1537
Frame Kruskal Wallis
All GN GNN TN TNN (df  = 3)
 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.10 percent level. 
Note 1: GN = give neutral, GNN = give non-neutral, TN = take neutral, and TNN = take non-neutral. 
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Note 2: The results of pairwise nonparametric tests between frames are summarized by the superscripts appearing to the right of each median. Within a row, when two 
frames share superscripts, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the medians are equal. Within a row, when two frames do not share a superscript, the difference 
between medians is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. These pairwise tests employed the Dwass, Steel, Critchlow-Fligner (DSCF) multiple comparison analysis, 
which is based on pairwise two-sample Wilcoxon comparisons.  
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Table 3.4: Action moderates language 
Dependent Variable:
Est. (CRSE) Est. (CRSE) Est. (CRSE) Est. (CRSE) Est. (CRSE) Est. (CRSE)
Estimates
Intercept 4.88 (0.83) *** 5.49 (0.94) *** 6.03 (1.21) *** 5.55 (0.92) *** 6.29 (1.05) *** 6.54 (1.18) ***
Action (reference = Give) -0.73 (0.88) -1.95 (1.21) -1.73 (1.21) -0.67 (0.94) -2.15 (1.29) * -2.18 (1.31) *
Language (reference = Neutral) -1.09 (0.88) -2.30 (1.07) ** -2.47 (1.08) ** -1.16 (0.94) -2.65 (1.14) ** -2.68 (1.17) **
Action X Language 2.43 (1.66) 2.62 (1.65) 2.97 (1.73) * 3.01 (1.74) *
Gender (reference = Man) -0.25 (0.36) -0.14 (0.16)
Economics (reference = No Training) -1.06 (0.65) -0.42 (0.43)
Experience (reference = No Experience) 0.25 (0.65) 0.15 (0.23)
Observations 256 256 241 256 256 241
QIC/QICu 272/259 275/260 264/248 315/259 329/260 313/248
Mean Differences
GNN-GN -1.09 (0.88) -2.30 (1.07) ** -2.47 (1.08) ** -1.16 (0.94) -2.65 (1.14) ** -2.68 (1.17) **
TN-GN -0.73 (0.88) -1.95 (1.21) * -1.73 (1.21) -0.67 (0.94) -2.15 (1.29) * -2.18 (1.31) *
TNN-GNN -0.73 (0.88) 0.49 (1.14) 0.88 (1.13) -0.67 (0.94) 0.82 (1.15) 0.83 (1.14)
TNN-TN -1.09 (0.88) 0.13 (1.27) 0.15 (1.27) -1.16 (0.94) 0.33 (1.30) 0.33 (1.27)
Mean Per Person Cooperation
III IV VIII
Mean Per Person First Order Beliefs
VI
 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.10 percent level. 
 
Note 1: GN = give neutral, GNN = give non-neutral, TN = take neutral, and TNN = take non-neutral. 
Note 2: The dependent variable in specifications I, II, and III was mean per person cooperation. The dependent variable in specifications IV, V, and VI was mean 
per person first order beliefs. Results when mean per person second order beliefs is the dependent variable were consistent with first order beliefs. 
Note 3: Standard errors are cluster robust (CRSE), clustered on session. 
Note 4: Based on the QIC and the QICu, specifications that control for demographic effects (specifications III and VI) were most preferred.  
Note 5: Because the independent variables are all dichotomous, coefficients represents effects relative to references categories (i.e., give, neutral, man, no 
training, and no experience). 
Note 6: 𝐺𝑁𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁 represents the effects of the non-neutral language versus neutral language in the give treatment. 𝑇𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁 represents the effects of taking 
versus giving in the neutral treatment. 𝑇𝑁𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁𝑁 represents the effect of taking versus giving in the non-neutral treatment. 𝑇𝑁𝑁 − 𝑇𝑁 represents the effects 
of non-neutral language versus neutral language in the take treatment 
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Table 3.5: Mediation by beliefs 
w/ demographics 
Est. (CRSE) Est. (CRSE) Est. (CRSE) Est. (CRSE) Est. (CRSE) Est. (CRSE)
Estimates
Intercept 6.29 (1.05) *** 6.54 (1.18) *** -1.51 (0.72) ** -1.13 (0.76) 5.49 (0.94) *** 6.03 (1.21) ***
Action (reference = Give) -2.15 (1.29) * -2.18 (1.31) * 0.46 (0.43) 0.66 (0.39) * -1.95 (1.21) -1.73 (1.21)
Language (reference = Neutral) -2.65 (1.14) ** -2.68 (1.17) ** 0.65 (0.46) 0.47 (0.46) -2.30 (1.07) ** -2.47 (1.08) **
Action X Language 2.97 (1.73) * 3.01 (1.74) * -0.88 (0.54) * -0.68 (0.52) 2.43 (1.66) 2.62 (1.65)
Mean Per Person First Order Beliefs 1.11 (0.08) *** 1.10 (0.08) ***
Gender (reference = Man) -0.14 (0.16) -0.10 (0.34) -0.25 (0.36)
Economics (reference = No Training) -0.42 (0.43) -0.60 (0.33) * -1.06 (0.65) *
Experience (reference = No Experience) 0.15 (0.23) 0.09 (0.52) 0.25 (0.65)
Observations
QIC/QICu
Mean Differences
GNN-GN -2.65 (1.14) ** -2.68 (1.17) ** 0.65 (0.46) 0.47 (0.46) -2.30 (1.07) ** -2.47 (1.08) **
TNN-GNN 0.82 (1.15) 0.83 (1.14) -0.42 (0.24) * -0.02 (0.26) 0.49 (1.14) 0.88 (1.13)
TN-GN -2.15 (1.29) * -2.18 (1.31) * 0.46 (0.43) 0.66 (0.39) * -1.95 (1.21) * -1.73 (1.21)
TNN-TN 0.33 (1.30) 0.33 (1.27) -0.23 (0.25) -0.21 (0.19) 0.13 (1.27) 0.15 (1.27)
w/o demographics w/ demographics 
Eqn. (6)Eqn (5)
w/o demographics w/ demographics 
Eqn. (4)
w/o demographics
256 241
329/260 313/248 255/261 242/249 275/260 264/248
256 241 256 241
MEANCOOP i
Total EffectsDirect and Indirect Effects
MEANCOOP iMEANFOB i
 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.10 percent level. 
 
Note 1: GN = give neutral, GNN = give non-neutral, TN = take neutral, and TNN = take non-neutral. 
Note 2: In the first two columns, the dependent variable is mean per person first order beliefs. Otherwise, the dependent variable is mean per person 
cooperation.  
Note 3: Standard errors are cluster-robust (CRSE), clustered on session. 
Note 4: 𝐺𝑁𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁 represents the effects of the non-neutral language versus neutral language in the give treatment. 𝑇𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁 represents the effects of 
taking versus giving in the neutral treatment. 𝑇𝑁𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁𝑁 represents the effect of taking versus giving in the non-neutral treatment. 𝑇𝑁𝑁 − 𝑇𝑁 represents 
the effects of non-neutral language versus neutral language in the take treatment. 
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Table 3.6: Type moderated mediation: Coefficient estimates Dependent Variable:
Effects Est. (CRSE) Est. (CRSE) Est. (CRSE)
Estimates
Intercept 4.92 (1.08) *** -0.89 (0.64) 0.66 (0.33) **
Action (reference = Give) -1.07 (1.25) 0.75 (0.44) * 0.41 (0.37)
Language (reference = Neutral) -2.19 (1.16) * 0.89 (0.66) 0.21 (0.56)
Action X Language 2.22 (1.46) -0.25 (0.83) 0.45 (0.76)
Conditional Cooperator (CC) 1.99 (0.53) *** -1.43 (0.89) 5.81 (1.11) ***
Low Cooperator (LC) 0.45 (0.35) 1.28 (0.66) * 4.53 (0.96) ***
High Cooperator (HC) 1.08 (1.00) 1.88 (0.86) ** 9.09 (1.86) ***
Action X CC -1.24 (0.74) * 0.55 (0.40) -2.05 (1.46)
Action X LC -0.46 (0.50) -1.96 (0.44) *** -2.99 (1.10) ***
Action X HC -1.51 (1.10) -0.86 (1.44) -4.29 (2.31) *
Language X CC -0.90 (0.75) 0.62 (0.51) -2.62 (1.22) **
Language X LC 0.24 (0.85) -1.89 (1.08) * -2.94 (1.60) *
Language X HC 2.94 (1.16) ** -6.59 (0.60) *** -4.81 (2.12) **
Action X Language X CC 1.61 (1.06) -2.91 (1.02) *** 1.26 (1.72)
Action X Language X LC -0.92 (1.04) 2.07 (1.41) 2.53 (2.04)
Action X Language X HC -0.99 (1.41) 5.12 (2.19) ** 6.23 (3.37) *
Mean First Order Beliefs 0.31 (0.10) ***
Mean First Order Beliefs X CC 0.96 (0.15) ***
Mean First Order Beliefs X LC 0.58 (0.11) ***
Mean First Order Beliefs X HC 1.15 (0.14) ***
Gender (reference = Man)
Economics (reference = No Training)
Experience (reference = No Experience)
Observations
QIC/QICu
Direct and Indirect Effects Total Effects
MEANFOB i MEANCOOP i MEANCOOP i
256 256 256
321/272 274/272
Eqn. (7) Eqn. (8) Eqn. (9)
252/276
 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.10 percent level. 
 
Note 1: NC = non-cooperator. CC = conditional cooperator, LC = low cooperator, and HC = cooperator. 
Note 2: Standard errors are cluster robust (CRSE), clustered on session. 
Note 3: Models that included demographic variables were also estimated and yielded similar results. 
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Table 3.7: Type moderated mediation: Mean differences 
 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.10 percent level. 
 
Note 1: GN = give neutral, GNN = give non-neutral, TN = take neutral, and TNN = take non-neutral. 
Note 2: NC = non-cooperator. CC = conditional cooperator, LC = low cooperator, and HC = cooperator. 
Note 3: Standard errors are cluster robust (CRSE), clustered on session. 
Note 4: Models that included demographic variables were also estimated and yielded similar results. 
Note 5: 𝐺𝑁𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁 represents the effects of the non-neutral language versus neutral language in the give 
treatment. 𝑇𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁 represents the effects of taking versus giving in the neutral treatment. 𝑇𝑁𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁𝑁 
represents the effect of taking versus giving in the non-neutral treatment. 𝑇𝑁𝑁 − 𝑇𝑁 represents the effects of 
non-neutral language versus neutral language in the take treatment. 
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Table 3.8: Indirect, direct, and total effects of type moderation beliefs mediation 
a (CRSE) p b (CRSE) p ab
Sobel 
(SE) p c' (CRSE) p c (CRSE) p
Mediation (Eqns, 4, 5, & 6)
GNN-GN -2.65 (1.14) 0.0204 ** 1.11 (0.08) <.0001 *** -2.95 (3.03) 0.3321 0.65 (0.46) 0.1597 -2.30 (1.07) 0.0317 **
Moderated Mediation (Eqns. 7, 8, & 9)
NC GNN-GN -2.19 (1.16) 0.0586 * 0.31 (0.10) 0.0024 *** -0.69 (2.53) 0.7872 0.89 (0.66) 0.1734 0.21 (0.56) 0.7096
CC GNN-GN -3.09 (1.01) 0.0023 *** 1.27 (0.12) <.0001 *** -3.92 (3.12) 0.2077 1.51 (0.61) 0.0132 ** -2.41 (1.11) 0.0294 **
LC GNN-GN -1.95 (1.30) 0.1334 0.89 (0.06) <.0001 *** -1.73 (2.53) 0.4902 -1.00 (0.65) 0.1245 -2.73 (1.42) 0.0539 *
HC GNN-GN 0.75 (1.85) 0.6853 1.46 (0.12) <.0001 *** 1.10 (1.40) 0.4354 -5.70 (0.59) <.0001 *** -4.60 (2.27) 0.0427 **
Direct Effects Total EffectsIndirect Effects
 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.10 percent level. 
 
Note 1: GN = give neutral, GNN = give non-neutral, TN = take neutral, and TNN = take non-neutral. 
Note 2: NC = non-cooperator. CC = conditional cooperator, LC = low cooperator, and HC = cooperator. 
Note 3: Standard errors are cluster robust (CRSE), clustered on session. 
Note 4: 𝐺𝑁𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁 represents the effects of the non-neutral language versus neutral language in the give treatment. 𝑇𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁 represents the effects of 
taking versus giving in the neutral treatment. 𝑇𝑁𝑁 − 𝐺𝑁𝑁 represents the effect of taking versus giving in the non-neutral treatment. 𝑇𝑁𝑁 − 𝑇𝑁 represents 
the effects of non-neutral language versus neutral language in the take treatment. 
Note 5: The p-values for indirect effects (𝑎𝑏) employed the Sobel test (Hayes, 2013, pp. 102-103). 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The experiment 
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  Language 
 
  Neutral Non-Neutral 
Action 
Give 
 
Give-Neutral 
(GN) 
 
 
Give Non-Neutral 
(GNN) 
Take 
 
Take Neutral 
(TN) 
 
 
Take Non-Neutral 
(TNN) 
 
Figure 3.2: 2 × 2 Factorial framing design 
Note 1: Action and language are the two experimental treatments used to create four different frames. 
Note 2: Each of the frames was assigned to a different set of 4 sessions. 
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Moderation Model 
 
 
 
Statistical Model of Moderation 
 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑠 = 𝑖𝑇 + 𝑐1𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑠 + 𝑐2𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑠 + 𝑐3𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑠 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑠 + 𝜀𝑇 
 
Figure 3.3: Moderation
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Direct and Indirect Effects 
 
 
 
𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐹𝑂𝐵𝑖𝑠 = 𝑖𝑀 + 𝑎1𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 + 𝑎2𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + 𝑎3𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + 𝜀𝑀 
𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑠 = 𝑖𝑌 + 𝑐1
′ 𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 + 𝑐2
′ 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + 𝑐3
′ 𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + 𝑏𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐹𝑂𝐵𝑖 + 𝜀𝑌 
 
 
Total Effect 
 
 
 
𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑠 = 𝑖𝑇 + 𝑐1𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑠 + 𝑐2𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑠 + 𝑐3𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑠 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑠 + 𝜀𝑇 
 
Figure 3.4: Mediation
158 
 
Direct and Indirect Effects 
 
 
 
 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐹𝑂𝐵𝑖𝑠 = 𝑖𝑀 + 𝑎1𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 + 𝑎2𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + 𝑎3𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + 
 𝒂𝟒𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝒊 + 𝒂𝟓𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝒊 + 𝒂𝟔𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 × 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝒊 + 
 𝒄𝟕
′ 𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 × 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝒊 + 𝜀𝑀 
 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑠 = 𝑖𝑌 + 𝑐1
′ 𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 +  𝑐2
′ 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + 𝑐3
′ 𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + 
 𝒄𝟒
′ 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝒊 + 𝒄𝟓
′ 𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝒊 +  𝒄𝟔
′ 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 × 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝒊 + 
 𝒄𝟕
′ 𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 × 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝒊 + 
 𝑏1𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐹𝑂𝐵𝑖 + 𝒃𝟐𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐹𝑂𝐵𝑖 × 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝒊 + 𝜀𝑌 
 
Total Effect 
 
 
 
 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑠 = 𝑖𝑇 + 𝑐1𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 + 𝑐2𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + 𝑐3𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 + 
 𝒄𝟒𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝒊 + 𝒄𝟓𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑠 × 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝑖 + 𝒄𝟔𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑠 × 𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝒊 + 
 ACTs × LANGs × 𝐓𝐘𝐏𝐄𝐬 + εT 
 
Figure 3.5: Type moderated mediation
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 Average Cooperation, First Order Beliefs, and Second Order Beliefs (N=256) 
 
Median Cooperation, First Order Beliefs, and Second Order Beliefs (N=256) 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Average and median cooperation and beliefs for all participants 
Note 1: Cooperation (solid line); FOB = first order beliefs (dashed line). SOB= second order beliefs (dotted line). 
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Give Neutral (N=64) Give Non-Neutral (N=64) 
  
Take Neutral (N=64) Take Non-Neutral (N=64) 
  
 
Figure 3.7: Average cooperation, first order beliefs, and second order beliefs for every round paneled by frame 
Note 1: Cooperation (solid lines). FOB = first order beliefs (dashed lines). SOB= second order beliefs (dotted lines). 
161 
 
Non-Cooperators (N=48) Conditional Cooperators (N=131) 
  
Low Cooperators (N=60) High Cooperators (N=17) 
  
 
Figure 3.8: Average cooperation, first order beliefs, and second order beliefs for every round paneled by type 
Note 1: Cooperation (solid lines). FOB = first order beliefs (dashed lines). SOB= second order beliefs (dotted lines). 
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Predicted Mean Per Person Cooperation 
 
Predicted Mean Per Person First Order Beliefs 
 
Figure 3.9: Predictions of mean per person cooperation and mean per person first order beliefs
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IndirectEffect: 𝑎𝑏 = −2.94 (𝑝 = 0.3321) 
Direct Effect: 𝑐′ = −2.30 (𝑝 = 0.0317) 
Total Effect: 𝑐 = 0.65 (𝑝 = 0.1597) 
 
Figure 3.10: Mediation in the give treatment 
 
Note 1: ***Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.01 level. 
Note 2: The p-values for the direct and total effects were generated via regression analysis with cluster robust 
standard errors. The p-value for the indirect effect employed the Sobel test (Hayes, 2013, pp. 102-103).
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Non-cooperators in the give treatment Conditional cooperators in the give treatment 
 
Indirect Effect: 𝑎𝑏 =  −0.69 (𝑝 = 0.7872) 
Direct Effect: 𝑐′ = 0.89 (𝑝 = 0.1734) 
Total Effect: 𝑐 = 0.21 (𝑝 = 0.7096) 
 
Indirect Effect:𝑎𝑏 =  −3.92 (𝑝 = 0.2077) 
Direct Effect: 𝑐′ = 1.51 (𝑝 = 0.0132) 
Total Effect: 𝑐 =  −2.41  (𝑝 = 0.0294) 
Low cooperators in the give treatment High cooperators in the give treatment 
 
Indirect Effect: 𝑎𝑏 =  −1.73 (𝑝 = 0.4902) 
Direct Effect: 𝑐′ =  −1.00(𝑝 = 0.1245) 
Total Effect: 𝑐 = −2.73 (𝑝 = 0.0539) 
 
Indirect Effect: 𝑎𝑏 = 1.10 (𝑝 = 0.4354) 
Direct Effect: 𝑐′ =  −5.70 (𝑝 < 0.0001) 
Total Effect: 𝑐 = −4.60  (𝑝 = 0.0427) 
 
Figure 3.11 Median of non-neutral language in the give treatment by type 
Note 1: ***Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.01 level. 
Note 2: The p-values for the indirect effects (𝑎𝑏) employed the Sobel test (Hayes, 2013, p. 102-103). 
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Appendix 
Researcher Script and Instructions 
Notes on Framing 
This appendix contains a complete copy of the researcher script and instructions for the 
give non-neutral frame (GNN). Subtle, but important, differences in wording were used to 
create the give non-neutral (GNN), give neutral (GN), take non-neutral (TNN), and take neutral 
(TN) frames. Note that framing language was applied to every component of the experiment 
except the questionnaire. The questionnaire was identical for all frames. The earnings 
equations for each frame are given below to illustrate important differences: 
Give non-neutral: 
Total points-income = (20 – points you gave to the project account) + 0.4 × 
sum of all points given to the project account 
Give neutral: 
Total points-income = (20 – points you allocated to the project account) + 
0.4 × sum of all points allocated to the project 
account 
Take non-neutral: 
Total points-income = Points you took from the project account +  
0.4 × (80 - sum of all points taken from the 
project account) 
Take neutral: 
Total points-income = Points you allocated to your personal account +  
0.4 × (80 - sum of all points allocated to personal 
accounts) 
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Notes on the Script and Instructions 
Opening comments and requests were read to participants. The introduction and 
practice questions were provided to participants in hard copy, exactly as they appear below, 
and shown on participants’ computer screens. The introduction was also read aloud. The 
instructions for the practice question were read aloud, but the practice questions themselves 
were not. The remaining instructions, examples, requests for inputs, and results all appeared on 
the participants’ computer screens. Instructions and examples were read aloud, including the 
instructions preceding input requests. Results screens were not read aloud. Throughout, 
comments in square brackets were notes to the researcher that were not read aloud. 
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GIVE NON-NEUTRAL 
OPENNING COMMENTS AND REQUESTS 
 
Hello. Thank you all for coming today. Before we begin, I would like to make a few requests.  
 
First, please turn off your cell phones. [Pause to give them time to do this.]  
 
Please also put away all of your belongings, including your phone, so that the only things on 
your desk are  
 
 a packet labelled “Instructions” 
 a packet labelled “Receipts” and 
 a pencil. 
 
When the study has completed, I will ask you to leave, one by one. When you leave, please be 
sure to  
 
 take all of your belongings, and  
 leave the instructions and pencil at your station. 
 
Please listen to the following instructions closely. Follow along on the computer. Please also note 
that the first three pages or screens of instructions are also on your desk. You may reference 
them throughout the experiment, if you wish. I have also written some relevant information on 
the board behind me. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Please read the following instructions carefully. Depending on your decisions and the decisions 
of others, you can earn money in addition to the $5 that you receive for showing up. The entire 
amount of money you earn will be added up and paid to you in cash at the end of the study.  
 
These instructions are solely for your private information. You are not allowed to communicate 
during the study. Violation of this rule will lead to exclusion from the study. If excluded, you will 
be paid $5 for showing up plus current earnings. If you have questions, please raise your hand. A 
member of the research team will come to you and answer them in private.  
 
We will not speak of dollars during the study, but rather of points. Your income will be calculated 
in points, which will be called points-income. At the end of the study, total points-income will be 
converted to dollars at the following rate:  
 
1 point = 5 cents.  
 
All participants will be assigned randomly to groups of four members. Except for the research 
team, no one knows who is in which group.  
 
The experiment 
 
The experiment consists of a series of decision situations, as described below, that vary in how 
decisions are made. For every decision situation – called rounds - everyone is randomly assigned 
to a new group. As a result, it is almost certain that every decision you make will be made as 
part of a different 4-person group. 
 
The decision situation  
 
You will be a member of a group consisting of 4 people. To start, your personal account contains 
20 points. Every individual has 20 points in their personal account that they can distribute 
between their personal account and the project account in any way they like. For example, you 
can put all 20 points into your personal account, you can put all 20 points into the project account, 
or you can split the 20 points between the accounts. 
 
You will earn points from both accounts in every decision situation. You are the only one who will 
earn points from your personal account. However, everyone will profit equally from the total 
amount in the project account. The next screen explains in more detail how earnings are 
calculated in every decision situation. 
 
Please click OK. 
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INTRODUCTION (continued) 
 
The following describes how earnings are calculated in every decision situation. Please pay 
close attention. You will have an opportunity to check your understanding on the next screen. 
 
Your points-income from your personal account 
 
You will earn one point for each point in your personal account. For example, if you give 0 points 
to the project account, your points-income from your personal account will be exactly 20 – 0 = 
20 points. If you give 14 points to the project account, your points-income from your personal 
account will be 20 – 14 = 6 points. No one except you earns something from your personal 
account.  
 
Points-income from your personal account = 20 – points you gave to the project account 
 
Your points-income from the project account 
  
Each group member will profit equally from the total amount in the project account. The points-
income from the project account for each group member will be determined as follows:  
 
Points-income from the project account = 0.4 × sum of all points given to the project 
account 
 
If, for example, the sum of all points given to the project account is 60 points, then you and the 
three other members of your group each earn 0.4 × 60 = 24 points from the project account. If 
the sum of all points given to the project account is 10 points, you and the three other members 
of your group each earn 0.4 × 10 = 4 points from the project account.  
 
Your total points-income 
 
Your total points-income is the sum of your points-income from your personal account and your 
points-income from the project account. 
 
Total points-income = (20 – points you gave to the project account) + 0.4 × 
sum of all points given to the project account 
 
Please click OK.  
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PRACTICE QUESTIONS 
 
The following questions will help you understand the calculation of your total points-income. 
Please provide all of your answers in points and enter your responses on the computer.  
 
You must answer all the questions correctly before we continue with the study. Raise your 
hand if you have questions. A member of the research team will answer your questions 
privately. There is a calculator at the bottom right of your screen for your use. 
 
For each question, everyone’s personal account contains 20 points. Every individual may 
distribute the 20 points in their personal account between their personal account and the project 
account in any way they like. 
 
Once you have answered all of the questions, click OK. 
 
1. Everyone, including you, gives 0 points to the project account. 
 
 
 a) What will your total points-income be?   _______ 
 b) What will the total points-income be for each of the other group members? _______ 
 
2. 
 
Everyone, including you, gives 20 points to the project account. 
 
 
 a) What will your total points-income be? _______ 
 b) What will the total points-income be for each of the other group members? _______ 
 
3. 
 
The other 3 members give a total of 30 points to the project account. 
 
 
 a) What will your total points-income be, if you give 0 points to the project 
account? 
_______ 
 b) What will your total points-income be, if you give 10 points to the project 
account? 
_______ 
 c) What will your total points-income be, if you give 15 points to the project 
account? 
_______ 
 
4. 
 
Assume that you give 8 points to the project. 
 
 
 a) What will your total points-income be if the other group members give a total 
of 7 points to the project account? 
_______ 
 b) What will your total points-income be if the other group members give a total 
of 12 points to the project account? 
_______ 
 c) What will your total points-income be if the other group members give a total 
of 22 points to the project account? 
_______ 
   
  
171 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE UNCONDITIONAL DECISION AND CONDITIONAL DECISION TABLE 
 
You have been randomly assigned to a group of 4 individuals. The decision situation is exactly as 
originally described (see handout). In this round, each individual has to make two types of 
decisions, an “unconditional decision” and “conditional decisions.” 
 
There are 20 points in your personal account. 
 
First, you decide how many of the 20 points in your personal account you want to give to the 
project account. You have no knowledge of others’ decisions. This is the “unconditional 
decision.”  
 
Again, there are 20 points in your personal account. 
 
Your second task is to fill in a “conditional decision” table. Suppose you know the average 
number of points that the three other members of your group gave to the project. You will 
enter the number of points out of 20 in your personal account that you would give to the project 
account for each possible average number of points given to the project account by the other 
three group members. For example, you have to decide how many points you would give to the 
project account knowing that the others in your group each gave 0 points to the project account. 
You also will have to decide how much you would give to the project account if the average 
number of points given by others to the project account was 1, 2, 3, etc.  
 
After all participants have made an “unconditional” decision and have filled in their “conditional 
decision” table, a group member will be selected randomly from every group. The “conditional 
decision” table will be the payoff-relevant decision for the randomly determined subject. The 
“unconditional decision” will be the payoff-relevant decision for the other three group 
members. You obviously do not know whether the random mechanism will select you. Think 
carefully about both types of decisions because either one could be relevant for you.  
 
Two examples should make this clear. Click OK to see the examples. 
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EXAMPLES 
 
EXAMPLE 1: Assume that the random mechanism selected you. This implies that your relevant 
decision will come from your “conditional decision” table. The “unconditional decision” is the 
relevant decision for the other three group members. Suppose that the average number of points 
given to the project account by the other three group members was 2 points. If you indicated in 
your “conditional decision” table that you will give 1 point to the project account if others gave 
2 points on average to the project account, then the total amount given to the project account is 
3×2+1=7 points. Therefore, all group members earn 0.4×7=2.8 points from the project account 
plus their respective points from their personal accounts. Your total points-income would be (20 
– 1) + 2.8 = 21.8 points. 
 
EXAMPLE 2: Assume that the random mechanism did not select you, so that the “unconditional 
decision” is the payoff-relevant decision for you and two other group members. Assume your 
unconditional decision was to give 13 points to the project account, and the “unconditional 
decisions” of two other group members were 0 and 20 points. Therefore, the average number of 
points given to the project account by you and the two other group members was (13 + 0 +20)/3 
= 11 points. If the group member whom the random mechanism selected indicated in her 
“conditional decision” table that she would give 17 points to the project account if the other 
three group members on average gave 11 points to the project account, then the total number 
of points given to the project account was 13+0+20+17=50 points. Therefore, all group members 
earn 0.4×50=20 points from the project account plus the points in their respective personal 
accounts. Your total points-income would be (20 – 13) + 20 = 27 points. 
 
Click OK. Then read and complete the “unconditional decision” and “conditional decision” table. 
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UNCONDITIONAL DECISION 
 
There are 20 in your personal account. 
 
Your “unconditional decision” is the number of points, up to 20, that you would give to the 
project account without any knowledge of others’ decisions. Please enter your “unconditional 
decision.”  
 
You may enter any whole number from 0 to 20. Then click OK. 
 
How many points would you give to the project account?  
 
[Verbally remind participants to click OK if there appears to be a delay.]  
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CONDITIONAL DECISION TABLE 
 
To start, there were 20 points in each personal account. 
 
The numbers in the table below are possible averages of the number of points given to the 
project account by the three other group members. In the boxes to the right of each average, 
enter the number of points, up to 20, that you would give to the project account based on the 
average number of points given to the project account by others. 
 
You may enter any whole number from 0 to 20. After you have made an entry in every box, click 
OK. 
 
Average Number of 
points others gave to 
the project account 
Number of points 
you would give to 
the project 
account 
 Average number of 
points others gave 
to the project 
account 
Number of points 
you would give to 
the project account 
     
0   10  
     
1   11  
     
2   12  
     
3   13  
     
4   14  
     
5   15  
     
6   16  
     
7   17  
     
8   18  
     
9   19  
     
   20  
 
[Verbally remind participants to click OK if there appears to be a delay.]  
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RESULTS 
 
You were (were not) randomly selected. Therefore, your “conditional (unconditional) decision” 
was the payoff-relevant decision for you. After you have reviewed the results, please click OK. 
 
Number of points you gave to the project account:  
Average number of points others gave to the project 
account: 
 
Your total points-income based on your conditional 
(unconditional) decision: 
 
 
[Verbally remind participants to click OK if there appears to be a delay. Results are rounded to 
the nearest whole number.]  
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NEXT TEN ROUNDS 
 
In the next 10 rounds, groups will be reassigned at the beginning of each round so that you are 
part of a different 4 person group. The decision situation is exactly as originally described (see 
handout).  
 
There are 20 points in your personal account. Every individual has 20 points in their personal 
account to distribute between their personal account and the project account in any way they 
like. Total points-income for each round will be calculated as originally described. Specifically,  
 
Total points-income = (20 - points you gave to the project account) + 
0.4 × sum of all points given to the project account 
 
In each of the next 10 rounds, you have to make three inputs: 
 
First, decide how many points you will give to the project account. That is, you have to decide 
how to distribute the 20 points in your personal account between the project account and your 
personal account. Your decision is “unconditional.” You must make this decision without knowing 
what others will do. 
 
Second, estimate the average number of points given to the project account by the other three 
group members, rounded to the nearest whole number.  
 
Third, estimate the average that the other three group members stated as their estimate for 
the average number of points given to the project account, rounded to the nearest whole 
number. 
 
You will be awarded points in addition to your total points-income based on the accuracy of your 
estimates. For each of your two estimates: 
 
 If your estimate is exactly right (after the actual average amount has been rounded to the 
nearest whole number), you will get 3 points in addition to your total points-income. 
 If your estimate deviates by 1 point from the actual, rounded average, you will get 2 points 
in addition to your total points-income. 
 If your estimate deviates by 2 or more points from the actual, rounded average, you will 
not get any additional points. 
 
Click OK. Then read and complete the following ten rounds of decisions and estimates. 
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ROUND (round number) DECISION AND ESTIMATES 
 
You have been randomly assigned to a new group.  
 
There are 20 points in your personal account. You may distribute those 20 points between 
your personal account and the project account in any way you like. 
 
Please enter the number of point you will give to the project account. Enter your estimate for 
the average number of points the other three group members’ will give to the project account. 
Enter your estimate of the average of the other three group members’ estimates of the average 
number of points others will give to the project account.  
 
Enter whole numbers from 0 to 20. After you have made your entries, click OK. 
 
How many points will you give to the project account?  
  
How many points on average do you think others will give to 
the project account? 
 
  
On average, what do you think the other three members of 
your group will estimate for the average number of points 
others will give to the project account? 
 
 
[Verbally remind participants to click OK if there appears to be a delay.]  
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ROUND (round number) RESULTS 
 
Below are the results of round (round number). After you have reviewed the results, click OK. 
 
Number of points you gave to the project account  
  
Average number of points others gave to the project account  
  
Your total points-income from this round, not including 
additional points from estimates 
 
  
Your additional points from your two estimates  
 
[Verbally remind participants to click OK if there appears to be a delay. Results are rounded to 
the nearest whole number.]  
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with each of the following statements. You must respond to every statement. Then 
click OK. 
 
Before making my decisions,        Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
I felt ownership of all of the possible project points.      o o o o o 
I felt ownership of only my 20 points.        o o o o o 
 
During the study:           Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
I wanted to earn as many points as I could.        o o o o o 
I wanted others to earn as many points as they could.      o o o o o 
I wanted to earn more points than others earned.       o o o o o 
I felt responsible only for myself, not for others, and not for the project.    o o o o o 
 
Allocating points to my personal account made me feel good.     o o o o o 
Allocating points to the project account made me feel good.     o o o o o 
I felt good when others allocated points to the project account.     o o o o o 
I felt bad when others allocated points to their personal accounts.    o o o o o 
 
I felt obligated to allocate points to the project account.     o o o o o 
I felt like I had to allocate as many points to the project account as others did.   o o o o o 
I felt that others were obligated to allocate points to the project account.   o o o o o 
I felt that others were obligated to allocate as many points to the project account  o o o o o 
as I did. 
 
I felt cheated when others allocated points to their personal accounts.    o o o o o 
I felt cheated when others allocated more points to their personal accounts than I did. o o o o o 
I was worried that others would allocate nothing to the project account.    o o o o o 
I had to allocate points to my personal account because I expected the project account  o o o o o  
to be small.  
180 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE (continued) 
 
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with each of the following statements. You must respond to every statement. Then 
click OK. 
 
Thinking back over the study,         Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
 
I fully understood the decision situation throughout the study.     o o o o o 
I understood the decision situation better over time.       o o o o o 
I was confused throughout the study.         o o o o o 
 
Overall            Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
I was very satisfied with the results of the decision situations.      o o o o o 
I believe that others were very satisfied with the results of the decision situations.  o o o o o 
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QUESTIONNAIRE (continued) 
 
Please answer as many of the following questions as you like. Responding to these questions is optional. Then click OK. 
 
What is your age?       
What is your gender?   o Male  o Female 
Are you a student?   o  US Student o  International Student  o  Non-student 
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QUESTIONNAIRE (continued) 
 
Please answer as many of the following questions as you like. Responding to these questions is optional. Then click OK. 
 
If you are not a student, in what occupation do you currently work? Please answer according to your most recent 
employment if you are not employed. 
 
  o Management, Business, and Financial 
  o  Computer, Engineering, and Science 
  o  Education, Legal, Community Service, Arts, and Media 
  o  Healthcare Practitioners and Technicians 
  o  Service  
  o  Sales and Related 
  o  Office and Administrative Support 
  o  Farming, Fishing, and Forestry 
  o  Construction and Extraction 
  o  Installation, Maintenance, and Repair 
  o  Production 
  o  Transportation and Material Moving 
  o  Military 
 
If you are a student, in what school or program are you currently enrolled.If you are enrolled in more than one, select the 
one that most closely matches your area of concentration. 
  o  Architecture and Urban Planning 
  o  Art & Design 
  o  Business 
  o  Dentistry 
  o  Education 
  o  Engineering 
  o  School of Information 
  o  Kinesiology 
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  o  Law 
  o  Literature, Science, and the Arts 
  o  Medicine 
  o  Music, Theatre, and Dance 
  o  Natural Resources and Environment 
  o  Nursing 
  o  Pharmacy 
  o  Public Health 
  o  Public Policy 
  o  Social Work 
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QUESTIONNAIRE (continued) 
 
Please answer as many of the following questions as you like. Responding to these questions is optional. Then click OK. 
 
Have you previously participated in a study like this one? 
 o  No 
 o  Yes, once, not including this study 
 o  Yes, more than once, not including this study 
 o  Don’t know 
 
Are you trained in economics?  
 o  No, I have never taken any courses in economics 
 o  Yes, I have taken one or two courses in economics 
 o  Yes, I have taken more than two courses in economics 
  o  Don’t Know 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The entire experiment is finished. Your income from the entire experiment includes: 
 
 Your earnings from your unconditional decision and conditional decision table (total 
points-income × $0.05). 
 Your earnings from rounds 1 through 10 (total points-income × $0.05 for every round). 
 Your earnings for correct estimates in rounds 1 through 10 (additional points × $0.05 for 
every round). 
 $5 compensation just for showing-up. 
 
Therefore, your total earnings from the entire study, rounded up to the next dollar are 
__________.  
 
Thank you for your participation! Please  
 
 Complete both copies of the paper receipt at your station, 
 Quietly pack up your things, and  
 Leave the paper instructions and pencil at your station.  
 
When your station number is called, come to the researcher area in the back of the room for 
payment. Bring the completed receipts and all of your things.  
 
Click OK when you are ready to clear this screen. 
 
[Verbally remind participants to click OK if there appears to be a delay. Call participants to the 
back of the room one-by-one to receive payments in a blank envelope.] 
